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Chapter 1
Introduction to Behavioral Economics
1.1 The Goal of this Dissertation
This dissertation familiarizes the reader with some recent advances in applied
behavioral economics, especially behavioral industrial organization. To set up
the stage for these newest developments, this chapter gives a general back-
ground and perspective on behavioral economics, and introduces the models
of individual decisionmaking that will be used by the applied models.
1.2 What Is Behavioral Economics?
Psychology and economics—often also called “behavioral economics”—is not
an easy field to define. In my view, it is not even really a field of economics at
all, but more like a way of thinking about and doing research in any field. It
is a mindset: the belief that economists should aspire to making assumptions
about humans that are as realistic as possible, and hence that we should
develop methods and habits to learn what is psychologically realistic.
What does this mindset entail? In a large part, it is not at all different
from the mindset of the overwhelming majority of modern economics. We
conceptualize economic phenomena by starting from individual behavior that
is goal-driven: people try to understand their environment and to achieve
their goals to the extent possible within the constraints they have. As in
almost any field of economics, our aim is to understand how the goal-driven
individual behavior plays out in different economic environments and what
the welfare consequences are. Some of the habits and criteria we use in our
teaching and research are therefore identical to those used by most economists.
We formalize ideas using mathematical models, in which decisionmakers are
1
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
often highly sophisticated. In our models and explanations, we highly value
simplicity as well as generality, and in fact view this as a major advantage of
many of the ideas we propose. And we recognize that markets and incentives
play an important role in shaping behavior, that one of the main goals of
economic analysis is to evaluate the performance of market institutions and
policies, and that therefore it is important to test ideas using data on market
behavior. All this means that psychology and economics is a field of economics
rather than psychology.
But there is a part of the habit and mindset of psychology and economics
that is more new. Namely, we study more carefully and in more detail than
most neoclassical economists what motivates people and how they go about
maximizing their well-being. Our interest in “unpacking” how people might
be thinking about and making decisions in turn implies an attentiveness and
open-mindedness toward exploring behavior through experiments and surveys,
and especially toward research in psychology, the other social sciences, and
the brain sciences. What emerges from this investigation is a more nuanced,
more detailed, and more accurate picture of individual economic actors than
is typical in economics. But once we incorporate the more detailed knowledge
of decisionmaking into our hypotheses, our goal is to understand economic
consequences, especially market outcomes and welfare effects.
In some ways, the developments that led to the current field of behav-
ioral economics are no different from those in game theory and information
economics several decades ago. In both of these fields, researchers replaced
previous—useful but simplistic—assumptions with more realistic and more de-
tailed premises, and tremendously improved our understanding of economics
as a result. Before the introduction of game theory into the field of industrial
organization, many researchers thought of firm behavior in the market either
in terms of perfect competition or in terms of monopoly. With game theory, it
became possible to analyze intermediate cases more fully, and to understand
how a firm’s strategic decisions depend on its information, resources, and the
structure of the industry. Similarly, firm behavior has and still is often usefully
conceptualized in terms of profit maximization (including in this dissertation).
Information economics, however, recognizes and assumes that a firm involves
multiple individuals with possibly different motives and information. This
allows a more nuanced understanding of the firm that is useful in many cir-
cumstances, such as when trying to understand the boundaries of the firm and
the labor market.
Psychology and economics does something similar, but where it expands or
improves previous assumptions is in the realm of individual decisionmaking.
As with the above developments, this is more useful in some settings than
2
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in others. This dissertation covers models of individual decisionmaking and
applications that I believe are very important economically.
The historical development of behavioral economics can be categorized
into three overlapping waves. In the first wave (which happened mostly in
the 1970’s and 80’s), researchers identified systematic and important ways
in which economic theory had been wrong, and suggested alternative ways
of understanding behavior based on simple psychological principles. In the
second wave (most of which started in the 90’s, and which is still going on
today), economists formally modeled some of the alternatives, and established
their empirical importance in the laboratory and the field. Finally, the third
wave (most of which started in the 2000’s) involves full integration of the
new psychologically based models into economic analysis, to address the same
questions economists have always been interested in: how individual behavior
plays out in organizations and markets, what the welfare consequences are,
and how policy should respond to market outcomes.
The applications in this dissertation belong solidly in third-wave behavioral
economics. They are built on a simple common principle of an asymmetry be-
tween consumers and firms. On the one hand, individual consumers are likely
to be subject to the psychological phenomena documented by psychologists
and behavioral economists. Hence, we assume that consumers exhibit these
phenomena when making decisions in the marketplace. On the other hand,
firms face incentives to maximize profits and have substantial resources and
can create complex systems to make this happen. To capture this in an ex-
treme way, we assume that they do not exhibit the psychological phenomena
in question at all, but instead act as classical profit-maximizing firms.
The next two sections introduce the models of consumer behavior that will
be used in later chapters. I introduce the taste for immediate gratification,
which will be used in Chapter 2, in the next section. Then, I introduce loss
aversion, which will be used in Chapters 3 and 4.
1.3 The Taste for Immediate Gratification
This section formalizes the taste for immediate gratification, and possible
naivete regarding this taste, as modeled using the β-δ approach by Laibson
(1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). While I present some evidence as
a way of motivating the model, I do not attempt to cover the broad array of
evidence that has been accumulated over the years in favor of the model. For
excellent reviews of the evidence, see Rabin (1998) and DellaVigna (2009).
3
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Figure 1.1: Estimated Annual δ’s from Economics Research
1.3.1 Introduction: The Need to Move Beyond Exponential Discount-
ing
The standard theory for modeling intertemporal choices in economics is Samuel-
son’s exponential-discounting model. In a version of this model, an agent
making a decision at time t aims to maximize
ut + δut+1 + δ
2ut+2 + · · · =
∑
τ≥t
δτ−tuτ ,
where uτ is the instantaneous utility at time τ and δ is the agent’s discount fac-
tor. The discount factor measures the proportional discount the agent applies
to any one-period delay: instantaneous utility at any time is worth δ times as
much as instantaneous utility in the previous period. In this model, the single
variable that captures intertemporal preferences is δ. So it is little wonder
that economists have tried to estimate δ over the years. Taken from Freder-
ick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002), Figure 1.1 illustrates estimates of
annual δ’s from economics research in the years 1975-2002. As is clear from
the figure, there is tremendous variation in the estimates.
4
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That economists’ estimates of δ are all over the place could mean three
things. It could mean that economists have not made much progress in con-
verging on a good estimate of δ, and that we need much more research to
figure out which estimates are right. It could also mean that the discount fac-
tor is wildly variable across different situations and populations in a way that
follows no logical pattern, so that there is no hope in pinning down an even
approximate value for it. I find it implausible that these explanations provide
a full account for the dispersion in measured δ’s, and hence will take a third
perspective (one that I will argue helps explain the data): that δ simply can-
not be measured accurately because the exponential discounting model tries
to cram too much into this single parameter. Exactly as Samuelson intended,
the model is an excellent way of conceptualizing and thinking about the fact
that people make intertemporal tradeoffs, and the discount factor is a useful
“summary statistic” for how much the decisionmaker cares about the future
in the particular situation. But intertemporal choice is a reflection of many
psychological processes, some of which are more conducive to patience and
some of which are more conducive to impatience. In addition, these forces are
relevant in different choice problems to different degrees, so an economist who
ignores them and tries to fit a single parameter onto every situation will keep
measuring a different δ each time. Hence, the exponential discounting model
is not a good model to shed light on how behavior varies across situations,
and understanding the underlying psychological processes better will help us
understand the variation better. As the most important example, I study
self-control problems in this dissertation.
1.3.2 Short-Run Desires Versus Long-Run Goals
This section discusses two types of motivation for the model of hyperbolic
discounting I introduce in the next section, both covering the model’s basic
features and illustrating its economic importance. First, when it comes to
tradeoffs between now and the near future, people are quite impatient. Second,
when it comes to tradeoffs between nearby future dates, people are much more
patient.
Evidence on Impatience in Short-Run Decisions
I begin this section by describing evidence from a range of decisionmaking
situations showing that individuals can be quite impatient when it comes to
choices that implicate immediate pleasures and pains. A common and eco-
nomically relevant example is the so-called payday effect : individuals who live
5
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6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
from paycheck to paycheck spend a lot of their income immediately after get-
ting paid. Huffman and Barenstein (2005), for instance, document that the
consumption of working households in the United Kingdom is 18% higher the
week after their payday than the week before. This indicates that when they
get paid, they are eager to consume, and do not care so much that they will
be suffering a few weeks down the line when they run out of money. Moti-
vated by the same hypothesis, Shapiro (2005) finds that the caloric intake of
food-stamp recipients declines by 13-14% over the month, while expenditure
on food declines by about 20% over the month (indicating that households
switch to less expensive foods over the course of the month). Shapiro argues
that a high degree of short-run impatience is the most likely explanation for
his findings, and rules out some alternative possible explanations.1
People’s impatience regarding consumption is reflected not only in their
spending a lot of their available funds immediately after they receive it, but also
in their eagerness to borrow from future income. One expensive form of short-
term borrowing is through credit cards, and in countries where credit cards are
widely available, credit-card debt tends to be quite high. For example, in the
United States in January 2012, the amount of outstanding revolving debt held
by households (most of which is credit-card debt) was $800.9 billion. That is
about $6,975 per household, including households that do not carry revolving
debt. As of November 2011, the average interest rate on credit-card accounts
with debt was 12.78%.2 And credit cards are among the cheaper forms of
short-term credit. One of the most expensive forms of (legal) borrowing in
the United States is from one’s upcoming paycheck. About 10 million people
borrow money through payday loans, and do so at annualized compounded
percentage rates often exceeding 1000%. Yet there are more payday-loan and
check-cashing outlets in the United States than there are McDonald’s and
Starbucks combined.
1 In an interesting—if somewhat sad—twist to the payday effect, Hastings and Wash-
ington (2010) document that store pricing responds to the effect: in areas with a lot of
food-stamp recipients (but not in other areas), prices rise at the time beneficiaries receive
their food stamps. This reaction is especially relevant for the current dissertation. Chapters
2-4 study how profit-maximizing firms react to consumers’ psychological phenomena, and
the paper by Hastings and Washington demonstrates in a compelling way that firms do this.
2Source for these statistics: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/
current/. It is worth mentioning that households use credit cards not only for imme-
diate consumption, but also for purchases such as durables. One of the main results of
Section 2 is showing that such purchases can also be understood in terms of the taste for
immediate gratification.
6
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y z median x yearly δ
$15 1 month 20 0.032
$15 ten years 100 0.83
$40 six months 50 0.64
$40 four years 90 0.82
Table 1.1: Some Findings of Thaler (1981)
Patience in Decisions About the Future
All the situations discussed in the previous section implicate the possibility of
immediate or near-immediate monetary receipts or consumption. I now argue
that the high level of impatience people display is specific to such situations:
for similar tradeoffs that are further in the future, individuals tend to be more
patient, so that exponential discounting cannot capture their attitudes toward
delay for both short-run and long-run decisions.
The simplest way to see this is to carry out some thought experiments on
the implications of applying the above type of impatience to intertemporal
tradeoffs in general. Specifically, If a level of impatience that seems reasonable
for short-run delays is applied to any delay of equal length, the implied level of
impatience over long-run delays would be unreasonable. To illustrate, consider
some simple arithmetic:
0.99365×10 ≈ 1
8541609622012070
and 0.9993×365×10 ≈ 1
57266
.
If a person values tomorrow just one percent less than today—so that she
ever-so-slightly prefers to put off an unpleasant task until tomorrow, even if
that means the task becomes ever-so-slightly more difficult to perform—and
applies the same preference to any one-day delay, she must value anything
that happens in 10 years as totally insignificant relative to what happens
today. Similarly, if she ever-so-slightly prefers to put off doing something from
the morning to the evening, she must value today 57,266 times as much as 10
years from now (so she would not invest $100 to get $5 million in ten years).
These simple calculations suggest that the kind of short-run impatience
found in the previous section cannot possibly describe intertemporal trade-
offs over longer horizons. Indeed, there is also direct evidence indicating that
people are more impatient over short-term decisions than over long-term de-
cisions. For instance, Thaler (1981) asked questions of the following form:
“What amount x makes you indifferent between $y today and $x in z time?”
7
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362 Journal of Economic Li terature,  Vo l .  X L  (June  2002) 
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Figure l a .  Discount Factor as a Function of Time 
Horizon (all studies) 
although they did not interpret their 
results the same way. 
If Read is correct about subadditive 
discounting, its main implication for 
economic applications may be to provide 
an alternative psychological underpin-
ning for using a hyperbolic discount 
function, because most intertemporal 
decisions are based primarily on dis-
counting from the present.17 
17.4 few studies have actually found increasing 
discount rates. Frederick (1999) asked 228 respon- 
dents to imagine that they worked at a job that 
consisted of both leasant work (" ood days") and 
unpleasant work Fbad days") an$ to equate the 
attractiveness of having additional good days this 
year or in a future year. On average, respondents 
were indifferent between 20 extra good days this 
year, 21 the following year, or 40 in five years, 
im lying a one-year discount rate of 5 percent and 
a {ve-year discount rate of 15 percent A possible 
explanation is that a desire for improvement is 
evoked more strong1 for two successive years 
(this year and next) t xan for two separated years 
(this ear and five years hence). Rubinstein (2000) 
askedstudents in a political science class to choose 
between the following two payment sequences: 
March 1 June 1 Sept 1 Nov 1 
A: $997 $997 $997 $997 
April 1 July1 Oct 1 Dec 1 
B: $1000 $1000 $1000 $1000 
Then, two weeks later, he asked them to choose 
between $997 on November 1 and $1000 on 
December 1. Fifty-four ercent of respondents 
referred $997 in Novernier to $1000 in Decem- 
%er, but only 34 percent preferred sequence A to 
sequence B. These two results suggest increasing 
discount rates. To explain them Rubinstein specu- 
lated that the three more proximate additional ele- 
time horizon (years) 
Figu,re l b .  Discount Factor as a Function of Time 
Horizon (studies with avg. horizons > 1year) 
4.2 Other DU Anomalies 
The DU model not only dictates that 
the discount rate should be constant for 
all time periods; it also assumes that the 
discount rate should be the same for all 
types of goods and all categories of 
intertemporal decisions. There are sev- 
eral empirical regularities that appear to 
contradict this assumption, namely: 
(1) gains are discounted more than
. , V 
losses; (2)  small amounts are discounted 
more than large amounts; (3)  greater 
discounting is shown to avoid delay 
of a good than to expedite its receipt; 
(4)  in choices over sequences of 
outcomes, improving sequences are 
often preferred to declining sequences 
though positive time preference dic-
tates the opposite; and (5) in choices 
over sequences, violations of indepen- 
dence are pervasive, and people seem 
to prefer spreading consumption over 
time in a way that diminishing marginal 
utility alone cannot explain. 
4.2.1 	The "Sign Effect" (gains are 
discounted more than losses) 
Many studies have concluded that 
gains are discounted at a higher rate 
than losses. For  instance, Thaler (1981) 
ments may have masked the differences in the 
timing of the sequence of dated amounts, while 
making the differences in amounts more salient. 
Figure 1.2: Estimated Discount Factors as a Function of the Time
Delay in Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002)
For each possible time delay z, one can calculate the equivalent yearly dis-
count factor δ, and see how δ depends on the time delay. Table 1.1 gives some
of Thaler’s findings. Clearly, the longer is the time delay, the larger is the
implied yearly δ, indicating that individuals tend to become more patient on
longer-run decisions.
Frederick and Loewenstei (1999) repeat the same exercise as Thaler, but
do so using economists’ estimates of yearly discount factors rather than hy-
pothetical choices. Figure 1.2 graphs the estimated yearly discount factor δ
as a function of the delay in the decisionmaking situation based on which δ
was estimated. Just like in Thaler’s case, the relationship is clearly and sig-
nificantly positive. Hence, from analyses using different sources of data and
different methods, the same pattern emerges over and over again: short-run
discount factors are lower than long-run discount factors.
1.3.3 Modeling the Conflict Between Short-Run Desires and Long-Run
Go ls
Discounted Utility Function
As argued in detail in the previous section, evidence suggests that people
discount nearby events quite heavily, but they are more patient for events
8
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further away. Recent research has given rebirth to attempts to incorporate this
pattern, and the interpersonal conflict it generates, formally into economics. In
this section, I consider a modification of exponential discounting that captures
these forces, and investigate some consequences of the new formulation.
Recall that Samuelson’s exponentially discounted utility model says that
utility at time t is
ut + δut+1 + δ
2ut+2 + δ
3ut+3 + . . . .
Instead of Samuelson’s formulation, Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Ra-
bin (1999) assume that at time t, a person aims to maximize
ut + βδut+1 + βδ
2ut+2 + βδ
3ut+3 + . . .
with 0 < β ≤ 1. This is the hyperbolic discounting or (more precisely) quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model. The extra parameter β that applies to all future
periods captures the extra discounting people apply to the future relative to
the present due to their taste for immediate gratification. Since they apply
β to all future periods equally, this means that they are relatively impatient
when it comes to tradeoffs between the present and the future, but they are
relatively patient when it comes to tradeoffs that occur in the future. And
since β captures the extra discounting that occurs between the present and
the future, it can be thought of as the short-run discount factor. When β = 1,
so that there is no extra discounting on the future, we get back to exponential
discounting.
Analyzing the Model: Sophistication versus Naivete
To illustrate how to work with the hyperbolic discounting model, as well as
to raise an additional issue, I demonstrate some of its implications in a simple
decision. This analysis is based on O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
Consider a student’s decision of when to do a problem set. She could do
it right after lecture (t = 0), when she remembers the material very well, or
tomorrow (t = 1), when she remembers the material less well, or the day after
tomorrow (t = 2), when she has forgotten everything. Because of this, the
cost of doing the problem set increases, the later she does it. At date 0, the
instantaneous disutility (immediate cost) of doing the problem set is 1. At
date 1, the instantaneous disutility of doing the problem set is 3/2. At date
2, the instantaneous disutility of doing the problem set is 5/2. The student is
a hyperbolic discounter with β = 1/2 and δ = 1.
To begin thinking about this example, first assume that the student can
decide at time 0 when to do the problem set. This means, for example, that
9
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10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
she can decide at time 0 to do the problem set at time 1. Because she can
decide what she will do in the future, we say that the student can commit or
has access to commitment. For example, she could set up a study group that
she cannot cancel later (or that is prohibitively costly to cancel later).
Since the student has different preferences at different points in time, we
refer to her in multiple ways that reflect her changing preferences: we let self
0 be the period-0 incarnation of the student, self 1 her period-1 incarnation,
and self 2 her period-2 incarnation. To decide when self 0 would like to do
the problem set, we have to look at the discounted costs of doing it from the
perspective of period 0:
• If the problem set is done in period 0, the discounted cost is 1.
• If the problem set is done in period 1, the discounted cost is 1
2
· 3
2
= 3
4
.
• If the problem set is done at period 2, the discounted cost is 1
2
· 5
2
= 5
4
.
Because it minimizes the discounted cost of doing the problem set, self 0
commits to doing it in period 1. Intuitively, because of her taste for immediate
gratification, the student prefers to delay—because she cares much more about
the present than about the future, she is willing to put off the task even though
she knows it will become harder. But because she is more patient when it
comes to future tradeoffs, she does not want to delay more than one period.
Now suppose that the student has no access to a commitment technology.
So, in both period 0 and period 1, she freely decides whether she does the
problem set then or later (at date 2, she has to do it if she has not already
finished it). It would still be the case that self 0 would want to do the problem
set at time 1. Would she actually do it at time 1? To answer this, we look at
discounted costs from the perspective of period 1:
• If the problem set is done in period 1, the discounted cost is 3
2
.
• If the problem set is done in period 2, the discounted cost is 5
4
.
So she now prefers to do the problem set at time 2. Because the student’s
earlier preference for what she should do at a later point (her period-0 prefer-
ence for doing the problem set at time 1) is different from what she wants to
do when the time comes (her period-1 preference to delay doing the problem
set), the student is dynamically inconsistent. This intertemporal conflict leads
to a self-control problem: the student wants to exercise self-control tomorrow,
but once tomorrow come she may not want to.
10
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But given this conflict, when does the student actually do the problem set?
It turns out that with the information introduced so far, it is impossible to
answer this question. To understand how the self-control problem plays out,
we need to know whether the student is aware that she will change her mind
in the future. There are two extreme assumptions one can make in this regard.
Naive decisionmakers are not aware of their own self-control problem—they
persist in happily thinking that whatever they plan will actually be carried
out by their later selves. Sophisticated decisionmakers, on the other hand,
perfectly anticipate their future behavior—they do not harbor illusions about
their ability to carry through plans. This means that they will try to take
actions to make sure they stick with current plans. These two possible as-
sumptions about the student’s self-awareness are very extreme, and most of
us have features of both sophistication and naivete.
Now we are ready to analyze the student’s behavior, separately by their
degree of sophistication. We start with a naive student. We have already
calculated that self 0 would prefer to do the problem set at time 1, and since
(being naive) she assumes she will behave “correctly” in the future, that is
what she assumes she will do. Hence, she does not do the problem set at time
0, thinking, “Well, this is no big deal, I will just do it tomorrow...” We have
also calculated that she does not do the problem set at time 1, so a naive
student does the problem set in period 2.
Intuitively, since she believes that she will do the problem set before this
will be too hard, she believes she cannot lose much by delaying. Next period,
she again perceives the cost of delaying to be small, so she delays again.
Note that from the point of view of time 0, the student incurs a discounted
cost of 5/4, higher than if she did the problem set in period 0. That is, the
student does something she considers unambiguously bad for herself. This
could not happen with exponential discounting: with exponential discounting,
whatever self 0 thinks is the best thing to do, later selves will be willing to do.
Hence, the behavior of the naive student is not driven purely by impatience—
time inconsistency is implicated as well. That hyperbolic discounters often do
things that they perceive as unambiguously bad for themselves is an important
property of these models, and plays a central role in applications of hyperbolic
discounting, including that in Chapter 2.
We now turn to sophisticated students. We know that if the student does
not do the problem set in period 0, she does not do it in period 1, either. A
sophisticated student realizes this, so she knows that if she does not do the
problem set in period 0, she will not do it until period 2. Since (according to
the above calculation) she prefers to do it in period 0 rather than in period 2,
a sophisticated student does problem set in period 0.
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Intuitively, a sophisticated student recognizes that if she delays, she will
delay more. Since she knows that would be too costly, she reluctantly does
the problem set at time 0.
As mentioned above, the most realistic assumption seems to be that most
individuals are neither fully sophisticated, nor fully naive. How do we model
such decisionmakers? O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) assume that the agent
believes with probability 1 that her future β will equal βˆ. In this formulation,
βˆ = β corresponds to full sophistication, and βˆ = 1 corresponds to full naivete.
Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) and Asheim (2008) assume that the agent has beliefs
that put some probability on βˆ = β, and the complementary probability on
βˆ = 1. In some settings, Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2010a) (Chapter 2) allow for
a person’s beliefs to be a full distribution.
1.4 Reference Dependence and Loss Aversion
This section introduces reference dependence and loss aversion, which will be
used as the model of consumer behavior in Chapters 3 and 4. As in the case
of hyperbolic discounting, I discuss some evidence as a way of motivating the
model, but do not discuss the full array of evidence in favor of the model. For
evidence, see Rabin (1998) and DellaVigna (2009).
1.4.1 An Illustration and an Introduction
Take a look at Figure 1.3 illustrating the Gradient Illusion. The central stripe
in the illustration is actually uniform in color. Yet the part surrounded by
a darker grey looks lighter than the part surrounded by a lighter grey. The
illusion persists even after one has been told that the central stripe is of uniform
color, after one has measured the color in Photoshop, and even if one has
created the figure oneself.
This illusion illustrates the extent to which our brain tends to perceive
things relative to other things. Just by putting these different background
colors next to the central stripe, we can induce the brain to automatically make
the comparison, and for that to dominate the judgment about the absolute
color of the stripe. Even once you are fully convinced that this is an illusion,
the central stripe still does not seem uniform in color. It is just hard to see it in
any other way. More generally, in judging perceptive things such as brightness,
loudness, or temperature, the stimuli are perceived in relation to some neutral
point.
The tendency to compare stimuli to other stimuli extends to the economic
12
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Figure 1.3: The Gradient Illusion. The central stripe has uniform
color—yet it seems much lighter on the left side.
domain in a big-time way. We call this the phenomenon of reference-dependent
preferences: that the utility level we derive from an outcome depends in a ma-
jor way on comparisons to certain “benchmark” outcomes or reference points—
not only on an absolute evaluation of the outcome itself. A large literature
starting with Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is devoted to modeling reference-
dependent preferences and its implications for economics.
1.4.2 Loss Aversion
The most important property of reference-dependent preferences is loss aversion—
people dislike losses relative to the reference point more than they like same-
sized gains. I illustrate two kinds of evidence on loss aversion, that based on
people’s willingness to trade their current position for another one, and that
based on choices over risky gambles.
Loss aversion is manifested in the striking endowment effect documented
first by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990, 1991) and subsequently by
many other researchers: once a person comes to possess a good, she almost
immediately values it more than before she possessed it. These experiments
usually start by randomly giving half the subjects (often a class) mugs. These
subjects become the “owners” or potential sellers, and the others are “non-
13
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owners” or potential buyers. The owners are then asked to examine the mug
and think about how useful it might be to them. They are also asked to pass
their mug to the closest non-owner, so that they can examine it as well. This is
an important part of the design, because it reduces the information asymmetry
between owners and non-owners. Buying and selling prices are then elicited in
an incentive-compatible way using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure
(Becker, DeGroot and Marschak 1964). Prototypical experiments starting
with Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), have consistently found a major
gap, with selling prices being about twice the buying prices.
The endowment effect—the fact that owners value a good more than other-
wise identical non-owners—is usefully conceptualized as a case of loss aversion.
Individuals who are randomly given mugs treat the mugs as part of their ref-
erence levels or endowments, and consider not having a mug to be a loss.
Individuals without mugs consider not having a mug as remaining at their
reference point, and getting a mug as a gain. Since people are more sensitive
to losses than they are to same-sized gains, the sellers “value” the mug more:
by keeping the mug, they avoid a loss, whereas buyers would merely make a
gain if they got the mug.
Another important manifestation of loss aversion is in attitudes toward
risky gambles. For instance, most people would turn down an immediate
fifty-fifty gain $550 or lose $500 gamble. This kind of risk aversion seems
such an intuitively obvious fact that for a long time researchers have not even
bothered to check it. But recently, Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2006) offered
the gamble for real to MBA students, financial analysts, and even very rich
investors (with median financial wealth over $10 million!). A majority of all
these people, including 71% of the investors, rejected the gamble.
The standard economic explanation for people’s rejection of this gamble
is risk aversion or (equivalently for our purposes) diminishing marginal util-
ity of wealth. Indeed, diminishing marginal utility of wealth is an excellent
assumption based on good psychology: people satisfy their most important
needs and desires first and the less important ones only if they have something
left over, so the first $1,000,000 in wealth generates more utility than the next
$1,000,000. This is a great explanation for large-scale risk aversion, such as
the decision to take $4 million for sure rather than $10 million with probability
one-half.
But most of the risky decisions we face are not in the $1 million range or
even the $100,000 range. They are much smaller. And in a key article, Rabin
(2000a) argued that expected-utility-over-wealth maximizers—who care only
about final wealth outcomes—should not reject such a gamble unless they
turn down phenomenally favorable larger risks. Since most people do take
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many risks, expected utility is not a reasonable explanation for rejecting the
small-scale gamble. Rabin’s mathematical argument centers around proving
statements of the following form: “If an individual with expected utility over
wealth turns down a fifty-fifty lose $l or gain $g gamble over a range of wealth
levels, she also turns down a fifty-fifty lose $L or gain $G gamble,” where G
is huge relative to L and L is not that large (G is infinite in some examples).
The argument proceeds by using that if a person turns down the g/l gamble
for some wealth level, her marginal utility must diminish by some non-trivial
amount over the range of the gamble. Using that this is the case for multiple
wealth levels, we conclude that over the range of these wealth levels marginal
utility diminishes quite a lot. But this implies extreme sensitivity to larger
gambles.
Here is an illustration of the precise argument. Suppose Johnny is a clas-
sical utility maximizer with diminishing marginal utility of wealth who would
turn down a fifty-fifty lose $500 or gain $550 bet for a non-trivial range of
initial wealth levels. Let us take a concave, increasing utility function over
wealth, u(·). Rejection of this bet means that
1
2
u(w + 550) +
1
2
u(w − 500) < u(w),
which implies
u(w + 550)− u(w) < u(w)− u(w − 500).
But notice that by the concavity of u(·), u(w)−u(w−500) < 500 ·u′(w−500),
and u(w + 550)− u(w) > 550 · u′(w + 550). Therefore,
500 · u′(w − 500) > 550 · u′(w + 550),
or
u′(w − 500) > 11
10
u′(w + 550).
Now suppose Johnny was $1,050 poorer in lifetime terms. This is a very
small change in lifetime wealth, equivalent to something less than $50 per year.
It is implausible that risk aversion would diminish significantly with such small
changes in initial wealth, especially for decreases in wealth. If so, then by the
same argument as above but now applied to a wealth level of w − 1050,
u′(w − 1550) > 11
10
u′(w − 500).
Combining the two
u′(w − 1550) >
(
11
10
)2
u′(w + 550),
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and by the same reasoning
u′(w − 2100) >
(
11
10
)2
u′(w).
But this implies that marginal utility for wealth skyrockets for larger de-
creases in wealth unless there are dramatic shifts in risk attitudes over larger
changes in wealth: for every decrease of $1,050 in Johnny’s wealth, his marginal
utility of wealth increases by a factor of 11/10. Doing this fifty times... If
Johnny became $52,500 poorer in lifetime wealth—which is something less
than $2,500 in pre-tax income per year, say—then he would value income at
least 117 times (≈ (11
10
)50
) as much as he currently does. While none of us
know Johnny, we know this is a false fact about Johnny.
Furthermore, such a plummeting marginal utility of money leads to wild
risk aversion over large stakes: if Johnny’s marginal utility of wealth increases
by a factor of 117 if he were $52,500 poorer, for instance, then—even if he were
risk neutral above his current wealth level—then Johnny would turn down a
fifty-fifty lose $110,000 or gain $6.4 million bet at his current wealth level.3
By a similar calculation, if Johnny were risk neutral above his current
wealth level but averse to 50/50 lose $10 / gain $11 bets below his current
wealth level, then he would turn down a 50/50 lose $22,000 / gain $100 billion
bet. Rabin gives many further numerical examples.
Since this kind of risk aversion is inconceivable (how many would turn down
this last bet?), we can conclude that diminishing marginal utility of wealth
cannot reconcile risk aversion over modest stakes with reasonable risk aversion
over large stakes. And these results are just bounds, and vastly understate the
severity of large-scale risk aversion implied by small-scale risk aversion.
So why do people reject a fifty-fifty lose $500 or gain $550 risk? Most likely
because of loss aversion. They dislike the prospect of an unpleasant loss of
$500 much more than they like the prospect of a gain of $500. Loss aversion
is not subject to the same critique as diminishing marginal utility over wealth
because it does not assume that risk preferences over any level of wealth are
determined by a single function. It could be that at any wealth level, a person
dislikes a $500 loss much more than she likes a $550 gain—if her reference
point is her current wealth. But this does not mean that her utility function is
3To get this number, I used that Johnny’s marginal utility at wealth levels below the
current wealth minus $52,500 is at least 117 times that at his current wealth level. A
$110,000 loss is a loss of more than $55,000 extra. He cares about this extra loss at least
117 times as much than about gains from the current wealth level. So even a gain of
6, 400, 000 < 117× 55, 000 would not be enough to compensate him.
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very concave overall, because it does not imply that her utility function must
at the same time curve at each of these wealth levels.
In other words, loss aversion gets around the Johnny logic by assigning
a special role to current wealth (or another reference point), and making a
strong distinction between gains and losses. Because losses are much more
painful than equal-sized gains are pleasant, it may well be that a gain of $550
is not as attractive as a loss of $500 is scary. But with loss aversion, it is not
necessarily the case that a loss of an extra $500 is worse than the loss of the
first $500—since both of these are losses. So the above logic breaks down.
1.4.3 The Reference Point
Predictions of reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion of course de-
pend crucially on what we assume the reference point is. While many theories
of reference-point determination have been proposed, the most frequently used
theory in recent years is that of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). To motivate the
key assumption in our model, I begin with an experiment. Abeler, Falk, Go¨tte
and Huffman (2011) gave students a menial task (entering data into the com-
puter) to perform for a piece-rate. Students could work as long as they wanted.
The twist in the authors’ experiment was in how students were paid. After
a student finished working, a random draw was made: with probability one-
half, the student received what she earned in the task, and with probability
one-half, she received a predetermined amount. For a randomly chosen half of
the subjects, the predetermined amount was e3.50, and for the other half, it
was e7.00. Subjects knew all these details of the experiment, including their
own predetermined amount, in advance.
Abeler et al. (2011) found a striking difference in how much the two groups
of students worked: the group whose predetermined amount was e3.50 tended
to stop more when they earned e3.50, and the group whose predetermined
amount was e7.00 tended to stop more when they have earned e7.00. In a
sense, the predetermined amount became a target for how much to earn. This
indicates that a subject’s recent expectations (i.e., probabilistic beliefs) about
how much she might earn determine her reference point for earnings. Chapters
3 and 4 of the dissertation build on this assumption, first formalized by Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006). Other evidence also lends support to the expectations-
based model. In a simple exchange experiment, Ericson and Fuster (2009)
find that subjects are more likely to keep an item they had received if they
have been expecting a lower probability of being able to exchange it, consistent
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with the idea that their expectations affected their reference point.4 Crawford
and Meng (2011) propose a model of cabdrivers’ daily labor-supply decisions
in which cabdrivers have rational-expectations-based reference points (“tar-
gets”) in both hours and income. Crawford and Meng show that by making
predictions about which target is reached first given the prevailing wage each
day, their model can reconcile the controversy between Camerer, Babcock,
Loewenstein and Thaler (1997) and Farber (2005, 2008) in whether cabdrivers
have reference-dependent preferences.
4 In an alternative experiment, Ericson and Fuster (2009) find that subjects are willing
to pay 20-30 percent more for an object if they had expected to be able to get it with 80-90%
rather than 10-20% probability. In a similar experiment, however, Smith (2008) does not
find the same effect.
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Chapter 2
Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in
the Credit Market1
2.1 Introduction
Researchers as well as policymakers have expressed concerns that some con-
tract features in the credit-card and subprime mortgage markets may induce
consumers to borrow too much and to make suboptimal contract and repay-
ment choices.2 These concerns are motivated in part by intuition and evidence
on savings and credit suggesting that consumers have a time-inconsistent taste
for immediate gratification, and often naively underestimate the extent of this
taste.3 Yet the formal relationship between a taste for immediate gratifica-
1This chapter is coauthored with Paul Heidhues, and appeared in the American Economic
Review (2010), 100(5), pp. 2279-2303. Some features of real-life credit contracts we discuss
in the paper no longer exist in the United States due to recently enacted regulations—also
mentioned in the paper—that are very similar in spirit to the welfare-improving interventions
we propose. Hence, our discussion of contract terms is most appropriate for the period
ending around 2010.
2 See, for instance, Ausubel (1997), Durkin (2000), Engel and McCoy (2002), Bar-Gill
(2004), Warren (2007), and Bar-Gill (2008).
3 Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2007) estimate that to explain a typical household’s
simultaneous holdings of substantial illiquid wealth and credit-card debt, the household’s
short-term discount rate must be higher than its long-term discount rate. Complementing
this finding, Meier and Sprenger (2010) document that low and middle-income individuals
who exhibit a taste for immediate gratification in experimental choices over monetary pay-
ments have more outstanding credit-card debt. Laibson et al. (2007) calculate that many
households are made worse off by owning credit cards, so the fact that they get those cards
suggests some degree of naivete about future use. Consistent with this idea, consumers
overrespond to the introductory “teaser” rates in credit-card solicitations relative to the
length of the introductory period (Shui and Ausubel 2004) and the post-introductory inter-
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tion and consumer behavior and welfare in the credit market remains largely
unexplored and unclear. Existing work on contracting with time inconsis-
tency (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004, Ko˝szegi 2005, Eliaz and Spiegler
2006) does not investigate credit contracts and especially welfare and possi-
ble welfare-improving interventions in credit markets in detail. Furthermore,
because borrowing on a mortgage or to purchase a durable good typically in-
volves up-front effort costs with mostly delayed benefits, models of a taste for
immediate gratification do not seem to predict much of the overextension that
has worried researchers and policymakers.
In this paper, we provide a formal economic analysis of the features and wel-
fare effects of credit contracts when some consumers have a time-inconsistent
taste for immediate gratification that they may only partially understand.
Consistent with real-life credit-card and subprime mortgage contracts but (we
argue) inconsistent with natural specifications of rational time-consistent the-
ories, in the competitive equilibrium of our model firms offer seemingly cheap
credit to be repaid quickly, but introduce large penalties for falling behind
this front-loaded repayment schedule. The contracts are designed so that bor-
rowers who underestimate their taste for immediate gratification both pay
the penalties and repay in an ex-ante suboptimal back-loaded manner more
often than they predict or prefer. To make matters worse, the same mispre-
diction leads non-sophisticated consumers to underestimate the cost of credit
and borrow too much—despite borrowing being for future consumption. And
because the penalties whose relevance borrowers mispredict are large, these
welfare implications are typically large even if borrowers mispredict their taste
for immediate gratification by only a little bit and firms observe neither bor-
rowers’ preferences nor their beliefs. Accordingly, for any positive proportion
of non-sophisticated borrowers in the population, a policy of disallowing large
penalties for deferring small amounts of repayment—akin to recent new US
regulations limiting prepayment penalties on mortgages and certain interest
charges and fees on credit cards—can raise welfare.
Section 2.2 presents our model. There are three periods, 0, 1, and 2. If
the consumer borrows an amount c in period 0 and repays amounts q and r
in periods 1 and 2, respectively, self 0, her period-0 incarnation, has utility
c− k(q)− k(r), where k(·) represents the cost of repayment. Self 1 maximizes
est rate (Ausubel 1999), suggesting that they end up borrowing more than they intended or
expected. Skiba and Tobacman (2008) find that the majority of payday borrowers default
on a loan, yet do so only after paying significant costs to service their debt. Calibrations
indicate that such costly delay in default is only consistent with partially naive time incon-
sistency. For further discussions as well as evidence for a taste for immediate gratification
in other domains, see DellaVigna (2009).
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−k(q) − βk(r) for some 0 < β ≤ 1, so that for β < 1 the consumer has
a time-inconsistent taste for immediate gratification: in period 1, she puts
lower relative weight on the period-2 cost of repayment—that is, has less self-
control—than she would have preferred earlier. Since much of the borrowing
motivating our analysis is for future consumption, self 0 does not similarly
discount the cost of repayment relative to the utility from consumption c.
Consistent with much of the literature, we take the long-term perspective and
equate the consumer’s welfare with self 0’s utility, but the overborrowing we
find means that self 1 and self 2 are also hurt by a non-sophisticated borrower’s
contract choice. To allow for self 0 to be overoptimistic regarding her future
self-control, we follow O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and assume that she
believes she will maximize −k(q) − βˆk(r) in period 1, so that βˆ satisfying
β ≤ βˆ ≤ 1 represents her beliefs about β.
The consumers introduced above can sign exclusive non-linear contracts in
period 0 with competitive profit-maximizing suppliers of credit, agreeing to a
consumption level c as well as a menu of installment plans (q, r) from which
self 1 will choose. Both for theoretical comparison and as a possible policy in-
tervention, we also consider competitive markets in which disproportionately
large penalties for deferring small amounts of repayment are forbidden. For-
mally, in a restricted market contracts must be linear—a borrower can shift
repayment between periods 1 and 2 according to a single interest rate set
by the contract—although as we discuss, there are other ways of eliminating
disproportionately large penalties that have a similar welfare effect.
Section 2.3 establishes our main results in a basic model in which β and
βˆ are known to firms. Since a sophisticated borrower—for whom βˆ = β—
correctly predicts her own behavior, she accepts a contract that maximizes her
ex-ante utility. In contrast, a non-sophisticated borrower—for whom βˆ > β—
accepts a contract with which she mispredicts her own behavior: she believes
she will choose a cheap front-loaded repayment schedule (making the con-
tract attractive), but she actually chooses an expensive back-loaded repayment
schedule (allowing firms to break even). Worse, because the consumer fails to
see that she will pay a large penalty and back-load repayment—and not be-
cause she has a taste for immediate gratification with respect to consumption—
she underestimates the cost of credit and borrows too much. Due to this
combination of decisions, a non-sophisticated consumer, no matter how close
to sophisticated, has discontinuously lower welfare than a sophisticated con-
sumer. This discontinuity demonstrates in an extreme form our main point
regarding contracts and welfare in the credit market: that because the credit
contracts firms design in response postulate large penalties for deferring re-
payment, even relatively minor mispredictions of preferences by borrowers can
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have large welfare effects.
Given the low welfare of non-sophisticated borrowers in the unrestricted
market, we turn to identifying welfare-improving interventions. Because in a
restricted market borrowers have the option of paying a small fee for deferring a
small amount of repayment, non-sophisticated but not-too-naive borrowers do
not drastically mispredict their future behavior, and hence have higher utility
than in the unrestricted market. Since sophisticated borrowers achieve the
highest possible utility in both markets, this means that a restricted market
often Pareto-dominates the unrestricted one. If many borrowers are very naive,
a restricted market can be combined with an interest-rate cap to try to limit
borrowers’ misprediction and achieve an increase in welfare.
The properties of non-sophisticated borrowers’ competitive-equilibrium con-
tracts, and the restriction disallowing disproportionately large penalties for
deferring small amounts of repayment, have close parallels in real-life credit
markets and their regulation. As has been noted by researchers, the baseline
repayment terms in credit-card and subprime mortgage contracts are typically
quite strict, and there are large penalties for deviating from these terms. For
example, most subprime mortgages postulate drastically increased monthly
payments shortly after the origination of the loan or a large “balloon” pay-
ment at the end of a short loan period, and failing to make these payments and
refinancing triggers significant prepayment penalties. Similarly, most credit
cards do not charge interest on any purchases if a borrower pays the entire
balance due within a short one-month grace period, but do charge interest on
all purchases if she revolves even $1. To protect borrowers, new regulations
restrict these and other practices involving large penalties: in July 2008 the
Federal Reserve Board severely limited the use of prepayment penalties, and
the Credit CARD Act of 2009 prohibits the use of interest charges for partial
balances the consumer has paid off, and restricts fees in other ways. Oppo-
nents have argued that these regulations will decrease the amount of credit
available to borrowers and exclude some borrowers from the market. Our
model predicts the same thing, but also says that this will benefit rather than
hurt consumers—who have been borrowing too much and will now borrow less
because they better understand the cost of credit.
In Section 2.4, we consider equilibria when β is unknown to firms, and show
that with two important qualifications the key results above survive. First,
since sophisticated and non-sophisticated borrowers with the same βˆ are now
indistinguishable to firms, the two types sign the same contract in period 0.
This contract has a low-cost front-loaded repayment schedule that a sophisti-
cated borrower chooses, and a high-cost back-loaded repayment schedule that
a non-sophisticated borrower chooses. As before, even if a non-sophisticated
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borrower is close to sophisticated, the only way she can deviate from the front-
loaded repayment schedule is by paying a large fee. Furthermore, we identify
reasonable conditions under which consumers self-select in period 0 into these
same contracts even if β and βˆ are both unknown to firms. Second, while the
restricted market does not Pareto-dominate the unrestricted one, we establish
that for any proportion of sophisticated and non-sophisticated borrowers, if
non-sophisticated borrowers are not too naive, then the restricted market has
higher total welfare.
In Section 2.5, we generalize our basic model—in which a non-sophisticated
borrower believes with certainty that her taste for immediate gratification is
above β—as well as other existing models of partial naivete and allow bor-
rower beliefs to be a full distribution F (βˆ). We show that whether or not
borrower beliefs are known, the qualitative predictions we have emphasized
for non-sophisticated borrowers—overborrowing, often paying large penalties,
and getting discretely lower welfare than sophisticated borrowers—depend not
on F (β) = 0, but on F (β) being bounded away from 1. Since this condition is
likely to hold for many or most forms of near-sophisticated borrower beliefs,
our observation that small mispredictions have large welfare effects is quite
general. For example, even if the borrower has extremely tightly and contin-
uously distributed beliefs centered around her true β, her welfare is not close
to that of the sophisticated borrower. We also highlight an important asym-
metry: while overestimating one’s self-control, even probabilistically and by a
small amount, has significant welfare implications, underestimating it has no
welfare consequences whatsoever.
In Section 2.6, we discuss how our theory contributes to the literature on
contracting with time-inconsistent or irrational consumers and relates to neo-
classical screening. We are not aware of a theory with rational time-consistent
borrowers that explains the key contract features predicted by our model, and
we argue that natural specifications do not do so. Because the main predictions
of our model are about repayment terms, the most likely neoclassical screening
explanation would revolve around heterogeneity in borrowers’ ability to repay
the loan early. If borrowers know at the time of contracting whether they can
repay fast, a lender will offer an expensive loan with back-loaded repayment
intended for those who cannot, but achieving this using a prepayment penalty
and going through the costs refinancing is inefficient. If borrowers do not know
at the time of contracting whether they can repay fast, a model of sequential
screening (Courty and Li 2000) or post-contractual hidden knowledge predicts
that—analogously to business travelers’ expensive but flexible airline tickets—
the optimal loan is expensive if repaid quickly but allows borrowers to cheaply
change the repayment schedule. This is of course exactly the opposite pattern
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of what we find and what is the case in reality.
In Section 2.7, we conclude the paper by emphasizing some shortcomings
of our framework, especially the importance of studying two major questions
raised by our results: what regulations non-sophisticated borrowers will accept,
and whether and how borrowers might learn about their time inconsistency.
Proofs are in the Web Appendix.
2.2 A Model of the Credit Market
2.2.1 Setup
In this section, we introduce our model of the credit market, beginning with
borrower behavior. There are three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. Self 0’s utility is
c − k(q) − k(r), where c ≥ 0 is the amount the consumer borrows in period
0 and q ≥ 0 and r ≥ 0 are the amounts she repays in periods 1 and 2,
respectively.4 Self 1 maximizes −k(q) − βk(r), where β satisfying 0 < β ≤ 1
parameterizes the time-inconsistent taste for immediate gratification (as in
Laibson 1997). Note that while self 1 discounts the future cost of repayment
by a factor of β, because much of the borrowing motivating our analysis is
for future consumption,5 self 0—from whose perspective c, q, r are all in the
future—does not discount the cost of repayment relative to the utility from
consumption. The cost function k(·) is twice continuously differentiable with
k(0) = 0, β > k′(0) > 0, k′′(x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0, and limx→∞ k′(x) = ∞.
Our results would not fundamentally change if the utility from consumption
c was concave instead of linear. Moreover, since self 1 makes no decision
regarding c, under separability from the cost of repayment our analysis would
be unaffected if—as is reasonable for mortgages and durable goods—the utility
from consumption was decomposed into a stream of instantaneous utilities and
added to self 1’s utility function.
Following O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (2001) formulation of partial naivete,
we assume that self 0 believes with certainty that self 1 will maximize −k(q)−
4 The bounds on q and r are necessary for a competitive equilibrium to exist when β and
βˆ defined below are known. In this case, the model yields a corner solution for the amount
the borrower expects to pay in period 2. Any finite lower bound, including a negative one,
yields the same qualitative results. Section 2.4 demonstrates that when β is unknown and
k′(0) is sufficiently low, the bounds are not binding.
5 Most mortgages require substantial time and effort during the application process, and
yield mostly delayed benefits of enjoying the new or repaired home. Similarly, a significant
amount of credit-card spending seems to be on durables and other future-oriented goods
(Hayhoe, Leach, Turner, Bruin and Lawrence 2000, Reda 2003).
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βˆk(r), where β ≤ βˆ ≤ 1. The parameter βˆ reflects self 0’s beliefs about β, so
that βˆ = β corresponds to perfect sophistication regarding future preferences,
βˆ = 1 corresponds to complete naivete about the time inconsistency, and
more generally βˆ is a measure of sophistication. Because the O’Donoghue-
Rabin specification of partial naivete using degenerate beliefs is special, in
Section 2.5 we allow borrower beliefs to be any distribution, and show that
so long as a non-sophisticated borrower attaches non-trivial probability to
her time inconsistency being above β, most of our qualitative results survive.
In addition, although evidence indicates that people are more likely to have
overly optimistic beliefs (βˆ > β), in Section 2.5 we consider the possibility of
overly pessimistic beliefs (βˆ < β), and show that—unlike overoptimism—this
mistake has no consequences in equilibrium.
We think of a group of consumers who are indistinguishable by firms as a
separate market, and will define competitive equilibrium for a single separate
such market. We assume that the possible β’s in a market are β1 < β2 < · · · <
βI , and βˆ ∈ {β2, . . . βI}. For any given βˆ = βi, the borrower has β = βi with
probability pi and β = βi−1 with probability 1 − pi. If firms observe βˆ, then
I = 2; and if they also observe β, then in addition p2 = 0 or p2 = 1.
Since the credit market seems relatively competitive—at least at the initial
stage of contracting—we assume that the borrowers introduced above interact
with competitive, risk-neutral, profit-maximizing lenders.6 For simplicity, we
assume that firms face an interest rate of zero, although this does not affect any
of our qualitative results. Borrowers can sign non-linear contracts in period 0
regarding consumption and the repayment schedule, and these contracts are
exclusive: once a consumer signs with a firm, she cannot interact with other
firms.7 An unrestricted credit contract is a consumption level c along with a
6 By standard indicators of competitiveness, the subprime loan origination market seems
quite competitive: no participant has more than 13% market share (Bar-Gill 2008). By
similar indicators, the credit-card market is even more competitive. For the subprime mort-
gage market, however, observers have argued that because borrowers find contract terms
confusing, they do not do much comparison shopping, so the market is de facto not very
competitive. Our analysis will make clear that when βˆ is known, the features and welfare
properties of contracts are the same in a less competitive market. But Section 2.4.2.4.2’s
and Section 2.5’s results on the sorting of consumers according to their beliefs in period 0
do take advantage of our competitiveness assumption.
7 While the effects of relaxing exclusivity warrants further research, in general it would
not eliminate our main points regarding non-sophisticated borrowers. Even if borrowers had
access to a competitive market in period 1, our results remain unchanged so long as the
original firm can include in the contract a fee—such as the prepayment penalties in subprime
mortgages—for refinancing with any firm in the market. If firms cannot postulate such a
fee for refinancing on the competitive market, then in our three-period setting a borrower
will always avoid repaying more than expected. But as predicted by O’Donoghue and Rabin
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finite menu C = {(qs, rs)}s∈S of repayment options, and is denoted by (c, C). To
focus on the role of borrower mispredictions regarding repayment, we suppose
that there is no possibility of default. Note that this specification allows the
set of repayment options to be a singleton {(q, r)}, committing the borrower’s
future behavior and fully solving her self-control problem.
To enable us to focus on the contracts accepted by consumers, we suppress
the strategic interaction between firms and define equilibrium directly in terms
of the contracts that survive competitive pressure.8 Since a borrower’s behav-
ior in period 0 can depend only on βˆ, the competitive equilibrium will be a
set of contracts {(ci, Ci)}i∈{2,...,I} for the possible βˆ types β2 through βI .9 For
a firm to calculate the expected profits from a contract, and for a borrower
to decide which of the contracts available on the market to choose, market
participants must predict how a borrower will behave if she chooses a given
contract. They do this through an incentive-compatible map:
Definition 2.1. The maps qi, ri : {β1, . . . , βI} → R+ are jointly incentive
compatible for Ci if (qi(β), ri(β)) ∈ Ci for each β ∈ {β1, . . . , βI}, and
−k(qi(β))− βk(ri(β)) ≥ −k(q)− βk(r) for all (q, r) ∈ Ci.
A consumer of type (βˆ, β) believes in period 0 that she will choose (qi(βˆ), ri(βˆ))
from Ci, whereas in reality she chooses (qi(β), ri(β)) if confronted with Ci.
Based on the notion of incentive compatibility, we define:
Definition 2.2. A competitive equilibrium is a set of contracts {(ci, Ci)}i∈{2,...,I}
and incentive-compatible maps (qi(·), ri(·)) for each Ci with the following prop-
erties:
(2001) and is consistent with evidence in Shui and Ausubel (2004), in a more realistic, long-
horizon, setting non-sophisticated borrowers may procrastinate for a long time before finding
or taking advantage of favorable refinancing opportunities. And even if a non-sophisticated
borrower refinances, she might perpetually do so using contracts of the type we predict, and
eventually repay according to such a contract. Indeed, Engel and McCoy (2002) document
that subprime mortgages are often refinanced with similarly structured loans, and credit-
card balance-transfer deals and teaser rates also draw consumers into contracts similar to
those they had before.
8 This approach is similar in spirit to Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) definition of compet-
itive equilibrium with insurance contracts. By thinking of borrowers as sellers of repayment
schedules C, lenders as buyers of these schedules, and c as the price of a schedule C, we can
modify Dubey and Geanakoplos’s (2002) competitive-equilibrium framework for our setting
in a way that yields the same contracts as Definition 2.2.
9 Although in principle different borrowers with the same βˆ may choose different con-
tracts, by assuming that there is exactly one contract for one βˆ type, this approach for
simplicity imposes that they do not.
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1. [Borrower optimization] For any βˆ = βi ∈ {β2, . . . , βI} and j ∈ {2, . . . , I},
one has ci − qi(βˆ)− ri(βˆ) ≥ cj − qj(βˆ)− rj(βˆ).
2. [Competitive market] Each (ci, Ci) yields zero expected profits.
3. [No profitable deviation] There exists no contract (c′, C ′) with jointly
incentive-compatible maps (q′(·), r′(·)) such that (i) for some βˆ = βi, c′ −
q′(βˆ)− r′(βˆ) > ci − qi(βˆ)− ri(βˆ); and (ii) given the types for whom (i) holds,
(c′, C ′) yields positive expected profits.
4. [Non-redundancy] For each (ci, Ci) and each installment plan (qj, rj) ∈
Ci, there is a type (βˆ, β) with βˆ = βi such that either (qj, rj) = (qi(βˆ), ri(βˆ))
or (qj, rj) = (qi(β), ri(β)).
Our first requirement for competitive equilibrium is that of borrower op-
timization: given a type’s predictions about how she would behave with each
contract, she chooses her favorite one from the perspective of period 0. Our
next two conditions are typical for competitive situations, saying that firms
earn zero profits by offering these contracts, and that firms can do no better.10
The last, non-redundancy, condition says that all repayment options in a
contract are relevant in that they affect the expectations or behavior of the
consumer accepting the contract. This assumption simplifies statements re-
garding the uniqueness of competitive equilibrium, but does not affect any of
our predictions regarding outcomes and welfare.11 Due to the non-redundancy
condition, the competitive-equilibrium contracts we derive exclude most op-
tions by assumption; in particular, non-sophisticated borrowers’ only option
to change the repayment schedule will be to change it by a lot for a large fee.
As is usually the case in models of non-linear pricing, the same outcomes can
also be implemented by allowing other choices, but making them so expensive
that the borrower does not want to choose them. In fact, this is how it works
in the real-life examples discussed below, where deferring even small amounts
of repayment carries disproportionately large fees.
10 We could have required a competitive equilibrium to be robust to deviations involving
multiple contracts, rather than the single-contract deviations above. In our specific setting,
this makes no difference to the results. This is easiest to see when βˆ is known: then, offering
multiple contracts instead of one cannot help a firm separate different consumers, so it
cannot increase profits.
11 For general distributions of β and βˆ, our definition of non-redundancy would have to
be more inclusive. Specifically, it would have to allow for a repayment schedule in Ci to
be the expected choice from Ci of a consumer type not choosing (ci, Ci)—because such an
option could play a role in preventing the consumer from choosing (ci, Ci). Clearly, this
consideration is unimportant if βˆ is known. Given our assumptions, it is also unimportant
if βˆ is unknown, because the competitive equilibrium in Section 2.4.2.4.2 already fully sorts
consumers according to βˆ.
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One of our main interests in this paper is to study borrower welfare in
the above market, and to find welfare-improving interventions. While using
self 1’s or self 2’s utility as our welfare measure will often yield similar insights
(because the overborrowing our model predicts implies that in the unrestricted
market selves 1 and 2 are stuck having to repay large amounts), we follow much
of the literature on time inconsistency (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004, Gru-
ber and Ko˝szegi 2004, O’Donoghue and Rabin 2006, for example) and identify
welfare with long-run, period-0, preferences.12 In our stylized setting, there
are then many ways of increasing welfare. Notably, since the optimal outcome
c, q, r is known and easy to describe—equating the marginal cost of repayment
in each period with the marginal utility of consumption, k′(q) = k′(r) = 1,
and c = q + r—a policy just mandating this allocation is an optimal pol-
icy. But we are interested in more plausible policies, ones that do not cause
harm because of features of the credit market missing from our model—which
such a mandate clearly does if the social planner does not know an individ-
ual borrower’s preferences.13 Hence, we will focus on interventions that leave
substantial flexibility in market participants’ hands, and that target the cen-
tral contract feature generating low welfare: that non-sophisticated borrowers’
only way to reschedule repayment is to pay a large penalty. We propose to
restrict contracts by requiring them to allow the deferral of small amounts
of repayment, and—more importantly—prohibiting disproportionately large
penalties for deferring small amounts. Since (as we argue in Section 2.6) the
large penalties are unlikely to be serving a neoclassical purpose, and we are
also unaware of unmodelled “behavioral” reasons for them, such a policy is
unlikely to do harm. Indeed, we discuss parallels between our restriction and
recent new regulations in the credit-card and mortgage markets.
Formally, in a restricted market the permissible repayment options must
form a linear set: the contract specifies some R and L, and the set of permissi-
ble repayment schedules is {(q, r)|q + r/R = L and q, r ≤M}, where M is an
12 Although we simplify things by considering a three-period model, in reality time incon-
sistency seems to be mostly about very immediate gratification that plays out over many
short periods. Hence, arguments by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) in favor of a long-run
perspective apply: in deciding how to weight any particular week of a person’s life relative to
future weeks, it is reasonable to snub that single week’s self—who prefers to greatly down-
weight the future—in favor of the many earlier selves—who prefer more equal weighting. In
addition, the models in Bernheim and Rangel (2004a, 2004b) can be interpreted as saying
that a taste for immediate gratification is often a mistake not reflecting true welfare.
13 Because in our model all consumers know their future circumstances in period 0, another
optimal policy is to require borrowers to commit fully to a repayment schedule. As Amador,
Angeletos, and Werning (2006) show, however, this intervention is suboptimal if consumers
are subject to ex-post shocks in their financial circumstances.
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exogenous bound on q and r that can be arbitrarily large and that we impose
as a technical condition to ensure the existence of competitive equilibrium, and
for which we require k′(M) > 1/β.14 As we note below, many other ways of
eliminating disproportionately large penalties have the same or similar welfare
effect.
2.2.2 A Preliminary Step: Restating the Problem
As a preliminary step in our analysis, we restate in contract-theoretic terms
the requirements of a competitive equilibrium when βˆ is known and the con-
sumer may be non-sophisticated (I = 2, p2 < 1). To help understand our
restatement, imagine a firm trying to maximize profits from a borrower who
has an outside option with perceived utility u for self 0. Restricting attention
to non-redundant contracts, we can think of the firm as selecting consumption
c along with a “baseline” repayment schedule (q2(β2), r2(β2)) the borrower ex-
pects to choose in period 0 and that a sophisticated type (if present) actually
chooses in period 1, and an alternative repayment schedule (q2(β1), r2(β1))
a non-sophisticated borrower actually chooses in period 1. In designing its
contract, the firm faces the following constraints. First, for the borrower to
be willing to accept the firm’s offer, self 0’s utility with the baseline schedule
must be at least u. This is a version of the standard participation constraint
(PC), except that self 0 may make her participation decision based on incor-
rectly forecasted future behavior. Second, if self 0 is to think that she will
choose the baseline option, then given her beliefs βˆ she must think she will
prefer it to the alternative option. We call this constraint a perceived-choice
constraint (PCC). Third, if a non-sophisticated consumer is to actually choose
the alternative repayment schedule, she has to prefer it to the baseline. This
is analogous to a standard incentive-compatibility constraint (IC) for self 1.
It is clear that a competitive-equilibrium contract must be a solution to the
above maximization problem with u defined as self 0’s perceived utility from
accepting this contract: given that a competitive-equilibrium contract earns
zero profits, if this was not the case, a firm could solve for the optimal contract
and increase c slightly, attracting all consumers and making strictly positive
expected profits. In addition, for the solution to the above maximization
problem to be a competitive equilibrium, u must be such that the highest
achievable expected profit is zero. In fact, this is also sufficient:
14 Strictly speaking, we have defined a competitive equilibrium only for the case of unre-
stricted contracts. When considering the restricted market, one needs to replace the finite
set of repayment options Ci with an infinite but linear set.
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Lemma 2.1. Suppose βˆ is known (I = 2), the possible β’s are β1 < βˆ and
β2 = βˆ, and p2 < 1. The contract with consumption c and repayment options
{(q2(β1), r2(β1)), (q2(β2), r2(β2))} is a competitive equilibrium if and only if
there is a u such that the contract maximizes expected profits subject to a
PC with perceived outside option u, PCC, and IC, and the profit level when
maximizing profits subject to these constraints is zero.
2.3 Non-Linear Contracting with Known β and βˆ
We begin our analysis of non-linear contracting with the case when both β
and βˆ are known. We show that non-sophisticated borrowers get a very dif-
ferent contract from sophisticated ones, and because they mispredict whether
they will pay the large penalty their contract postulates for changing the re-
payment schedule, they have discontinuously lower welfare. We establish that
prohibiting such large penalties for deferring small amounts of repayment can
raise welfare. Finally, we show that the misprediction of time-consistent pref-
erences has no implications for outcomes, indicating that time inconsistency
is necessary for our results.
2.3.1 Competitive Equilibrium with Unrestricted Contracts
We start with the remark that if borrowers are time consistent and rational,
the organization of the credit market does not matter:
Fact 2.1. If β = βˆ = 1, the competitive-equilibrium consumption and repay-
ment outcomes are the same in the restricted and unrestricted markets, and
both maximize welfare.
For the rest of the paper (with the exception of Section 2.3.2.3.3), we as-
sume that β < 1. First, we consider the case of a perfectly sophisticated bor-
rower, for whom βˆ = β. By the same logic as in DellaVigna and Malmendier
(2004), since a sophisticated borrower correctly predicts her own behavior, it
is profit-maximizing to offer her a contract that maximizes her utility:
Proposition 2.1. Suppose β and βˆ are known, and βˆ = β. Then, the
competitive-equilibrium contract has a single repayment option satisfying k′(q) =
k′(r) = 1, and c = q + r.
The situation is entirely different for a non-sophisticated borrower, for
whom βˆ > β. Applying Lemma 2.1, the competitive-equilibrium contract
consists of a consumption level c, a repayment schedule (q, r) self 1 actually
30
               dc_785_13
2.3. NON-LINEAR CONTRACTING WITH KNOWN β AND βˆ 31
chooses, and a possibly different baseline repayment schedule (qˆ, rˆ) self 0 ex-
pects to choose, that solve
max
c,q,r,qˆ,rˆ
q + r − c (2.1)
s.t. c− k(qˆ)− k(rˆ) ≥ u, (PC)
−k(qˆ)− βˆk(rˆ) ≥ −k(q)− βˆk(r), (PCC)
−k(q)− βk(r) ≥ −k(qˆ)− βk(rˆ), (IC)
PC binds because otherwise the firm could increase profits by reducing c.
In addition, IC binds because otherwise the firm could increase profits by
increasing q. Given that IC binds and βˆ > β, PCC is equivalent to q ≤ qˆ: if
self 1 is in reality indifferent between two repayment options, then self 0—who
overestimates her future self-control by at least a little bit—predicts she will
prefer the more front-loaded option. Conjecturing that q ≤ qˆ is optimal even
without PCC, we ignore this constraint, and confirm our conjecture in the
solution to the relaxed problem below.
Given the above considerations, the problem becomes
max
c,q,r,qˆ,rˆ
q + r − c
s.t. c− k(qˆ)− k(rˆ) = u, (PC)
−k(q)− βk(r) = −k(qˆ)− βk(rˆ). (IC)
Notice that in the optimal solution, rˆ = 0: otherwise, the firm could decrease
k(rˆ) and increase k(qˆ) by the same amount, leaving PC unaffected and creating
slack in IC, allowing it to increase q. Using this, we can express k(qˆ) from IC
and plug it into PC to get c = k(q) + βk(r) + u. Plugging c into the firm’s
maximand yields the unconstrained problem
max
q,r
q + r − k(q)− βk(r)− u,
and gives the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2. Suppose β and βˆ > β are known. Then, the competitive-
equilibrium contract has a baseline repayment schedule (qˆ, rˆ) satisfying qˆ >
0, rˆ = 0 that the borrower expects to choose and an alternative schedule (q, r)
satisfying k′(q) = 1, k′(r) = 1/β that she actually chooses. Consumption is
c = q + r > qˆ, and is higher than that of a sophisticated borrower. The
borrower has strictly lower welfare than a sophisticated borrower.
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The first important feature of the equilibrium contract is that it is flexible
in a way that induces the borrower to unexpectedly change her mind regarding
how she repays. To see why this is the case, consider why the sophisticated
borrower’s contract—which is also the non-sophisticated borrower’s favorite
among fully committed contracts—is not a competitive equilibrium. The rea-
son is that a firm can deviate by offering slightly higher consumption and still
allow the same repayment terms, but introduce an alternative option to defer
part of the first installment for a fee. Thinking that she will not use the alter-
native option, the consumer likes the deal. But since she does use the option,
the firm earns higher profits than with a committed contract.
Beyond showing that the equilibrium contract is flexible in a deceptive
way, Proposition 2.2 says that k′(q) = βk′(r), so that self 1’s preferences fully
determine the allocation of actual repayment across periods 1 and 2. Hence,
the ability to commit perfectly to a repayment schedule does not mitigate the
consumer’s time inconsistency regarding repayment at all. Intuitively, once a
firm designs the contract to induce repayment behavior self 0 does not expect,
its goal with the chosen option is to maximize the gains from trade with the
self that makes the repayment decision, so it caters fully to self 1’s taste for
immediate gratification.
To make matters worse, the competitive-equilibrium contract induces over-
borrowing in two senses: the non-sophisticated consumer borrows more than
the sophisticated one, and she borrows more than is optimal given that re-
payment is allocated according to self 1’s preferences.15 Unlike in existing
models of time inconsistency, self 0 overborrows not because she undervalues
the cost of repayment relative to consumption, but because she mispredicts
how she will repay her loan, in effect leading her to underestimate its cost.
To see how the exact level of c is determined, recall that the contract is de-
signed so that self 0 expects to finish her repayment obligations in period 1
(rˆ = 0). Hence, when deciding whether to participate, self 0 trades off c with
k(qˆ). But from the firm’s perspective, k(qˆ) is just the highest actual total
cost of repayment that can be imposed on self 1 so that she is still willing to
choose the alternative installment plan. This means that the tradeoff deter-
mining the profit-maximizing level of borrowing is between c and self 1’s cost
of repayment, which discounts the second installment by β.
Notice that due to the excessive borrowing in period 0, the non-sophisticated
15 The prediction regarding the amount of borrowing contrasts with predictions of hy-
perbolic discounting in standard consumption-savings problems, such as Laibson (1997). In
those problems, whether more naive decisionmakers borrow more or less than sophisticated
ones depends on the per-period utility function. In our setting, non-sophisticated consumers
borrow more for any k(·).
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borrower is worse off than the sophisticated one not only from the perspec-
tive of period 0, but also from the perspective of period 1—repaying the same
amount in period 1 and more in period 2. Hence, the fact that the borrower is
fooled into changing her mind and allocating repayment according to self 1’s
preferences is ultimately worse for self 1 as well.
All of the above holds for any βˆ > β, so that all non-sophisticated borrow-
ers, even near-sophisticated ones, receive discretely different outcomes from
and discretely lower welfare than sophisticated borrowers. The discontinuity
is an extreme form of one of our main points in the paper: that due to the
credit contracts profit-maximizing firms design in response, even small mis-
predictions of preferences by borrowers often have large welfare effects. The
welfare effects are large because a borrower is allowed to change her repayment
schedule only by paying a large fee, and the fee is designed so that she mis-
predicts whether she will pay it.16 Hence, even if self 0 mispredicts her future
utility by only a little bit, she mispredicts her future outcomes by a lot, and
because she is time-inconsistent this means she mispredicts her welfare by a
lot—repaying her loan in a much more costly way than she expects.
While our main interest is in the implemented repayment schedule (q, r),
the structure of the baseline schedule (qˆ, rˆ) is also intriguing: the firm asks the
borrower to carry out all repayment in period 1, even if the marginal cost of
repaying a little bit in period 2 is very low. Intuitively, because the baseline
terms are never implemented, the firm’s goal is not to design them efficiently.
Instead, its goal is to attract the consumer in period 0 without reducing the
total amount she is willing to pay through the installment plan she actually
chooses in period 1. Front-loading the baseline repayment schedule achieves
this purpose by making the schedule relatively more attractive to self 0 than
to self 1.
Finally, the above analysis makes it clear how competition matters: through
u. For a monopolist, u is a borrower’s perceived outside option when not tak-
ing a loan. In a perfectly competitive market, u is set endogenously such that
profits are zero. Since the repayment options in the optimal contract are in-
dependent of u, whether the market is perfectly competitive or monopolistic
matters only for determining the consumption level c.17
16 As we have mentioned above, the fact that a borrower literally has no other option but
to pay a large fee and defer a large amount of repayment follows from the non-redundancy
condition in Definition 2.2. The same outcome can also be implemented by allowing the
deferral of small amounts of repayment, but charging disproportionately large fees for this—
as the real-life contracts we discuss do.
17 In a Hotelling-type model of imperfect competition in contract offers, an intermediate
level of competition generates a contract identical to that implied by the above analysis for a
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The properties of the non-sophisticated borrower’s competitive-equilibrium
contract—a relatively low-cost front-loaded repayment schedule with a large
penalty to switch out of it—arguably closely resemble some features of real-life
credit arrangements.18 Loaded with cash-back bonuses, free rental-car insur-
ance, and other perks, the typical credit-card deal is extremely favorable—so
long as the consumer repays all of her debt within the one-month grace period.
If she revolves even $1, she is charged interest on all purchases, and all of a
sudden credit-card use becomes quite expensive. Similarly, in-store financ-
ing and credit-card balance-transfer deals often involve no interest for a few
months, but if a consumer does not repay fully within the allotted time, she
is charged interest from the time of purchase. Most credit cards also charge
late-payment, over-the-limit, and other fees that are large even for small vio-
lations of terms. In the subprime market, the most common, “hybrid,” form
of mortgage starts with low payments, but after a short period resets to high
monthly payments that will be difficult for most borrowers to meet. Even
more extreme is the “balloon” mortgage, which requires the borrower to pay
off the entire remaining balance in a large payment at the end of a relatively
short loan period. In addition, these types of mortgages typically include hefty
prepayment penalties.19 As emphasized by Hill and Kozup (2007) and espe-
cially Renuart (2004) and as the logic of our model suggests, the high monthly
payments or the balloon payment drive borrowers to refinance, and the high
prepayment penalty—folded into the principal and financed—serves to make
level of u that is in-between the competition and monopoly extremes, with the appropriate u
increasing monotonically as competition increases and approaching that in the competitive
market above. Formally, suppose there are two firms A and B located at the endpoints
of the unit interval, and there is a mass one of borrowers uniformly distributed along this
interval. The period-0 self of a borrower located at χ derives utility cA−k(qA)−k(rA)−dχ
from firm A’s contract, where cA is the consumption level offered by firm A and qA and rA
are the repayments made to firm A. The period-0 self of the same borrower derives utility
cB − k(qB) − k(rB) − d(1 − χ) from firm B’s contract, and 0 when rejecting both firms’
contract offers. To find the equilibrium contract offers, think of firm A as first maximizing
its profits for any perceived utility u = cA−k(qˆA)−k(rˆA) it chooses to offer to the borrower
located at χ = 0, and then selecting the optimal perceived utility level for this borrower.
The first step is identical to the problem above, so the repayment options are also identical
to those found above. Optimizing over c gives that if d is sufficiently low, the market is
covered in equilibrium and c = q + r − d, generating a u that increases with an increase in
competition as captured by a decrease in d.
18 We focus on the non-sophisticated borrower’s contract because (as we show in Section
2.4) when β is unknown sophisticated and non-sophisticated borrowers accept the same con-
tract, and this contract much resembles the above contract for non-sophisticated borrowers.
19 Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) report that 54.5 percent of US subprime mortgages
originated in 2006 were of the hybrid type, 25.2 percent were of the balloon type, and 71
percent postulated a prepayment penalty.
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this profitable to the lender. In a practice known as “loan flipping,” creditors
sometimes refinance repeatedly (Engel and McCoy 2002). Indeed, Demyanyk
and Van Hemert (2008) find that the majority of subprime mortgages is ob-
tained for refinancing into a larger new loan for the purposes of extracting
cash.20
2.3.2 A Welfare-Increasing Intervention
Given non-sophisticated borrowers’ suboptimal welfare, it is natural to ask
whether there are welfare-improving interventions. If borrowers are sufficiently
sophisticated, there is a simple one:
Proposition 2.3. A sophisticated borrower (βˆ = β) is equally well off in the
restricted and unrestricted markets. If a non-sophisticated borrower (βˆ > β)
is sufficiently sophisticated (βˆ is sufficiently close to β), she is strictly better
off in the restricted than in the unrestricted market.
By counteracting her tendency for immediate gratification as given by β, a
restricted contract with an interest rate R = 1/β aligns self 1’s behavior with
the borrower’s long-run welfare. And since sophisticated borrowers understand
their own behavior perfectly, it is profit-maximizing to offer such a contract
to them. Hence, for sophisticated borrowers the restricted and unrestricted
markets both generate the highest possible level of utility.
More interestingly, restricting contracts to have a linear structure pre-
vents firms from fooling non-sophisticated but not-too-naive borrowers into
discretely mispredicting their behavior, and hence raises these borrowers’ wel-
fare. For any interest rate R, a slightly naive borrower mispredicts her future
behavior by only a small amount, which leads her to make only a small mis-
take in how much she wants to borrow. This means that her behavior is very
close to that of a sophisticated borrower, so that she gets a contract very close
to that offered to a sophisticated borrower. As a result, her utility is close to
optimal.
20 A weakness of our theory is that it does not convincingly explain why contracts look so
different in the prime and subprime mortgage markets. Many prime contracts feature very
simple installment plans (for example, the same nominal payment every month for 30 years),
and have little or no prepayment penalties. Although this is consistent with our theory if
borrowers in the prime market are time-consistent, we find this explanation implausible. A
simple plausible explanation (but one completely outside our theory) is that unlike borrowers
in the subprime market, borrowers in the prime market have access to plenty of other sources
of credit that would make refinancing their mortgage an unattractive way to make funds
available for short-term consumption, substantively violating our exclusivity assumption.
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In the case of observable β and βˆ and sufficiently sophisticated borrowers,
therefore, our intervention satisfies the most stringent criteria of “cautious”
or “asymmetric” paternalism (Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue
and Rabin 2003): it greatly benefits non-sophisticated borrowers, while it does
not hurt sophisticated borrowers. Furthermore, if everyone in the population
is rational (sophisticated), the intervention has no effect on outcomes at all.
The linearity of the allowable set of repayment options is not fundamental
for the intervention to be welfare-improving. What is important is to rule out
disproportionately large penalties for deferring small amounts of repayment,
preventing borrowers from discretely mispredicting their behavior. Any con-
tract in which r is a convex function of q has this property. For instance,
Proposition 2.3 still holds if we allow contracts with a “focal” installment plan
q¯, r¯ and a higher interest rate when repaying less than q¯ in period 1 than when
repaying more. Similarly, we could allow linear contracts with meaningful
bounds on how much can be repaid in period 1.
Some recently enacted regulations aimed at protecting borrowers in the
mortgage and credit-card markets in the US are interpretable in terms of
Proposition 2.3’s message to prohibit large penalties for small deviations from
contract terms. In July 2008, the Federal Reserve Board amended Regula-
tion Z (implementation of the Truth in Lending Act) to severely restrict the
use of prepayment penalties for high-interest-rate mortgages. By 12 C.F.R.
§226.35(b)(2), a prepayment penalty can only apply for two years following
the commencement of the loan, and only if the monthly payment does not
change in the first four years. This regulation will prevent lenders from col-
lecting a prepayment penalty by requiring a high payment in the near future
that induces borrowers to refinance. Title I, Section 102.(a)-(b) of the Credit
Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure (Credit CARD) Act of
2009 prohibits the use of interest charges for partial balances the consumer
pays off within the grace period, and Section 101.(b) prohibits applying post-
introductory interest rates to the introductory period, ruling out exactly the
kinds of large penalties we have discussed above. The act also limits late-
payment, over-the-limit, and other fees to be “reasonable and proportional
to” the consumer’s omission or violation.
Note that the restricted market mitigates non-sophisticated but not-too-
naive consumers’ overborrowing, so if there is a non-trivial proportion of these
consumers in the population, lenders extend less total credit in the restricted
market than in the unrestricted market. This insight is relevant for a central
controversy surrounding the above regulations of the credit market. Opponents
have repeatedly argued that the new regulations will decrease the amount of
credit available to borrowers and exclude some borrowers from the market,
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intimating that this will be bad for consumers.21 Our model predicts that
these opponents may well be right in predicting a decreased amount of credit,
but also says that in as much as this happens, it will benefit rather than hurt
consumers—because consumers were borrowing too much to start with.22
Proposition 2.3 holds in general only for sufficiently sophisticated borrow-
ers because both restricted and unrestricted contracts can lead a very naive
borrower to severely overestimate how much she will be willing to pay back
in period 1. If many consumers are very naive and as a result establishing
the restricted market is not in itself an effective intervention, this can be com-
bined with other regulations to limit borrowers’ misprediction of their own
behavior. One simple regulation is to restrict the amount of repayment that
can be shifted to period 2, mechanically limiting borrowers’ mispredictions.
Another possible regulation is to set an interest-rate cap. For some commonly
used utility functions, in fact, non-sophisticated borrowers are better off in a
restricted market with an interest-rate cap of even zero than in an unrestricted
market:23
Proposition 2.4. Suppose k(x) = xρ for some ρ > 1 or k(x) = (y−x)−ρ−y−ρ
for some y > 0, ρ > 0. Then, for any βˆ > β, a borrower has higher utility in
a restricted market with R = 1 than in an unrestricted market.
Intuitively, in both the unrestricted market and in the restricted mar-
ket with an interest-rate cap of zero (which will clearly bind), repayment is
allocated across periods 1 and 2 according to self 1’s preferences (k′(q) =
βk′(r)). But because contracts are more restricted in the latter market, non-
sophisticated borrowers mispredict their behavior by less, and hence do not
overborrow as much. Of course, allowing at least a small positive interest
rate leads to even higher welfare for non-sophisticated borrowers, because it
21 See, for instance, “Senate Passes Credit-Card Reform Bill by Vote of 90-
5,” FOXBusiness, May 19, 2009, http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/
senate-passes-credit-card-reform-bill-vote/; and “How the Banks Plan to Limit
Credit-Card Protections,” Time, April 27, 2009 http://www.time.com/time/politics/
article/0,8599,1894041,00.html.
22 If we relax the simplifying assumption that k′(0) < β, the exclusion from the market
mentioned above occurs in our model for a non-sophisticated but not-too-naive borrower
with 1/β > k′(0) > 1. Such a borrower participates in the unrestricted market, but will
stay out of a restricted market—and because her marginal cost of repayment is greater than
the benefit of consumption, staying out is the better outcome.
23 These utility functions guarantee that with linear contracts, non-sophisticated con-
sumers borrow more than sophisticated ones, and this and further overborrowing lowers
ex-ante utility. Our proof makes use of these features, but no other feature of the utility
functions in Proposition 2.4.
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induces them to repay more of their loan earlier. Despite these advantages,
an interest-rate cap is more problematic than other policies we suggest in this
paper because it harms sophisticated borrowers with a low β by preventing
them from getting the ex-ante optimal high-interest-rate contract. Hence, an
interest-rate cap is welfare improving only if we are confident that there is a
sizable portion of non-sophisticated borrowers in the population.
2.3.3 The Role of Time Inconsistency
The theory in this paper makes two major assumptions that deviate from most
classical theories of the credit market: that borrowers have a time-inconsistent
taste for immediate gratification, and that they might mispredict this taste.
Since (as we have shown above) sophisticated consumers receive the maximum
achievable level of utility, the misprediction of preferences is necessary for our
central welfare results regarding overborrowing and suboptimal repayment. In
this section, we show that the misprediction of time-consistent preferences has
no welfare consequences for the borrower, establishing that time inconsistency
is also necessary for our central results.
Suppose that the borrower’s true period-1 utility is given by −k(q)− k(r)
(that is, β = 1), and she is time-consistent: self 0 weights the repayment
costs the same way that she believes self 1 does. But self 0 might mispredict
self 1’s preferences, believing that self 1’s utility will be −k(q) − βˆk(r) for
some βˆ ≥ 1. Hence, although true ex-ante utility is c − k(q) − k(r), self 0
believes it to be c − k(q) − βˆk(r). This situation is conceivable, for instance,
if self 0 mispredicts how painful it will be to make a loan payment in period 1
relative to period 2, but thinks that the decision to allocate repayment across
the two periods should be made according to this pain. With these changes
to the model, PCC in Problem 2.1 above does not change, while PC changes
to c − k(qˆ) − βˆk(rˆ) ≥ u and IC changes to −k(q) − k(r) ≥ −k(qˆ) − k(rˆ).
Analyzing the resulting problem yields:
Proposition 2.5. In the time-consistent model, for any βˆ ≥ β = 1 the re-
payment schedule chosen by the borrower in a competitive equilibrium satisfies
k′(q) = k′(r) = 1, and the borrowed amount is c = q + r.
Proposition 2.5 says that the competitive-equilibrium contract maximizes
the borrower’s utility for any period-0 beliefs. As in the time-inconsistent case,
for βˆ > β the borrower is induced to unexpectedly change her mind and repay
according to self 1’s preferences—but this is the welfare-maximizing repayment
schedule in the time-consistent case. In addition, because preferences are
time-consistent—and hence the repayment schedule self 1 chooses is not more
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costly from the ex-ante point of view than what self 0 expects—mispredicting
repayment behavior does not lead the borrower to underestimate the cost of
credit, so she does not overborrow.24
Although a non-sophisticated time-consistent borrower ends up maximizing
ex-ante utility just like a sophisticated borrower, her contract is different in
that it includes a very front-loaded repayment option (qˆ, rˆ) satisfying qˆ >
0, rˆ = 0 that she expects to choose. This is an artifact of the assumption that
β and βˆ are known: unlike in the time-inconsistent case we analyze in Section
2.4, under time-consistent preferences with β unknown a near-sophisticated
borrower mispredicts her repayment behavior by only a little bit. Intuitively,
fooling a borrower regarding her repayment schedule is profitable because it
makes the lender’s offer seem cheaper, and hence makes it easier to attract
the borrower. With a near-sophisticated time-consistent borrower, however,
a lender cannot make the loan seem much cheaper than it actually is. At
the same time, because a sophisticated borrower will actually follow the ex-
ante expected repayment schedule, if the firm does not know which type it
is facing, fooling the near-sophisticated borrower by distorting the ex-ante
expected repayment terms is costly. As a result, it is not optimal to fool her
by more than a little.
2.4 Non-Linear Contracting with Unknown Types
This section investigates competitive equilibria when either β, or both β and
βˆ, are unknown to firms. Beginning with the former case, we show that with
two important qualifications, our key insights from Section 2.3 survive. First,
because sophisticated and non-sophisticated consumers with the same beliefs
cannot be distinguished by firms, these two types sign the same contract—
although they still choose very different repayment schedules from that con-
tract and have very different welfare levels. Second, a restricted market no
longer Pareto dominates the unrestricted market—although it still has higher
total welfare for any proportion of sophisticated and near-sophisticated bor-
rowers. We then assume that both β and βˆ are unknown, and identify condi-
tions under which the competitive equilibrium remains the same as when βˆ is
known.
24 That borrowers are completely unaffected by mispredicting time-consistent preferences
relies on the market being competitive. Although allocations would still be efficient, a
monopolist would use the borrower’s misprediction to extract more rent. As in Laibson and
Yariv (2007), in a competitive market firms give all of this rent back to borrowers in an
effort to attract them.
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2.4.1 Known βˆ, Unknown β
Suppose that a borrower’s βˆ is known (I = 2), and she has β1 < βˆ with
probability p1 and β2 = βˆ with probability p2. For technical convenience, we
assume that k′(0) < p1, 1− p1, β1, which guarantees that first-order conditions
throughout the section describe optimal choices.
Because sophisticated and non-sophisticated borrowers have the same be-
liefs in period 0, they accept the same contract. The following proposition
identifies key features of this contract.
Proposition 2.6 (Period-1 Screening). Suppose βˆ is known, and β takes the
values β1 < βˆ and β2 = βˆ with probabilities p1 and p2 = 1 − p1, respectively.
The unique competitive-equilibrium contract, accepted by both types, has two
installment plans (q1, r1) and (q2, r2), which are chosen in period 1 by types β1
and β2, respectively. These satisfy q1 < r1, q2 > r2, q1 + r1 > q2 + r2, and
k′(q2)
k′(r2)
− 1 = (1− β1) · k
′(q2)
k′(q1)
· p1
p2
, (2.2)
k′(q1)
k′(r1)
− β1 = 0. (2.3)
Furthermore, consumers overborrow on average: p1k
′(q1) + p2k′(q2), p1k′(r1) +
p2k
′(r2) > 1.
By Equation 2.2, the sophisticated borrower’s repayment schedule calls
for a first installment that is too high even from the long-term perspective
of period 0. And by Equation 2.3, the non-sophisticated borrower’s repay-
ment schedule caters fully to self 1’s preferences. These results are closely
related to those in standard screening problems in which the tradeoff between
increasing efficiency for the less profitable type and decreasing the informa-
tion rent paid to the more profitable type leads to a distorted outcome for
the less profitable type and an efficient outcome for the more profitable type.
In our model, however, the relevant preferences in this tradeoff exist at dif-
ferent times. Since a sophisticated borrower sticks to her ex-ante preferred
installment plan, the profit the firm can extract from her depends on period-0
preferences, so this side of the tradeoff takes the period-0 perspective. But
since a non-sophisticated borrower abandons her ex-ante preferred installment
plan, the profit the firm can extract from her depends partly on period-1 pref-
erences, so this side of the tradeoff takes the period-1 perspective.
The difference between the sophisticated and non-sophisticated borrowers’
first-order conditions implies a generalization of our insight above that there is
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a discontinuity in outcomes and welfare at full sophistication, with the discon-
tinuity now generated by the large penalties for deferring repayment stipulated
in the contract that both sophisticated and non-sophisticated borrowers sign.
As β1 approaches β2 from below, q1 approaches a number strictly smaller than
q2 does. In other words, a non-sophisticated borrower, even if she is arbi-
trarily close to sophisticated, repays in a discontinuously different way from a
sophisticated borrower, and is discontinuously worse off as a result.
We now show that if non-sophisticated borrowers are not too naive, elimi-
nating disproportionately large penalties for deferring small amounts of repay-
ment is still welfare-improving:
Proposition 2.7. Suppose βˆ is known, and β takes each of two values, β1 < βˆ
and β2 = βˆ, with positive probability. Borrowers strictly prefer the competitive-
equilibrium contract in the unrestricted market over that in the restricted mar-
ket, and a sophisticated borrower is indeed better off in the unrestricted market.
If the non-sophisticated borrower is sufficiently sophisticated (β1 is sufficiently
close to βˆ), her welfare, as well as the population-weighted sum of type 1’s and
type 2’s welfare, is greater in the restricted market than in the unrestricted
market.
As is the case when β is known, if non-sophisticated borrowers are not too
naive, their welfare is higher in the restricted market than in the unrestricted
one. The basic reason is also the same as before: because in the restricted mar-
ket non-sophisticated borrowers have the option of deferring a small amount of
repayment for a proportionally smaller fee, they do not drastically mispredict
their own behavior. In the current setting, however, sophisticated borrowers
are worse off in the restricted than in the unrestricted market, so the re-
stricted market does not Pareto-dominate the unrestricted one; and since all
borrowers think they are sophisticated, they all prefer the unrestricted mar-
ket. The intuition for this result is related to a point first emphasized by
Gabaix and Laibson (2006): because non-sophisticated borrowers are more
profitable, in a competitive equilibrium it must be that firms make money on
non-sophisticated borrowers and lose money on sophisticated borrowers. This
cross-subsidy, and consequently the utility of sophisticated borrowers, is lower
in the restricted market than in the unrestricted one. When β is unknown,
therefore, our intervention does not satisfy the stringent requirement of asym-
metric paternalism to avoid hurting fully rational consumers. Nevertheless,
for any p1 and p2 the restricted market is still socially superior by the measure
typically used in public economics: the population-weighted sum of individ-
uals’ welfare. Hence, this intervention is “robust” in that it is likely to be
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welfare-improving even if we do not know much or do not agree about the
prevalence of non-sophisticated types in the population.
2.4.2 Unknown β and βˆ
We now consider competitive equilibria when β and βˆ are both unobservable to
firms, providing a condition under which the contracts we have derived in Sec-
tion 2.4.2.4.1 sort borrowers according to βˆ in period 0. This means that even
when firms observe neither consumers’ preferences nor their degree of sophis-
tication, any non-sophisticated consumer endogenously selects a contract with
which she changes her mind regarding repayment, making her strictly worse
off than a sophisticated consumer with the same time-preference parameter β.
We build our analysis on that of Section 2.4.2.4.1, where βˆ is known. Let
ui be the sophisticated borrower’s utility from the competitive-equilibrium
contract when βˆ = βi is known, with probability pi a borrower is sophisticated,
and with probability (1−pi) she is type βi−1. Our key condition is the following:
Condition 2.1. ui is increasing in βi.
Condition 2.1 states that if βˆ was observable, the sophisticated borrower’s
utility from the equilibrium contract would be increasing in βˆ. That is, the
closer a sophisticated borrower is to being time consistent, the higher is her
utility. While this is an endogenous condition, it is intuitively plausible: it
requires roughly that borrowers who are more optimistic about their future
behavior tend to be more naive about it. Since firms compete more fiercely
for such profitable borrowers, they drive up the utility of sophisticated bor-
rowers.25
We argue that under Condition 2.1, there is a competitive equilibrium in
which consumers sign the same contracts as when βˆ is observed. The crucial
part is that from such a set of contracts, consumers self-select according to βˆ
in period 0; then, since there would be no profitable deviation even if firms
knew βˆ, there is certainly none when they do not know βˆ. By Condition
2.1, the credit contract intended for a borrower with higher βˆ offers a bet-
ter deal if the borrower can stick to the more favorable repayment schedule,
but requires greater self-control to stick to that schedule. Hence, because a
25 Condition 2.1 is clearly non-empty. Consider, for instance, a setting with two possible
βˆ’s. If the lower βˆ type is almost certain to be sophisticated while the higher βˆ type has
a non-trivial probability of being non-sophisticated, Condition 2.1 holds. More generally,
in the current setting with two types of β for each βˆ, we require that consumers who
believe themselves to be less time-inconsistent are non-sophisticated with sufficiently higher
probability.
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consumer takes the most favorable credit contract with which she believes she
can repay according to the ex-ante preferred schedule, she chooses the contract
corresponding exactly to her βˆ.
To illustrate the logic of this self-selection through an example, consider a
consumer looking to buy a TV on sale financed using store credit that does
not accrue interest for six months. The nicer the TV, the sweeter is the deal
both because the sale is steeper and because the six-month interest-free period
is more valuable. At the same time, it is more difficult to pay back a larger
loan in six months. Hence, the consumer chooses the TV which she believes
she can just pay off in time. But if she is even slightly naive, this TV will be
too nice, and she will fail to pay it off.
In fact, the above competitive equilibrium is the unique one:
Proposition 2.8 (Period-0 Screening). Suppose Condition 2.1 holds. Then, in
the unique competitive equilibrium with βˆ unobserved, each consumer accepts
the same contract as when βˆ is observed.
2.5 General Borrower Beliefs
In the basic model used throughout the paper, a borrower believes with cer-
tainty that her taste for immediate gratification will be βˆ (as in O’Donoghue
and Rabin 2001). While this assumption is analytically convenient, it is also
very special. In this section, we investigate outcomes for a general specification
of borrower beliefs that incorporates existing formulations of partial naivete
as special cases. We clarify when a discontinuity in outcomes and welfare at
full sophistication occurs, and identify an important asymmetry: while overes-
timating one’s self-control has drastic welfare consequences, underestimating
it has none.
Let the cumulative distribution function F (βˆ) with support in [0, 1] repre-
sent a borrower’s beliefs about her taste for immediate gratification β. Because
we cannot solve a model with fully general beliefs and preferences both un-
observed, we suppose that firms know borrowers’ β. Since firms have a lot of
information about consumers and spend a lot on researching their behavior,
we find this scenario plausible for many borrowers.
It is straight-forward to extend the definition of competitive equilibrium
to allow for a borrower to be uncertain about what she will choose in period
1. Our key result is the following:
Proposition 2.9. Both when firms know borrowers’ beliefs and when they do
not, in a competitive equilibrium the repayment schedule a borrower with beliefs
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F (·) actually chooses satisfies
k′(q) = 1; k′(r) =
1
F (β) + (1− F (β))β . (2.4)
The borrowed amount is c = q+r. If F (β) = 1, the borrower believes in period
0 that she will choose (q, r) with probability 1. If F (β) < 1, then there is a
unique other repayment schedule (qˆ, rˆ) such that the borrower believes in period
0 that she will choose (q, r) with probability F (β) and (qˆ, rˆ) with probability
1− F (β). This other schedule satisfies qˆ > 0, rˆ = 0 and q < qˆ < q + r.
Proposition 2.9 generalizes many of the central points regarding outcomes
and welfare we have made in this paper. In particular, non-sophisticated
consumers with F (β) < 1 delay repayment more often than they expect, and
they borrow more and have lower welfare than sophisticated consumers. In
addition, the fact that firms cannot observe consumers’ beliefs does not affect
the competitive equilibrium at all.26
Equation 2.4 in the proposition also clarifies that the extent to which a
non-sophisticated consumer overborrows, repays in a back-loaded way, and
has lower welfare than a sophisticated consumer, depends on 1 − F (β), the
probability she attaches to unrealistically high levels of self-control. As a re-
sult, whether a borrower with beliefs close to sophisticated has discontinuously
lower welfare than a sophisticated borrower depends on whether F (β) is close
to 1. We argue that for most natural senses in which beliefs can approach
sophistication, F (β) does not approach 1, so that near-sophisticated borrow-
ers will typically have discretely lower welfare than sophisticated borrowers.
Consider a sequence Fn of distributions, and let F
∗ be the distribution (cor-
responding to perfect sophistication) that assigns probability 1 to the true β.
As a possible example of an increase in sophistication, if each Fn+1 is obtained
by shifting Fn to the left, with the mean of Fn approaching β, then Fn(β) does
not approach 1, and this is the case even if the support of each Fn is extremely
tight. Alternatively, if the Fn are symmetric continuous distributions with
mean β whose variance approaches zero as n approaches infinity, Fn(β) does
not change at all (and is equal to one-half). Combining these two possibilities,
26 To see why borrowers self-select, notice that a borrower’s competitive-equilibrium con-
tract when beliefs are known maximizes her perceived expected utility subject to a zero-
profit condition determined by the borrower’s actual behavior. Since given the contract
the borrower signs her behavior is independent of her beliefs, the zero-profit condition is
independent of borrower beliefs. This implies that each borrower prefers the competitive-
equilibrium contract she gets with her beliefs known to contracts borrowers with other beliefs
get.
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if the Fn are symmetric continuous distributions whose mean approaches β
from above and whose variance approaches zero, then Fn(β) ≤ 1/2 for all n.
More generally, a natural formulation of convergence to sophistication with
general beliefs is that Fn → F ∗ in distribution (or, equivalently, Fn → F ∗
in probability), and this statement does not imply that Fn(β) → F ∗(β) = 1.
In fact, this implication seems extremely special, especially for sequences that
approach F ∗ from the direction of overoptimistic beliefs.
Intuitively, a non-sophisticated borrower has much lower utility than a
sophisticated borrower if she assigns a non-trivial probability to unrealistically
high levels of self-control. Knowing that these beliefs are wrong, firms offer
a contract that requires such unrealistic levels of self-control to repay in an
advantageous way, thereby making credit seem cheap and fooling the consumer
into overborrowing and paying a large fee for back-loading repayment. Note
that although we have assumed that β is known to firms, this intuition suggests
that the basic mechanism operates more generally—whenever there is a β such
that borrowers attach unrealistically high probability on average to βˆ > β, and
firms know this.
Proposition 2.9 and the above intuition make clear that in our setting,
previous formalizations of near sophistication can be seen as opposite ex-
tremes. Translated into our model, Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) and Asheim
(2008) assume that F (·) is binary, assigning probability p to being time-
consistent (β = 1) and probability 1 − p to the true β. In this model of
partial naivete, a near-sophisticated borrower puts a high probability on her
actual taste—1− p = F (β) ≈ 1—so she cannot be fooled much regarding how
she will repay. In the O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) model of partial naivete,
a near-sophisticated consumer puts zero weight on her actual taste or lower—
F (β) = 0—so she can be completely fooled. For many or most notions of near
sophistication, F (β) is neither close to zero nor close to one, so the borrower
can be partially fooled. This means that welfare is discretely lower than for
sophisticated consumers, although by less than with the O’Donoghue-Rabin
specification.
Proposition 2.9 also indicates that in a market situation, there is a fun-
damental asymmetry between overly optimistic and overly pessimistic beliefs
about time inconsistency. This is true at the individual level: the weight a
person puts on too high levels of βˆ has significant welfare implications, but
the weight she puts on too low levels of βˆ has no implications in that it is
as if she put the same weight on her true β. And a similar conclusion holds
when comparing individuals with different beliefs: whereas a small amount of
confident overoptimism (e.g. a degenerate βˆ > β) leads to a discontinuous
drop in welfare, a small amount of overpessimism (βˆ < β) leads to no welfare
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loss at all. The intuition derives from which kind of misprediction firms can
profitably take advantage of. As we have emphasized throughout the paper,
a firm can attract an overly optimistic borrower by leading her to think she
will repay more of her loan early than she actually will, making credit seem
cheap and generating overborrowing and a change of mind regarding repay-
ment. In contrast, the only way a firm could mislead a pessimistic borrower is
by making her think that she will repay less of her loan early than she actually
will. Since the borrower considers her future self too present-oriented to start
with, she would dislike this possibility, so she would be reluctant to sign such
a contract. Hence, there is no point in misleading her in this direction.27
Similarly to the predictions on contract terms and welfare in the unre-
stricted market, our conclusion that the restricted market can yield higher
welfare also extends, with minor qualifications, to the more general formula-
tion of borrower beliefs. By the same argument as in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, such
an intervention benefits near-sophisticated borrowers with F (β) non-trivially
different from 1. Since a borrower with F (β) ≈ 1 gets utility close to that
of a sophisticated borrower anyway, the same intervention cannot benefit her
by much. And since an overly pessimistic borrower gets the same utility as a
sophisticated borrower, she can only be made worse off by the intervention.
But while it will not help much, neither does the intervention hurt the lat-
ter two types of borrowers by much. Since the welfare gain for the former
types of borrowers is discrete, therefore, if there is even a very small fraction
of these borrowers in the population, a restricted market may have higher
social welfare than an unrestricted market. For the same reason, our model
implies that the restricted market can generate substantially higher welfare
even if borrowers are not only all close to sophisticated, but also on average
correct about their future preferences—with some overestimating β and some
underestimating it.28
27 The above logic also explains why for any borrower beliefs there are at most two
(relevant) repayment options in the competitive-equilibrium contract. To the extent that
the borrower puts weight on unrealistically high levels of self-control (βˆ > β), she can be
fooled into believing she will choose a cheap front-loaded repayment schedule, so a lender
offers a single repayment schedule that will make credit seem cheapest. To the extent that
the borrower puts weight on unrealistically low levels of self-control (βˆ < β), it is unprofitable
to fool her, so a lender offers the repayment option she will actually choose.
28 As we have discussed in Section 2.3, if many consumers are very naive it is unclear
whether the restricted market yields higher welfare than the unrestricted one. But even in
that case, a restricted market combined with an interest-rate cap is often better than an
unrestricted market.
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2.6 Related Literature
2.6.1 Related Psychology-and-Economics Literature
Our model builds on several recent papers on contracting with time-inconsistent
or boundedly rational consumers. While we discuss other differences between
these theories and ours below, the most important difference is that we con-
sider a richer set of welfare implications, and also analyze welfare-increasing
interventions.
Our paper belongs to the small literature on contracting with time incon-
sistency, including DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), Gottlieb (2008), and
Hafalir (2008) on specific contract forms and Ko˝szegi (2005) and Eliaz and
Spiegler (2006) on general non-linear contracts. Closest to our work, DellaV-
igna and Malmendier (2004) develop a model in which firms sell to time-
inconsistent individuals using two-part tariffs consisting of an initial lump-sum
transfer and a later price for consuming. Analogously to our prediction that
deferring repayment is costly, they show that for a product with immediate
benefits and delayed costs, the price is above cost. Although this has no wel-
fare effect in their setting, in an extension they also show that firms choose
renewal fees so that all non-sophisticated consumers mispredict whether they
will renew. But because their model exogenously imposes the contract forms,
and because it is not specifically written for the credit market, it does not
make many of our finer predictions on contract features and outcomes (such
as the overborrowing by non-sophisticated consumers, the excessively front-
loaded baseline repayment schedules, and the disproportionately large fees for
deferring small amounts of repayment).
Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) develop a two-period model in which a monopolist
offers contracts in the first period to a population of consumers who have
homogeneous time-inconsistent preferences about an action to be taken in the
second period, but attach heterogeneous prior probabilities to the change in
preferences. We modify Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) by assuming a different
form of naivete about preferences and by focusing on perfect competition, and
as a result get a discontinuity in outcomes and welfare at full sophistication
that is not present in their model. By extending their and our model to
allow for any borrower beliefs, we show that the discontinuity holds for many
or most forms of these beliefs. We also extend their theory by considering
heterogeneity in preferences in addition to beliefs. And we specialize their
model to a credit market in which time inconsistency derives from a taste
for immediate gratification, yielding specific predictions that would not make
immediate sense in their setting.
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Modeling a phenomenon that is clearly very important in credit markets,
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) assume that there is an exogenously given costly
add-on (e.g. a printer’s cartridge costs or a credit card’s fees) that naive con-
sumers might partially or fully ignore when making purchase decisions, and
that sophisticated consumers take steps to avoid. Gabaix and Laibson’s main
finding is that because competitive firms lose money on sophisticated con-
sumers and make money on naive consumers, they may not have an incentive
to debias the latter ones. While both forms of naivete are clearly relevant, our
focus is on what happens when consumers might misunderstand their reaction
to a contract rather than the terms of the contract. This has the advantage
that we can derive borrowers’ misprediction of the cost of credit from a general
model of consumer preferences and beliefs interacting with profit-maximizing
firms—rather than take this misprediction as exogenous—allowing us to en-
dogenize more features of credit contracts (e.g., a low-cost overly front-loaded
baseline repayment schedule along with a large penalty to switch out of it)
and propose plausible interventions. There is also a major difference between
the two models in the source of inefficiency: whereas in Gabaix and Laibson’s
model the welfare loss comes from sophisticated consumers’ costly effort to
avoid the add-on, in ours it derives largely from the suboptimal contracts non-
sophisticated borrowers receive—an aspect that seems very realistic for credit
markets.
Grubb (2009) considers contracting with consumers who overestimate the
extent to which they can predict their demand for a product (e.g., their cell-
phone usage). To exploit consumers’ misprediction, firms convexify the price
schedule by selling a number of units at zero marginal price and further units
at a positive marginal price. The high marginal price for high amounts of
consumption is similar to our basic prediction that deferring repayment is ex-
pensive. Unlike in Grubb (2009), however, in our setting the price of deferring
repayment is imposed as a large fee, and beyond this fee the marginal price
can be low to encourage self 1 to defer more of her repayment. This feature
seems consistent with credit markets; for instance, although a subprime mort-
gage typically carries a large prepayment penalty, once a borrower pays that
penalty there is little extra cost in refinancing more of the mortgage.
2.6.2 Predictions of Neoclassical Models
We are not aware of neoclassical theories that explain the contract features we
have derived. Beyond this observation, we argue in this section that natural
versions of neoclassical models do not generate qualitatively similar features.
Since the main predictions of our model concern a contract’s repayment
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terms and how a borrower chooses from these terms, we begin with discussing
situations in which there is heterogeneity in borrowers’ ability or willingness
to repay the loan fast—to which screening using repayment terms would seem
to be the natural response. If borrowers know at the time of contracting
whether they will be able to repay fast, it is optimal for lenders to offer an
expensive loan aimed at late payers that allows back-loaded repayment. But
a contract with a prepayment penalty is a very inefficient way of achieving
this—it would be better to simply offer an expensive mortgage that postulates
later repayment to start with, avoiding the costs of refinancing. Similarly, a
credit-card contract intended for a late payer could simply be more expensive
and have a longer grace period, rather than require fast repayment and feature
a large penalty for deviations.
If borrowers do not know at the time of contracting whether they will
be able to repay fast, but are rational regarding this uncertainty and are
time consistent, we get a situation of classical sequential screening (Courty
and Li 2000, for example) or post-contractual hidden knowledge (Laffont and
Martimort 2001, Section 2.11, for example). But specifying such a model
in a natural way for our setting yields essentially the opposite qualitative
contract features than what we have found. As a simple example in the context
of hidden knowledge, suppose that each borrower is interested in buying a
product for a price of 1, and she has the option of paying for the product out
of pocket in period 1. She can, however, also obtain a loan for buying the
product from a single lender. If the borrower obtains a loan, she pays back
an amount q in period 1 and an amount r in period 2, with costs θk(q) and
r, respectively. The variable θ, with support equal to some positive interval
[θ, θ], captures differences in the cost of repaying early. Neither party knows
θ at the time of contracting, but the borrower learns it before choosing q in
period 1. Then, it is easy to show that the lender’s optimal contract involves
a loan that is expensive if repaid early—if θ is low, the borrower wishes she
had paid out of pocket—but whose repayment schedule is free to change. In
contrast, our model predicts loans that are cheap if repaid early but whose
repayment terms are expensive to change.29
29 The formal derivation of the optimal contract in the case of hidden knowledge, as well
as some discussion of the above assumptions, is available from the authors upon request. By
the same basic logic, sequential screening seems to yield similarly different contracts from
those predicted by our theory. In the main example given by Courty and Li (2000), there
is a business traveler with highly uncertain valuation for an airplane ticket and a leisure
traveler with less uncertain valuation, and the airline screens these travelers by offering an
expensive refundable ticket to the business traveler and a cheap non-refundable ticket to
the leisure traveler. Analogously, a lender should offer an expensive flexible mortgage to
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While our model assumes no default and therefore ignores issues of credit
risk, it is unlikely that the contract features we have found could be explained
by this consideration. As shown in classical contributions by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) and Bester (1985, 1987), the primary screening tools lenders would use
when facing heterogeneity in credit risk are credit rationing and collateral
requirements. If there is a negative correlation between credit risk and the
ability to repay early, then screening in part using repayment terms might be
an optimal response. But if this was the case, borrowers who repay quickly
would be the most profitable—a prediction that is empirically false. Credit-
card companies only appear to break even on consumers who repay their full
bill every month, and make the bulk of their ex-post profits on consumers who
carry a balance (Ausubel 1991, Chakravorti and Emmons 2003). In fact, con-
sumers who regularly pay off their balances are sometimes referred to in the
industry as “deadbeats” or “freeloaders” (Chakravorti and Shah 2001). Simi-
larly, as mentioned above, subprime mortgage lenders seem to have generated
a significant portion of their profits from prepayment penalties and refinancing
fees.
The contract features we have derived also do not seem consistent with
a screening model in which rational time-consistent borrowers differ in their
need for credit. If this was the case, the primary screening tool lenders would
likely use is the amount of credit rather than the time structure of repayment.
Finally, the large penalties predicted by our theory are at first glance sim-
ilar to penalties used by principals in moral-hazard and screening models to
prevent an agent from taking actions the principal does not want.30 In con-
trast to these penalties that serve only a preventive role and that agents rarely
or never pay in equilibrium, in our model non-sophisticated borrowers do pay
the penalties. In fact, the penalties are a central source of firm profits and
designing them is a central part of a firm’s contract-design problem.
2.7 Conclusion
While it captures some salient features of real-world credit markets and iden-
tifies simple welfare-improving interventions, our setting leaves unanswered
important questions about whether and in what way partial naivete justifies
intervention. Although the intervention we propose is welfare-improving in the
borrowers who face uncertainty regarding their ability to repay early—one that is expensive
if repaid early but has a lot of flexibility on how to pay back.
30 In the classical case of moral hazard, see Mirrless (1999) and Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005, page 140).
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sense typically used in economics (social welfare), in the spirit of libertarian
paternalism’s (Sunstein and Thaler 2003) respect for individual liberty, we can
formulate another criterion for interventions: that they should be accepted by
consumers. In our theory, all borrowers believe they are rational, so if they
correctly predicted what contracts they would receive in a restricted market,
they would be against intervention. Investigating whether this generalizes to
settings where firms do not redistribute all of their profits to sophisticated bor-
rowers, and whether there are modifications of our intervention that consumers
would accept, is left for future work.
Another important issue we have completely ignored in this paper is the
source of consumer beliefs. Consumers may learn about their preferences from
their own behavior and that of the firms, and they often seem to have a
generic skepticism regarding contract offers even if they do not know how
exactly the contract is looking to exploit them. Since our model (like most
models of naivete with which we are familiar) starts from exogenously given
beliefs, it cannot easily accommodate such learning and meta-sophistication.31
Nevertheless, our results suggest that learning can sometimes lower welfare.
So long as a borrower does not become fully sophisticated, she might switch
away from her preferred repayment schedule ex post, so that her increased
sophistication does not help in achieving full self-control in repayment. In
addition, her pessimism might mean that—in a futile attempt at achieving
self-control—she chooses a worse deal up front, lowering her utility.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. (⇒) Suppose (c, C) satisfies the condition of the
lemma. Since only this contract is offered and it satisfies the borrower’s PC,
it is optimal for her to accept the contract and her choice between contracts
is trivial. Thus Condition 1 of Definition 2.2 is satisfied. Conditions 2 and
4 hold by construction. The key part is to check Condition 3. Consider a
contract (c′, C ′) with incentive compatible repayment terms that the borrower
strictly prefers. Incentive compatibility guarantees that the contract satisfies
IC and PCC, and the fact that the borrower strictly prefers it implies that PC
31 The only paper we know that systematically studies whether individuals will learn
their taste for immediate gratification is Ali (2011). In the model, a decisionmaker who is
too optimistic about her self-control does not restrict her choices, and hence keeps learning
about her self-control from her own behavior. As a result, overoptimism about self-control
tends to be eliminated by learning. Given the evidence that many people are overoptimistic,
we view Ali’s (2011) theory as deepening the puzzle of how learning affects the behavior of
time-inconsistent individuals.
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is satisfied when the outside option is u. Hence, because (c′, C ′) satisfies all
constraints that (c, C) does, and (c, C) is optimal given these constraints and
yields zero profits, (c′, C ′) cannot yield positive expected profits.
(⇐) Since there is only one βˆ type, there can only be one contract. Let
(c, C) be that competitive-equilibrium contract. Condition 4 (non-redundancy)
implies that there are only two repayment options in the contract, one for β1
and one for β2. Incentive compatibility implies that (c, C) satisfies IC and
PCC, and it trivially satisfies PC with u defined as the perceived utility from
(c, C). Now suppose by contradiction that (c, C) does not maximize profits
given these constraints. Then, there is a contract (c′, C ′) that satisfies the
same constraints and yields strictly positive profits. This means that for a
sufficiently small  > 0, (c′ + , C ′) attracts all borrowers and yields strictly
positive profits, violating Condition 3 of Definition 2.2.
Proof of Fact 2.1. It follows from Proposition 2.1 that she borrows
c = 2(k′)−1(1) and repays (k′)−1(1) in each period in the unrestricted market,
and from the proof of Proposition 2.3 that she borrows and repays the same
amounts in long-term restricted market.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. A sophisticated borrower correctly foresees
the repayment option she eventually chooses. Thus, a non-redundant contract
(i.e. one that satisfies Condition 4 of Definition 2.2) has a single repayment
option (q, r). Using this fact, Conditions 1 and 3 of Definition 2.2 imply that
any competitive contract (c, C) must solve
max
c,q,r
q + r − c
s.t. c− k(q)− k(r) ≥ u, (PC)
where u is the perceived utility from accepting the competitive contract (c, C).
It is clear that in the maximization problem above PC is satisfied with equality;
otherwise, the firm could increase profits by lowering c. Plugging PC into the
maximand, we can rewrite the firm’s problem as
max
q,r
q + r − k(q)− k(r).
Solving this maximization yields k′(q) = k′(r) = 1 in any competitive contract.
Furthermore, the zero-profit condition (Condition 2) implies that c = q + r,
and this completely characterizes the unique competitive-equilibrium contract.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. We have established in the text that qˆ >
0, rˆ = 0, k′(q) = 1, k′(r) = 1/β, and Lemma 2.1 implies that c = q + r. Using
Proposition 2.1, the sophisticated and non-sophisticated borrowers repay the
same amount in period 1, but the non-sophisticated borrower repays more
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in period 2. Hence, the non-sophisticated consumer borrows more than the
sophisticated one.
To show that q + r > qˆ, suppose by contradiction that qˆ ≥ q + r. Then,
notice that for a sufficiently small  > 0, self 0 strictly prefers the repayment
schedule (qˆ/2 + , qˆ/2 + ) to (qˆ, 0), the terms she thinks she is going to choose
with the competitive-equilibrium contract. Hence, the firm could increase
profits by offering a single repayment schedule (qˆ/2+, qˆ/2+), a contradiction.
Finally, from the proof of Proposition 2.1 it is clear that the contract offered
to a sophisticated borrower is the unique contract that maximizes period-0
welfare among all contracts that break even (c = q + r). Since the borrower’s
contract also breaks even and differs from the sophisticated one, the borrower
is strictly worse off than a sophisticated borrower.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Let a restricted contract be described by the
triplet (c, R, L), where c is consumption, R is the interest rate, and L is the
present discounted value of total repayment from the perspective of period 1,
using the interest rate R.
Consider sophisticated borrowers first. Notice that a contract with R =
1/β will induce the borrower to repay in equal installments. This means that
a contract that combines R = 1/β with the ex-ante optimal consumption level
c∗ and the competitive L∗ maximizes the borrower’s utility subject to the con-
straint that consumption is equal to total repayment. Conversely, no other
contract with which a firm breaks even maximizes the borrower’s utility: for
the borrower to repay according to k′(q) = k′(r) = 1, the contract must have
R = 1/β, L = L∗, and then for the firm to break even consumption must be c∗.
Hence, if this contract was not offered but firms made zero profits, for a suffi-
ciently small  > 0 the contract (c∗−, 1/β, L∗) could be profitably introduced.
Hence, (c∗, 1/β, L∗) is the unique competitive-equilibrium contract.
Now we consider non-sophisticated borrowers. For any R,L, there is a
unique repayment schedule (q, r) the borrower follows, and hence a unique
c(R,L) = q + r with which a firm breaks even. Let B be the set of contracts
(c(R,L), R, L); this is the set of contracts that if accepted break even given the
borrower’s actual behavior, and is independent of βˆ. Furthermore, consider the
borrower’s perceived utility U βˆ(c, R, L) as a function of (c, R, L) over B; this
is a function of βˆ. Notice that a competitive-equilibrium contract maximizes
U βˆ over B; otherwise, a firm could find a contract that breaks even and gives
the borrower higher perceived utility, and starting from this contract could
decrease c slightly, attracting the borrower and earning positive profits. To
see that competitive equilibrium exists, we first show that without loss of
generality we can assume that R ∈ [k′(0)/(βˆk′(M)), k′(M)/(βk′(0))], and L ∈
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[0,M +Mβˆk′(M)/k′(0)]. The borrower believes she will choose qˆ to solve
min
qˆ
k(qˆ) + βˆk(R(L− qˆ)) s.t. 0 ≤ qˆ ≤M and 0 ≤ R(L− qˆ) ≤M, (2.5)
and she actually chooses q to solve the above problem with q and β replacing qˆ
and βˆ. Hence, for any R ≥ k′(M)/(βk′(0)) we have a corner solution in which
q = qˆ = M and hence the second-period repayment amounts are rˆ = r =
R(L−M). The firm can thus replicate the outcome of any contract (c, R, L)
in which R > k′(M)/(βk′(0)) by one in which R = k′(M)/(βk′(0)) and L is
appropriately adjusted. Similarly, if R ≤ k′(0)/(βˆk′(M)), then q = qˆ = 0, so
that we can replace any contract featuring R < k′(0)/(βˆk′(M)) with a con-
tract featuring R = k′(0)/(βˆk′(M)). Hence, without loss of generality we can
restrict attention to contracts in which R ∈ [k′(0)/(βˆk′(M)), k′(M)/(βk′(0))].
Since repayment amounts in each period are bounded from above by M and
the interest rate from below by k′(0)/(βˆk′(M)), we can furthermore restrict at-
tention to L ∈ [0,M +Mβˆk′(M)/k′(0)]. Now since q, r (and hence c = q + r)
and qˆ, rˆ are continuous in R,L and R,L are chosen from compact sets, it
follows that a contract exists that maximizes U βˆ(c, R, L) over B.
Now notice that given a contract (c, R, L), the borrower’s perceived repay-
ment behavior is continuous in βˆ, R, L, which in turn implies that U βˆ(c, R, L)
is continuous in βˆ, c, R, L. For βˆ = β, we have shown above that U βˆ has a
unique maximum at (c∗, 1/β, L∗). We complete the proof by showing that as
a result, if βˆ → β, any selection of maximizers (c(βˆ), R(βˆ), L(βˆ)) of U βˆ over
B must approach (c∗, 1/β, L∗). This means that in the restricted market the
welfare of a non-sophisticated borrower approaches that of a sophisticated bor-
rower as βˆ → β. In contrast, by Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, in the unrestricted
market the welfare of a non-sophisticated borrower does not approach that of a
sophisticated borrower as βˆ → β, so for βˆ sufficiently close to β the restricted
market yields higher welfare.
Suppose by contradiction that there is some selection of maximizers (c(βˆ),
R(βˆ), L(βˆ)) of U βˆ over B that does not converge to (c∗, 1/β, L∗) as βˆ →
β. Since the (c(βˆ), R(βˆ), L(βˆ)) are within a compact set, there must be a
convergent subsequence with limit (c, R, L) 6= (c∗, 1/β, L∗). Since B is closed,
(c, R, L) ∈ B. We know that Uβˆ(c(βˆ), R(βˆ), L(βˆ)) ≥ Uβˆ(c∗, 1/β, L∗), so by
continuity Uβ(c, R, L) ≥ Uβ(c∗, 1/β, L∗), contradicting that Uβ has a unique
maximum over B at (c∗, 1/β, L∗).
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Let us call the restricted market in which the
interest rate is zero (i.e. R = 1) the capped market. We begin by showing
that the borrower’s consumption is lower in the capped market than in the
unrestricted market. Since self 0 thinks self 1’s cost of repayment is k(q) +
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βˆk(r), she believes that for any L, self 1 will choose the repayment schedule
by minimizing k(q) + βˆk(L− q) subject to q, L− q ≤M ; let the solution be qˆ,
and set rˆ = L − qˆ. In the competitive equilibrium of the capped market, the
amount of credit c maximizes the borrower’s perceived utility subject to c = L;
otherwise, the firm could offer a contract that both has higher perceived utility
and has c < L, attracting the borrower and making positive profits. We first
observe that the competitive-equilibrium c is such that qˆ, rˆ < M . Suppose by
contradiction that qˆ ≥ M or rˆ ≥ M . Then, because βˆ ≤ 1 implies rˆ ≥ qˆ,
we must have rˆ = M . Hence k′(rˆ) = k′(M) ≥ 1/β, and using the perceived
cost minimization of the borrower, k′(qˆ) ≥ βˆk′(rˆ) ≥ βˆ/β > 1. Therefore,
because the perceived marginal cost of repayment in both periods is strictly
greater than the marginal utility of consumption, decreasing c and L = c
by a small amount increases the borrower’s perceived utility independently
of how she believes she will allocate the decreased L across periods 1 and
2, a contradiction. By a similar argument, we can show that competitive-
equilibrium c is such that qˆ, rˆ > 0. Suppose by contradiction that this is not
the case. Since rˆ ≥ qˆ, this means that qˆ = 0. Then k′(qˆ) = k′(0) < β, and
therefore k′(rˆ) ≤ k′(qˆ)/βˆ < β/βˆ < 1. Hence, because the perceived marginal
cost of repayment in both periods is strictly lower than the marginal utility
of consumption, increasing c and L = c by a small amount increases the
borrower’s perceived utility independently of how she believes she will allocate
the increased L across periods 1 and 2, a contradiction.
Because in a competitive equilibrium 0 < qˆ, rˆ < M , the solution to the
borrower’s perceived repayment-cost minimization problem is described by the
first-order condition k′(qˆ) = βˆk′(L − qˆ). Let qˆ(L) denote the unique solution
to this first-order condition; this is the amount self 0 thinks self 1 will repay in
period 1 if she owes L. Note that qˆ(L) is a continuously differentiable function
of L, with a derivative strictly between zero and one.
Again using that the competitive-equilibrium c maximizes the borrower’s
perceived utility subject to L = c, the competitive-equilibrium c solves
max
c
c− k(qˆ(c))− k(c− qˆ(c)),
yielding the first-order condition
1 = k′(qˆ(c))qˆ′(c) + k′(rˆ(c))(1− qˆ′(c)).
Plugging in k′(rˆ(c)) = k′(qˆ(c))/βˆ gives
1 = k′(qˆ(c))[qˆ′(c) + (1− qˆ′(c))/βˆ].
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Since the term in square brackets is greater than 1, k′(qˆ(c)) ≤ 1, which implies
that k′(rˆ(c)) ≤ 1/βˆ < 1/β. Because qˆ(c) + rˆ(c) = L = c, we thus have
c < (k′)−1(1) + (k′)−1(1/β), which establishes that consumption is less than in
the unrestricted market.
Now we use the fact that the borrower consumes more in the unrestricted
market than in the capped market to show that she has lower welfare than in
the capped market. Simple arithmetic yields the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2. Suppose either (i) k(x) = xρ for some ρ > 1; or (ii) k(x) =
(y − x)−ρ − y−ρ for some y > 0, ρ > 0. Then, in the capped market c is
increasing in βˆ.
Proof. We begin by establishing this for case (i). The borrower expects to
repay c in a way such that k′(qˆ) = βˆk′(c− qˆ), which in case (i) simplifies to
qˆ(βˆ, c) =
βˆ
1
ρ−1
1 + βˆ
1
ρ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b(βˆ)
c. (2.6)
Thus, her perceived-period-zero utility is c− (b(βˆ)c)ρ − ((1− b(βˆ))c)ρ, which
can be rewritten as c − cρ
[
b(βˆ)ρ + (1− b(βˆ))ρ
]
. The borrower chooses c to
maximize her perceived utility so that 1 = ρcρ−1
[
b(βˆ)ρ + (1− b(βˆ))ρ
]
. Since
b(βˆ) is increasing and less than 1/2, the term in square brackets is decreasing
in βˆ, and thus c is increasing in βˆ.
In case (ii), let W ≡ 2y− c, s ≡ y− qˆ, and t ≡ y− rˆ. Hence in the capped
market t = W − s. Rewriting k′(qˆ) = βˆk′(c− qˆ), yields
s(βˆ,W ) =
βˆ
−1
1+ρ
1 + βˆ
−1
1+ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b(βˆ)
W. (2.7)
Observe that b(βˆ) is decreasing and greater than 1/2. The borrower’s perceived
period-zero utility is c −
(
b(βˆ)W (c)
)−ρ
−
(
(1− b(βˆ))W (c)
)−ρ
− 2y−ρ, which
can be rewritten as c−W (c)−ρ [b(βˆ)−ρ + (1− b(βˆ))−ρ]− 2y−ρ. Since the power
function with the exponent −ρ is convex, and b(βˆ) decreasing and greater
than 1/2, an increase in βˆ decreases the term in square brackets. Since at the
perceived optimal c, 1 = ρW (c)−(ρ+1)[b(βˆ)−ρ + (1− b(βˆ))−ρ], an increase in βˆ
must lead to a decrease of W (c) or—in other words—an increase in c.
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To complete the proof, consider contracts in the capped market and restrict
attention to contracts for which consumption is equal to total repayment (c =
L). We show that for any β, βˆ, the actual repayment amounts satisfy 0 <
q(c) ≤ r(c) < M . The part r(c) ≥ q(c) is obvious. For βˆ = β, we have
already established that qˆ(c) > 0 and thus q(c) > 0. Because by Lemma
2.2 c is increasing in βˆ, we also have q(c) > 0 for all βˆ ≥ β. For βˆ = 1,
k′(qˆ) = k′(rˆ) = 1. Since q(c) > 0 implies k′(q(c)) ≥ βk′(r(c)), we must have
k′(r(c)) < 1/β, so that r(c) < M . Again using Lemma 2.2, since c is increasing
in βˆ, for any βˆ ≤ 1 we must have r(c) < M .
Since 0 < q(c), r(c) < M , replacing βˆ by β in Equations 2.6 and 2.7 shows
that the repayment amounts q(c), r(c) increase linearly in c. Hence in the
capped market the borrower’s welfare is c − k(a1 + bc) − k(a2 + (1 − b)c) for
some constants a1, a2 ∈ R, and b ∈ (0, 1). Twice differentiating with respect to
c shows that for the utility functions in the proposition, among contracts where
R = 1 and c = L the borrower’s welfare is single-peaked in consumption. By
revealed preference, the maximum occurs at the consumption level that the
sophisticated borrower chooses in the capped market. Lemma 2.2 implies that
a non-sophisticated borrower consumes more in the capped market than the
sophisticated borrower, and we established above that she consumes even more
than that in the unrestricted market. This implies that she has lower welfare
in the unrestricted than in the capped market.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. The firm’s problem is
max
c,q,r,qˆ,rˆ
q + r − c
s.t. c− k(qˆ)− βˆk(rˆ) ≥ u, (PC)
−k(qˆ)− βˆk(rˆ) ≥ −k(q)− βˆk(r), (PCC)
−k(q)− k(r) ≥ −k(qˆ)− k(rˆ). (IC)
The steps in the analysis are very similar to those in the time-inconsistent
case. PC binds because otherwise the firm could increase profits by reducing
c. In addition, IC binds because otherwise the firm could increase profits by
increasing q. Given that IC binds and βˆ > 1, PCC is equivalent to q ≤ qˆ, so
conjecturing that q ≤ qˆ is optimal even without PCC, we ignore this constraint,
and confirm our conjecture in the solution to the relaxed problem below.
The relaxed problem is
max
c,q,r,qˆ,rˆ
q + r − c
s.t. c− k(qˆ)− βˆk(rˆ) = u, (PC)
−k(q)− k(r) = −k(qˆ)− k(rˆ). (IC)
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Notice that in the optimal solution, rˆ = 0: otherwise, the firm could decrease
k(rˆ) and increase k(qˆ) by βˆ times the same amount, leaving PC unaffected
and creating slack in IC, allowing it to increase q. Using this, we can express
k(q) from IC and plug it into PC to get
c = k(q) + k(r) + u.
Plugging c into the firm’s maximand and solving yields all the statements in
the proposition. Finally, using rˆ = 0 it follows from IC that qˆ > q, and thus
the solution to the relaxed problem indeed satisfies PCC.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. Applying Lemma 2.1, we set up a firm’s
problem as choosing a type-independent consumption c and a menu of type-
dependent repayment options {(q1, r1), (q2, r2)} subject to participation, in-
centive, and perceived-choice constraints. Notice that because both types
initially believe they are the sophisticated type β2 and the sophisticated bor-
rower chooses the baseline repayment schedule, the non-sophisticated bor-
rower’s perceived-choice constraint is identical to the sophisticated borrower’s
incentive constraint. As in textbook models of screening (e.g. Bolton and
Dewatripont 2005, Chapter 2), we solve a relaxed problem with only type
1’s incentive constraint, and verify ex-post that the solution satisfies type 2’s
incentive constraint. Given these considerations, the firm’s relaxed problem is
max
c,q1,r1,q2,r2
p1(q1 + r1) + p2(q2 + r2)− c (2.8)
s.t. c− k(q2)− k(r2) ≥ u, (PC)
−k(q1)− β1k(r1) ≥ −k(q2)− β1k(r2). (IC)
In the optimal solution, IC binds; otherwise, the firm could increase q1 with-
out violating IC or PC, increasing profits. In addition, PC binds; otherwise,
the firm could decrease c and thereby increase profits. From the binding con-
straints, we get k(q2) = c− k(r2)− u and k(q1) = k(q2) + β1(k(r2)− k(r1)).
We first establish uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium. Based on the
above arguments, the firm’s problem reduces to
max
c,q1,r1,q2,r2
p1(q1 + r1) + p2(q2 + r2)− c
c− k(q2)− k(r2) = u (PC)
k(q2) + β1k(r2) = k(q1) + β1k(r1). (IC)
We prove that r1 < r2 is suboptimal. Supposing by contradiction that r1 < r2,
using IC we have k(q2)+k(r2) = k(q1)+β1k(r1)+(1−β1)k(r2) > k(q1)+k(r1).
Then, if q1 + r1 ≥ q2 + r2, the firm could eliminate the repayment option
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(q2, r2) without decreasing profits, creating slack in PC and thereby allowing
it to decrease c. And if q1 + r1 < q2 + r2, the firm would be strictly better off
not offering (q1, r1), yielding the desired contradiction.
Now, substituting PC into the maximand gives
max p1(q1 + r1) + p2(q2 + r2)− k(q2)− k(r2)
k(q2) + β1k(r2) = k(q1) + β1k(r1) (IC).
Let A = k(q2), B = k(r2), D = k(r1) − k(r2). Then, k(r1) = B + D and
using the IC constraint k(q1) = A − β1D. Let f = k−1. Since k is strictly
increasing and strictly convex, f is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and
our assumptions on k furthermore ensure that limx→∞ f ′(x) = 0. Then, the
firm’s maximization problem can be written as
max
A≥0,B≥0,0≤D≤A/β1
p1(f(A−β1D)+f(B+D))+(1−p1)(f(A)+f(B))−A−B
(2.9)
with no constraints. The first-order conditions are:
p1f
′(A− β1D) + (1− p1)f ′(A) = 1, (FOCA)
p1f
′(B +D) + (1− p1)f ′(B) = 1, (FOCB)
f ′(B +D)− β1f ′(A− β1D) = 0. (FOCD)
Notice that there is a lower bound T such that if A,B ≥ T , then p1(f(A−
β1D) +f(B+D)) + (1−p1)(f(A) +f(B))−A−B ≤ 0 for any permissible D.
Since the maximand is strictly positive if the firm offers the optimal committed
contract (for which D = 0 and A = B = A − β1D = k[(k′)−1(1)]), this
means that there is a global maximum that either satisfies the above first-
order conditions or is at a corner. We show that for k′(0) < 1 − p1, β1, or
equivalently f ′(0) > 1/(1− p1), 1/β1, the global maximum is not at a corner.
It is clear from the derivatives of the maximand with respect to A and B that
the firm’s objective function does not obtain a maximum when A = 0 or B = 0.
If D = A/β1, either FOCB does not hold, in which case the maximum is not
attained, or FOCB holds, in which case f
′(B +D) < 1 and thus f ′(0) > 1/β1
implies that the derivative of the maximand with respect to D is negative,
ruling out such a corner solution. For D = 0, either FOCA and FOCB do not
both hold, in which case the maximum is not attained, or FOCA and FOCB
both hold, in which case f ′(A) = f ′(B) = 1 and hence the derivative of the
maximand with respect to D is positive, ruling out such a corner solution as
well.
We have established that a global maximum must satisfy the system of
first-order conditions. To prove that the competitive equilibrium is unique, we
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next show that the solution to the system of first-order conditions is unique.
Because k′(0) < p1 and hence f ′(0) > 1/p1, for any D ≥ 0 there is a unique
A > β1D satisfying FOCA; call this α
A(D). Since αA(D) is strictly increasing
in D, αA(D)−β1D must be strictly decreasing in D. Also, notice that if B ≥ 0
is fixed, then for any D ≥ 0 there is either a unique A ≥ β1D satisfying FOCD
or—in case f ′(B + D) > β1f ′(0)—there exists no solution to this first-order
condition; if a solution exists for some B and D, one also exists for higher
B and D. If the solution exists, we refer to it as αDB (D) and otherwise we
set αDB (D) = β1D. Note also that if α
D
B (D) > β1D, α
D
B (D) − β1D is strictly
increasing in D.
Since f is strictly concave, f ′ and f ′−1 are strictly decreasing. Consider
the range of B given by B ≤ f ′−1(β1), or equivalently f ′(B) ≥ β1. If for fixed
B and D = 0 there is an A satisfying FOCD, then α
D
B (0) = f
′−1(f ′(B)/β1);
and otherwise αDB (0) = 0. In either case, α
D
B (0) ≤ f ′−1(1) = αA(0). Using the
implicit function theorem,
dαA(D)
dD
= β1
p1f
′′(αA(D)− β1D)
p1f ′′(αA(D)− β1D) + (1− p1)f ′′(αA(D)) < β1,
and whenever αDB (D) > β1D,
dαDB (D)
dD
=
f ′′(B +D) + β21f
′′(αDB (D)− β1D)
β1f ′′(αDB (D)− β1D)
> β1.
Since at any crossing point of the two curves αA(D) = αDB (D) > β1D, this
means that at any crossing point αDB is steeper. In addition, since limy→∞ f
′(y) =
0, it follows from FOCD that as D → ∞, αDB (D) > β1D and f ′(αDB (D) −
β1D)→ 0 while FOCA implies that f ′(αA(D)−β1D) > 1 for any D > 0. Hence
αDB (D) > α
A(D) for sufficiently large D. Summarizing, since αDB (0) ≤ αA(0),
αDB (D) is steeper than α
A(D) at any crossing point, both curves are contin-
uous, and for a sufficiently high D we have αDB (D) > α
A(D), for this range
of B there is a unique A and D satisfying first-order conditions FOCA and
FOCD. Call these solutions A
∗(B) and D∗(B), respectively. If B > f ′−1(β1)
then αDB (0) > α
A(0) > β1D and since α
D
B (D) is steeper than α
A(D) at any
crossing point no solution to the first-order conditions FOCA and FOCD exists
in this range of B.
To complete the proof, notice that since αA(D) is independent of B and
αDB (D) is increasing in B, A
∗(B) and D∗(B) are decreasing in B; by FOCA,
this means that A∗(B)− β1D∗(B) is increasing in B, which by FOCD means
that B+D∗(B) is increasing in B. Hence, the function p1f ′(B+D∗(B))+(1−
p1)f
′(B), which is continuous in B, is strictly decreasing in B. Furthermore,
60
               dc_785_13
2.7. CONCLUSION 61
because k′(0) < 1−p1, f ′(0) > 1/(1−p1), so p1f ′(0+D∗(0))+(1−p1)f ′(0) > 1.
Since for B = f ′−1(β1), αDB (0) = αA(0), one has β1 = f
′(B) = f ′(B + D∗(B))
for this value of B. Hence for B = f ′−1(β1), one has p1f ′(B +D∗(B)) + (1−
p1)f
′(B) < 1. Since p1f ′(B + D∗(B)) + (1 − p1)f ′(B) is strictly decreasing
in B, this implies there exists a unique B ∈ (0, f ′−1(β1)) for which B,D∗(B)
satisfies FOCB. Because for B ≤ f ′−1(β1), A∗(B), D∗(B) characterize a solu-
tion to FOCA and FOCB, we have shown that B,A
∗(B), D∗(B) is the unique
solution to the system of first-order conditions. Thus we have shown that the
competitive equilibrium is unique.
To characterize the optimal installment plan, we invert the expressions
for k(q1) and k(q2) found above and plug them into the principal’s objective
function, yielding
max
c,r1,r2
p1
[
k−1
(
c− k(r2)− u+ β1 (k(r2)− k(r1))
)
+ r1
]
+ p2
[
k−1
(
c− k(r2)− u
)
+ r2
]− c. (2.10)
The first-order-conditions with respect to r1 and r2 are:
p1
[
1− β1k
′(r1)
k′(q1)
]
= 0,
p2
[
1− k
′(r2)
k′(q2)
]
− p1(1− β1)k
′(r2)
k′(q1)
= 0.
Rewriting these first-order conditions gives the equations in the proposition,
which in turn imply that q1 < r1 and q2 > r2. It remains to establish that
q1 + r1 > q2 + r2. Suppose by contradiction that q1 + r1 ≤ q2 + r2. Then the
firm would be at least as well off offering a single repayment option (q2, r2):
the resulting contract satisfies PC and, since there is no choice in period 1, it
also satisfies PCC and IC, and yields at least as high profits. This, however,
contradicts the fact that in any optimal contract q1 < r1 and q2 > r2.
Finally, we show that borrowers overborrow on average. Taking the first-
order condition of the maximization problem 2.10 with respect to c gives
p1
1
k′(q1)
+ p2
1
k′(q2)
= 1.
By Jensen’s inequality, the left-hand side is greater than
1
p1k′(q1) + p2k′(q2)
,
which gives p1k
′(q1) + p2k′(q2) > 1.
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To show the analogous inequality for r1 and r2, we solve for k(r1) and
k(r2) from the binding constraints (instead of solving for k(q1) and k(q2)),
invert these, and plug them into the principal’s objective function to get
max
c,q1,q2
p1
[
q1 + k
−1(c− k(q2)− u+ (k(q2)− k(q1)) /β1)]
+ p2
[
q2 + k
−1(c− k(q2)− u)]− c.
Again taking the first-order condition with respect to c and using Jensen’s
inequality completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.7. First, we show that the borrower strictly
prefers the unrestricted market over the restricted one by showing that the
perceived utility u generated by the competitive-equilibrium contract in the
unrestricted market is higher than the borrower’s perceived utility in the re-
stricted market. Suppose by contradiction that this is not the case. Then, a
contract with the consumption and repayment terms the two types of borrow-
ers choose in the restricted market satisfies the constraints PC, IC, and PCC
in Lemma 2.1, and breaks even, and is therefore a competitive-equilibrium
contract. But this is impossible since a competitive equilibrium identified in
Proposition 2.6 does not replicate outcomes in the restricted market: for the
condition k′(q1) = β1k′(r1) to hold, the firm needs to set R = 1, and at this
interest rate sophisticated borrowers will not repay more in period 1 than 2.
Since sophisticated borrowers understand their behavior, the fact that their
perceived utility is higher than in the restricted market implies that their actual
welfare is also higher.
We next consider social welfare. The same steps as in Proposition 2.3
establish that as β1 → β2, the competitive-equilibrium contract approaches
(c∗, 1/β2, L∗), so that both types’ outcomes approach the welfare-maximizing
outcome (the only difference in the argument is that the break-even c(R,L)
must be defined in expectation). Since in the unrestricted market k′(q1) =
β1k
′(r1) for any β1 < β2, total welfare remains bounded away from the welfare-
maximizing level as β1 → β2. Hence, for β1 sufficiently close to β2 the re-
stricted market yields higher social welfare. Finally, since a non-sophisticated
borrower has lower welfare than a sophisticated borrower, the fact that total
welfare remains bounded away from optimal as β1 → β2 implies that the non-
sophisticated borrower’s welfare also does. Since her welfare in the restricted
market approaches the optimum as β1 → β2, for β1 sufficiently close to β2 the
restricted market yields higher welfare for her.
Proof of Proposition 2.8. We begin by establishing that there is a
competitive equilibrium in which the same contracts are offered as when βˆ is
known and each borrower selects the contract designed for her belief βˆ. We first
62
               dc_785_13
2.7. CONCLUSION 63
show borrower optimality (Condition 1 of Definition 2.2). Since a borrower of
type βˆ expects to choose the baseline repayment option in a contract intended
for any βˆ′ ≤ βˆ, among these contracts she prefers the one intended for her
because by Condition 2.1 it gives her the highest perceived period-0 utility.
Second, while from a period-0 perspective the borrower prefers the baseline
option in the contract for βˆ′ > βˆ to the baseline option in the contract for
her own type, she also believes that she will switch away from this option ex
post. Once she takes this into account, the period-0 utility from the contract
designed for βˆ′ > βˆ is lower. To see this last point, suppose by contradiction
that a type βˆ preferred to select the contract designed for βˆ′ > βˆ. Then, the
contract for βˆ is suboptimal when βˆ is known: the contract designed for βˆ′
both attracts βˆ types and induces all of them to choose the non-sophisticated
repayment option, which by Proposition 2.6 is strictly profitable, and thus this
contract guarantees positive profits when βˆ is known. Since the contracts are
identical to the ones in which βˆ is observable they satisfy the zero-profit and
non-redundancy requirements (Conditions 2 and 4). Furthermore, Condition
3 is satisfied because any other contract that gives a borrower of type βˆ a
higher perceived utility makes losses on this type of borrowers, since otherwise
this contract could also be profitably introduced when βˆ is observable.
Now we argue that this competitive equilibrium is unique. Consider any
purported equilibrium in which not all βˆ types are offered the competitive-
equilibrium contract for the case in which βˆ is known. Let u′i be the perceived
utility of βˆi in this situation. First, we show that there is some i such that
u′i < ui. Suppose by contradiction that u
′
i ≥ ui for all i. Then, even if βˆ was
observable, a firm could only break even on each type, and do so only using
the competitive-equilibrium contract for each type—contradicting that not all
βˆ types get the same contract as when βˆ is known.
Now consider the highest i such that u′i < ui. For a sufficiently small  > 0,
a contract that is optimal for type βˆi with the outside option u
′
i +  attracts βˆi
and makes positive expected profits on this type. Furthermore, since for any
j > i, u′i < ui ≤ uj ≤ u′j, the contract does not attract higher βˆj. If it attracts
βˆj for some j < i, it makes strictly positive profits on these borrowers, since
they all select the non-sophisticated repayment option in the contract. Hence,
the contract makes positive expected profits.
Proof of Proposition 2.9. As in the case of degenerate borrower beliefs,
the notion of competitive equilibrium is based on the notion of incentive com-
patible maps determining what a borrower expects to choose for each possible
βˆ and what she actually chooses (similarly to Definition 2.1). Accordingly,
we think of a firm’s problem as selecting (qˆ(βˆ), rˆ(βˆ)) the borrower thinks she
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will choose for each possible βˆ, as well as a (q, r) = (qˆ(β), rˆ(β)) the borrower
actually chooses, where qˆ(·) and rˆ(·) must be incentive compatible.
First suppose that firms know F (·). Denote the support of F by F . Rewrit-
ing 2.1, the firm’s problem is
max
c,q,r,qˆ(βˆ),rˆ(βˆ)
q + r − c
s.t.
∫ [
c− k(qˆ(βˆ))− k(rˆ(βˆ))
]
dF (βˆ) ≥ u, (PC)
−k(qˆ(βˆ))− βˆk(rˆ(βˆ)) ≥ −k(qˆ(βˆ′))− βˆk(rˆ(βˆ′)) for any βˆ ∈ F , βˆ′ ∈ F ∪ {β},
(PCC)
−k(q)− βk(r) ≥ −k(qˆ(βˆ))− βk(rˆ(βˆ)) for any βˆ ∈ F . (IC)
As before, PC binds because otherwise a firm could raise profits by decreasing
c. Notice that for any βˆ ≤ β, for PCC and IC to both hold we must have
qˆ(βˆ) ≤ q and rˆ(βˆ) ≥ r. Hence, the IC constraint k(q) + βk(r) ≤ k(qˆ(βˆ)) +
βk(rˆ(βˆ)) implies that k(q)+k(r) ≤ k(qˆ(βˆ))+k(rˆ(βˆ)), with a strict inequality if
(q, r) 6= (qˆ(βˆ), rˆ(βˆ)). Hence, given PC it is optimal to set (qˆ(βˆ), rˆ(βˆ)) = (q, r)
for all βˆ ≤ β, and in any optimal contract the set of βˆ ≤ β for which this
equality does not hold must have measure zero under the agent’s beliefs F (·).
Next consider βˆ > β. We ignore PCC for these βˆ; it is obvious to check
that the resulting contract satisfies it. It is optimal to set rˆ(βˆ) = 0 for all
βˆ > β: for any βˆ with rˆ(βˆ) > 0, we can decrease k(rˆ(βˆ)) by some amount and
increase k(qˆ(βˆ)) by β times the same amount, leaving IC unaffected and weakly
increasing the left-hand side of PC. Furthermore, in any optimal contract the
set of βˆ > β for which rˆ(βˆ) > 0 must have measure zero; otherwise, these steps
would create a slack in PC, allowing the firm to decrease c. With rˆ(βˆ) = 0
for all βˆ > β (other than a measure zero set under F (·)), it is optimal to set
qˆ(βˆ) = qˆ at the level such that IC binds, and the set of βˆ > β for which this
is not the case must have measure zero under F (·).
Given these simplifications, the firm’s problem becomes
max
c,q,r,qˆ,rˆ
q + r − c
s.t. F (β) [c− k(q)− k(r)] + (1− F (β)) [c− k(qˆ)] = u, (PC)
−k(q)− βk(r) = −k(qˆ). (IC)
Expressing k(qˆ) from IC, plugging it into PC, and solving for c and plugging
it into the maximand yields that the firm wants to maximize
q + r − k(q)− [F (β) + (1− F (β))β] k(r).
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Solving this yields Equation 2.4. That q < qˆ < q+ r follows from the fact that
IC binds.
Finally, we argue that the above (essentially unique) contract is the competitive-
equilibrium contract for a borrower with beliefs F (·) even if firms do not ob-
serve borrowers’ beliefs. The argument is in two parts.
I. Offering these contracts is a competitive equilibrium. To see this, notice
first that the profits a firm earns from an accepted contract are independent of
the borrowers’ beliefs. Suppose by contradiction that a borrower with beliefs
F (βˆ) strictly prefers the contract (c′, C ′) to a contract (c, C) we have solved
for above. Then, the firm could offer a contract (c′ − , C ′) for some  > 0
when F (βˆ) is known and earn strictly positive profits, contradicting the no-
profitable-deviation condition of competitive equilibrium.
II. There is no other competitive equilibrium. Let (c, C) = (q + r, {(qˆ, 0),
(q, r)}) be the (essentially unique) competitive-equilibrium contract when F (·)
is known (for which we have solved above). Suppose by contradiction that
there is a competitive equilibrium in which a borrower with beliefs F (·) ac-
cepts a contract (c′, C ′) that does not satisfy the conditions specified in the
proposition. Let u′ be her perceived utility from (c′, C ′), and let u be her per-
ceived utility from (c, C). Notice that u maximizes the borrower’s perceived
utility among contracts that earn zero profits given the borrower’s actual be-
havior. Since (c′, C ′) is not a competitive equilibrium when F (·) is known
but earns zero profits, this implies that u > u′. Therefore, a firm can offer
(c − , C), and for a sufficiently small  > 0 both attract the borrower with
beliefs F (·) and make positive profits from her. Since a borrower’s behavior is
independent of her beliefs, a firm still makes positive profits if it also attracts
other borrowers, contradicting the no-profitable-deviation condition.
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Chapter 3
Competition and Price Variation when
Consumers are Loss Averse1
3.1 Introduction
Menu costs, tacit collusion, search costs, kinked demand curves, and many
other theories have been invoked to explain a widespread empirical fact: that
prices in imperfectly competitive industries often do not change when costs or
demand change.2 Existing theories, however, cannot convincingly account for
another way in which prices vary surprisingly little: they are often identical
across differentiated products. As is part of industrial-organization folklore
starting from Hall and Hitch (1939) and Sweezy (1939) and is documented by
the Competition Commission of the United Kingdom (1994), Beck (2004), and
Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2007), many non-identical competitors charge identical,
“focal,” prices for their differentiated products. In addition, as documented
for instance by McMillan (2004) and Einav and Orbach (2007) and familiar to
anyone who has bought clothes, books, or movie tickets, many retailers selling
multiple products with different cost and/or demand characteristics charge the
same, “uniform,” price for them.
1This chapter is coauthored with Paul Heidhues, and appeared in the American Economic
Review (2008), 98(4), pp. 1245-1268.
2 Indirect evidence for this fact—often referred to as price stickiness—is provided by
Kashyap (1995), Slade (1999), and Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003), who document in
various retail industries that regular prices typically do not change for months at a time.
There is also direct evidence that marginal-cost changes are sometimes fully absorbed by
retailers (Competition Commission of the United Kingdom 1994, page 150, Section 7.41).
And evidence on countercyclical markups reviewed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
suggests that even when prices do adjust to circumstances, they move less than marginal
costs.
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To explain the above tendencies toward reduced price variation, we develop
a model of price competition between profit-maximizing firms selling to loss-
averse consumers. Because consumers are especially averse to paying a price
when it exceeds their expectation of the purchase price, the price responsive-
ness of demand—and hence the intensity of competition—is greater at higher
than at lower market prices, reducing or eliminating price variation. Unlike
in most previous theories, this logic applies both to different possible prices
of the same product and to prices of different products, so that our theory
not only explains the unresponsiveness of prices to changing circumstances, it
also often predicts focal and uniform pricing as the unique outcome even for
asymmetric firms and products. And because a change in the responsiveness of
demand affects competition more when the value of an extra consumer is high,
we predict that these tendencies are stronger in more concentrated industries.
Section 3.2 presents our model and illustrates our solution concepts and
some key results using a two-firm example. Building on Salop (1979), a con-
sumer’s “taste” is drawn uniformly from the circumference of a circle, and
she is looking to buy exactly one of n products located equidistant from each
other on the same circle. Her utility from or “satisfaction with” a product is
decreasing in the product’s distance from her taste, and she also suffers ad-
ditive disutility from paying the product’s price. But (applying Ko˝szegi and
Rabin 2006, 2007) we posit that in addition to this intrinsic utility, a consumer
derives gain-loss utility from comparing outcomes in money and product sat-
isfaction to her lagged rational expectations about those outcomes, with losses
being more painful than equal-sized gains are pleasant. For example, if she
had been expecting to spend $14.99 on a Britney Spears CD—her favorite
music—she experiences a sensation of loss if she buys that CD for $18.98, and
also if she instead buys a—less agreeable—Madness CD for $14.99.3 And if
she expected to pay either $14.99 or $19.99 for something, paying $18.98 for
it generates a mixture of two feelings, a loss of $3.99 and a gain of $1.01, with
the weight on the loss equal to the probability with which she expected to pay
$14.99.
The firms, none of whom owns two neighboring products, are standard:
they face uncertain privately observed costs of production and simultaneously
set prices to maximize expected profits given other firms’ behavior and con-
sumer expectations. We begin the analysis in Section 3.3 by showing that
the necessary and sufficient condition for a focal-price equilibrium—an equi-
librium in which all firms always charge the same focal price p∗—to exist is
3 Actual prices are taken on September 4th, 2005, from www.amazon.com. $14.99 is the
retail price of both CD’s (and numerous others), while $18.98 is a typical list price.
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that any two cost realizations of any two firms are within a given constant.
This condition allows for, say, one firm to have higher costs than another in all
states of the world. If consumers had expected to pay p∗ with probability one,
they assess buying at a price greater than p∗ as a loss in money and buying
at a price lower than p∗ merely as a gain in money, so that demand is more
responsive to unilateral price increases than decreases from p∗. Due to this
asymmetry, for a range of cost levels p∗ is the optimal price to charge.
We next establish two properties of focal-price equilibria. First, a focal-
price equilibrium is more likely to exist in more concentrated industries. Since
the profits from a consumer are higher in this environment, the asymmetric
demand responsiveness at p∗ creates a greater difference in marginal profits
from price increases versus price decreases from p∗, and hence yields a greater
range of costs for which p∗ is the optimal price to charge. Second, loss aversion
increases prices. Since a consumer is more sensitive to a loss from getting a
surprisingly low product satisfaction than to a gain from paying surprisingly
little, attracting her from a competitor is difficult, decreasing competition.
In Section 3.4, we derive a sufficient condition that guarantees that any
equilibrium is a focal-price equilibrium, even though it does not require firms
to have the same cost distribution. The key is to argue that a firm sets a
deterministic price in any equilibrium; then, if the supports of firms’ cost
distributions have even a single common point, firms cannot charge different
deterministic prices, so any equilibrium is a focal-price one. If the consumer
expected a firm’s prices to be stochastic, the sense of loss from comparing
the realized price to lower possible ones would make her demand more re-
sponsive at higher than at lower prices in the firm’s anticipated distribution.
Then, if the firm’s costs do not vary much, in contradiction to equilibrium it
could increase profits either by decreasing high prices (attracting a lot of extra
demand) or by increasing low prices (not losing much demand).
In Section 3.5, we characterize all equilibria with common stochastic marg-
inal costs and symmetric pricing strategies. This leads to a tractable model for
studying price variation when conditions for focal pricing are not necessarily
met, and for analyzing firms’ responses to industry-wide cost shocks. As above,
if a consumer had expected stochastic prices, her demand is more responsive
at higher than at lower prices within the anticipated price distribution. Hence,
competition is fiercer at higher prices, leading to markups that strictly decrease
in cost. Using the empirical observation that costs are strongly procyclical,
this means that markups are countercyclical. In addition, in some regions of
cost it may be that competition at higher prices is tougher to an extent that is
inconsistent with firms raising their price in response to cost increases at all.
In such regions, the price must be constant in cost.
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In Section 3.6, we argue that our results are robust to a number of modi-
fications of our model, including dynamics, demand asymmetries and shocks,
heterogeneity in consumer preferences, and the endogenous determination of
the number of firms. In Section 3.7, we discuss theories of pricing most closely
related to our model. By dint of predicting equal and sticky prices even in
a one-shot setting, our theory cautions against the common interpretation of
these patterns as signs of collusion. In fact, we can go further: because playing
an equilibrium with equal in addition to sticky prices does not help firms in
detecting each other’s deviations, models of collusion do not provide a com-
pelling reason for ex-ante asymmetric firms to set equal prices, whereas our
theory does. In the same vein, other explanations of price stickiness are not
intended to, and largely do not, predict focal and uniform pricing. For in-
stance, menu costs may explain sticky pricing and can perhaps contribute to
uniform pricing, but they cannot address equal pricing across firms. And if
unexpected price increases trigger costly search by consumers but unexpected
price decreases do not, sticky pricing can result, but there is no reason for
differentiated products to have the same price.
3.2 Setup and Illustration
This section introduces our theory and explains the solution concepts and some
key results through simple examples and heuristic calculations. We incorpo-
rate consumer loss aversion into the model of Salop (1979) using a disciplined
approach introduced by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006): we base the reference-
dependent “gain-loss utility” on classical “intrinsic utility” taken straight from
Salop (1979) and fully endogenize the reference point as lagged rational ex-
pectations. If there is no loss aversion, our theory reduces to Salop’s.
3.2.1 Reference-Dependent Utility
A mass of one of consumers have tastes χ ∈ [0, 1] distributed uniformly on
the circumference of a circle with perimeter one. There are n ≥ 2 products
denoted y1, . . . , yn on the same circle equidistant from each other. A consumer
can buy at most one product, and to avoid unenlightening extra notation, we
assume her utility from not consuming is negative infinity, so that she always
does buy a product.4 Letting d(χ, y) denote the distance of χ and y on the
4 Our results would be identical if consumers had an option of not buying, but v below was
sufficiently high (or costs and product differentiation sufficiently low) that no consumer took
advantage of this option in equilibrium. And in Section 3.6, we argue that our qualitative
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circle, the intrinsic utility of consumer χ from buying product y at price p
is v − t · d(χ, y) − p, where k1 = v − t · d(χ, y) is her intrinsic utility from or
“satisfaction” with the good and k2 = −p is her intrinsic utility from paying its
price. Like previous authors, we interpret χ as the consumer’s “ideal variety,”
and t · d(χ, y) as her disutility from consuming a product y different from her
ideal. The constant t is a measure of the (intrinsic) differentiation between
products.
For a riskless consumption outcome k = (k1, k2) and riskless reference point
r = (r1, r2) defined over product satisfaction and money, total utility u(k|r)
is composed of two additive terms: intrinsic utility introduced above, and
reference-dependent “gain-loss utility” equal to µ(k1 − r1) + µ(k2 − r2). To
capture loss aversion, we assume that µ is two-piece linear with a slope of 1
for gains and a slope of λ > 1 for losses.5 This specification incorporates three
key assumptions. First, the consumer assesses gains and losses in the two
dimensions, satisfaction and money, separately. Hence, she evaluates a good
that costs more but is closer to her ideal than the reference point as a loss in
money and a gain in satisfaction—and not, for example, as a single gain or
loss depending on total intrinsic utility relative to the reference point. This is
consistent with much experimental evidence commonly interpreted in terms of
loss aversion.6 Second, while money is on a different psychological dimension
from any of the n products, our model also says that the n products are on
the same dimension. This assumption reflects our impression that goods that
compete most strongly with each other are typically hedonically substitutable;
indeed, that is partly why they compete. Third, since the gain-loss utility
function µ is the same in both dimensions, the consumer’s sense of gain or loss
is directly related to the intrinsic value of the changes in question. While we
find this assumption psychologically realistic, we point out in Section 3.6 that
results on reduced price variation would survive even if consumers made a relevant decision
of whether to buy.
5 In order not to clutter our formulas with extra notation, we do not introduce a weight
on gain-loss utility relative to intrinsic utility. This does not qualitatively affect any of our
results, and we have confirmed that our calibration at the end of Section 3.3 also remains
unchanged.
6 Specifically, it is key to explaining the endowment effect and other observed regularities
in riskless trades. The common and intuitive interpretation of the endowment effect—that
randomly assigned “owners” of an object value it more highly than “non-owners”—is that
owners construe giving up an object as a painful loss that counts more than the money
they receive in exchange, so they attach a high monetary value to the object. But if gains
and losses were defined over the value of an entire transaction, owners would not be more
sensitive to giving up the object than to receiving money in exchange, so no endowment
effect would ensue.
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it is only necessary for one of our results, Proposition 3.2.
Since we assume below that the reference point is expectations, we extend
the above utility function to allow for the reference point to be a probability
measure Γ over R2:
U(k|Γ) =
∫
r
u(k|r)dΓ(r). (3.1)
In evaluating k, the consumer compares it to each possibility in the reference
lottery. For example, if she had been expecting to pay either $15 or $20 for
her favorite CD, paying $17 for it feels like a loss of $2 relative the possibility
of paying $15, and like a gain of $3 relative to the possibility of paying $20. In
addition, the higher the probability with which she expected to pay $15, the
more important is the loss in the overall experience.
We assume that consumers’ prior on χ is identical to the population dis-
tribution, U [0, 1]. Since it gives rise to the same distribution of satisfaction
from each product, an equivalent model is one in which consumers know their
ideal variety, but are uncertain about the positioning of products.7 A situation
where consumers have a very good idea about their ideal variety as well as the
products offered corresponds to a narrow or even degenerate prior distribution
on χ, and yields a different model. In Section 3.6, we argue that our results
in Sections 3.3 and 3.5 carry over to this case unchanged, and that reasonable
specifications also yield our results in Section 3.4.
3.2.2 Concepts and Results: Illustration
While Section 3.2.1 defined how the consumer’s utility depends on her reference
point, we must also specify what the reference point is and how firms behave
when selling to loss-averse consumers. In this section we illustrate some of
our definitions and results in a two-firm example and without the full formal
detail of later sections.
To both motivate our model of reference-point determination and explain a
key result, suppose the two firms in the market are expected to set determinis-
tic prices p1 and p2 > p1 for products 1 and 2. In the face of these prices, what
is the consumer’s reference point for evaluating her purchase? We posit that it
is her lagged rational expectations about outcomes. But since these depend on
her own behavior, our assumption requires elaboration. To illustrate, suppose
that the consumer had planned to buy the cheaper product if her taste is within
distance α ∈ (1/4, 1/2) of firm 1, and to buy the expensive product otherwise,
7 More precisely, our model is identical to one in which each consumer knows her ideal
variety, and product 1’s location is drawn from a uniform distribution on the circle, with
the n products still equidistant from each other.
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as shown on the left-hand side of Figure 3.1. This plan induces an expected
purchase-price distribution F with mass 2α on p1 (the probability that χ falls
within α of y1 = 0) and mass 1− 2α on p2, as well as an expected distribution
of the purchased product’s distance from ideal that is shown on the right-hand
side of Figure 3.1. Hence, the consumer’s reference point—and so her utility
at the time of purchase—is affected by the plans she had formed earlier: if
α is higher, she expected to pay less and get lower product satisfaction with
higher probability, which makes paying a high price more painful and getting a
less satisfying product less painful. To close the model, we follow Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006) in requiring a consistency condition called personal equilibrium:
the consumer can only make plans she knows she will follow through. In the
current setting, this means that given the expectations above, when she has
taste α the consumer must be indifferent between purchasing from firms 1 and
2.
While our model of consumer behavior is new, firm behavior is more or less
standard: each firm maximizes expected profits given other firms’ behavior
and the consumer’s reference point.8 As in a standard model, a major factor
in determining equilibrium is the consumer’s reaction to price changes. To
understand a key part of this reaction, we focus on the money dimension. If
the consumer above (unexpectedly) pays a price p satisfying p1 < p < p2, her
reference-dependent utility in money is
−p− λ(2α)(p− p1) + (1− 2α)(p2 − p).
The first term is intrinsic utility. The second term represents a sense of loss
from comparing p to the lower expected purchase price p1—a loss of p − p1
weighted by the probability with which she expected to pay p1, 2α. And the
third term represents a gain from comparing p to the higher expected purchase
price p2—a gain of p2−p weighted by the probability with which she expected
to pay p2, 1−2α. Hence, a small price increase decreases the consumer’s utility
in the money dimension by 1 + λ(2α) + (1− 2α). More generally, at any price
p that is not a mass point of the expected purchase-price distribution F , the
utility impact of a marginal price change is equal to 1+λ ·F (p)+1 ·(1−F (p)).
The intuition is simple. Paying p is experienced as a loss relative to lower prices
in the expected purchase-price distribution, and as a gain relative to higher
prices in that distribution. Due to this “comparison effect,” a change in p is
counted as a change in loss with weight F (p)—the probability with which the
8 We assume profit maximization to capture our impression that firms display reference-
dependent preferences far less than consumers do, and to isolate the effect of consumer loss
aversion on market outcomes.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of a Consumer’s Plans with Two Firms Charg-
ing Deterministic Prices
The figure on the left illustrates the consumer’s strategy: if her taste is within
distance α ∈ (1/4, 1/2) of firm 1, she buys the cheaper product 1, otherwise she
buys the more expensive product 2. The figure on the right illustrates the density
of the expected distribution of the purchased product’s distance from ideal that
is induced by this plan. If the consumer’s taste is very close to a product, she
buys that product, so the density is 4 for small distances. For larger distances,
the consumer is willing to buy a product that far from her taste only if it is the
cheaper product, so the density shrinks to 2. Given her plans, the consumer does
not expect to purchase a product that is further than α from her ideal variety.
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consumer expected to pay lower prices—and as a change in gain with weight
1− F (p)—the probability with which she expected to pay higher prices.
Based on the above considerations, at any price pi that is not a mass point
of F , the partial derivative of firm i’s demand with respect to its price pi is
− [1 + λF (pi) + (1− F (pi))]
t · z , (3.2)
where z reflects the consumer’s gain-loss utility in product satisfaction. When
pi is a mass point of F , demand is continuous and left and right differentiable
with the derivatives given by the left and right limits of Expression (3.2).
Although z depends on the consumer’s reference point and the prices set by
the firm’s neighbors, for the purposes of this section we assume heuristically
that it is an exogenous constant.
Now we can illustrate results about possible equilibria in the market.
Proposition 3.3 says (more generally and precisely) that so long as there ex-
ist realizations of marginal costs c1 and c2 with c1 ≥ c2, an equilibrium in
which the firms charge deterministic prices p1 and p2 > p1 does not exist.
With these prices, when c1 ≥ c2 firm 2 has a higher markup than firm 1, so
it benefits more from one extra consumer than firm 1 suffers from one less
consumer. Furthermore, since firm 2 has lower infra-marginal demand than
firm 1, its infra-marginal losses from lowering its price are lower than firm 1’s
infra-marginal gains from raising its price by the same amount. And because
by Expression (3.2) the responsiveness of demand at prices just below p2 is
the same as the responsiveness just above p1, either firm 1 wants to raise its
price or firm 2 wants to lower its price.
In contrast, Proposition 3.1 says (generally and precisely) that even if the
firms have different marginal-cost distributions, an equilibrium in which they
charge the same deterministic price p∗ often exists. If consumers expect to
pay p∗ with certainty, Expression (3.2) implies that the price responsiveness
of a firm’s demand when it unilaterally raises its price is −(1 + λ)/(tz), while
the responsiveness when it lowers its price is only −2/(tz). Intuitively, a price
decrease of a given amount expands demand less than a price increase of the
same amount reduces demand because consumers are not as attracted by a
gain in money as they dislike a loss in money. Since the effect of these price
changes on profits from inframarginal consumers is symmetric, for a range of
cost levels neither deviation can increase profits.
To conclude this section, we illustrate the reasoning behind our trickiest re-
sult, Proposition 3.4, which provides conditions for all firms to set a determin-
istic price. Combined with conditions above ruling out different deterministic
prices for different firms, this leads to conditions under which any equilibrium
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is a focal-price equilibrium. The essence of the argument can be seen most
simply by assuming that in equilibrium firm 1’s cost and price are continu-
ously distributed on (c1, c1) and (p1, p1), respectively, and firm 2’s price is also
continuously distributed. We show a condition under which a contradiction re-
sults. If the marginal costs of the two firms are sufficiently similar and densely
distributed, firm 1’s expected demand is about 1/2. Using this and Expression
(3.2), the fact that at cost c1 firm 1 does not want to set a price lower than p1
implies p1−c1 / (tz)/[4+2(λ−1)F (p1)]. Similarly, that at cost c1 firm 1 does
not want to set a price above p
1
implies p
1
−c1 ' (tz)/[4+2(λ−1)F (p1)]. Sub-
tracting the latter inequality from the former one and using that the consumer
must have expected to buy from firm 1 with probability of about one-half, so
that F (p1)− F (p1) ' 1/2, we get
c1 − c1 '
tz
2
[
(λ− 1)(F (p1)− F (p1))
[2 + (λ− 1)F (p
1
)][2 + (λ− 1)F (p1)]
]
+ p1 − p1
' tz
2
(λ− 1)1
2
(1 + λ)2
=
tz
4
λ− 1
(λ+ 1)2
.
Hence, if c1 − c1 is small, firm 1’s incentives are incompatible with the above
purported equilibrium. Intuitively, if firm i chooses a stochastic price, then—
no matter how close are its highest and lowest prices—expectations-based loss
aversion dictates an amount by which the consumer is more price responsive
at the firm’s high price than at its low price. This in turn implies an amount
by which the markup at the high price must be lower than at the low price.
But if the firm’s highest and lowest costs do not differ by that amount, such
a situation is impossible.
3.2.3 Personal Equilibrium and Market Equilibrium
This section formally specifies consumer behavior and defines market equilib-
rium. We begin by defining the concept of personal equilibrium motivated
above with two firms setting deterministic prices for more firms and arbitrary
price distributions. Suppose that the consumer has a prior H ∈ ∆(Rn+) on
the non-negative price vectors she might face. Her decision of which good to
buy is made after observing the realized χ and the realized price vector, and is
described by the strategy σ : [0, 1]× Rn+ → {1, . . . , n}. As emphasized above,
her reference point for evaluating outcomes is her lagged rational expectations
about outcomes. This is the distribution Γσ,H induced by σ, H, and her uni-
form prior over χ, over vectors (k1, k2) of product satisfaction and expenditure.
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Figure 3.2: Timing of Full Market Model
To deal with the resulting interdependence between behavior (σ) and expec-
tations (Γσ,H), personal equilibrium (Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2006) requires the
behavior generating expectations to be optimal given the expectations:
Definition 3.1. σ is a personal equilibrium for the price distribution H if
σ(χ, p) ∈ argmaxi∈{1,...,n} U (v − t · d(χ, yi) , pi | Γσ,H)
for all χ ∈ [0, 1] and p ∈ Rn.
We now integrate consumer behavior into a notion of market equilibrium.
The timing of our full market model is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Consumers
first form the expectations regarding consumption outcomes that later deter-
mine their reference point. Next, firms observe their cost realizations and
simultaneously set prices. Finally, each consumer observes her ideal variety
and the realized market prices, and purchases a good.
For expositional simplicity, we assume that the n available products are
produced by n different firms, with firm i producing good i, yi. In Section 3.6,
we argue that as long as each product is owned by exactly one firm and no
firm owns neighboring products, our results on how products are priced extend
unchanged to situations where some or all firms produce multiple products.
Hence, results on focal pricing below also imply uniform pricing for multiprod-
uct firms.
Firms’ costs are jointly distributed according to Θ on the set
∏n
i=1[ci, ci],
where [ci, ci] is the smallest closed interval containing the support of firm i’s
cost distribution. Let c = min {ci} and c = max {ci}. Denote firm i’s
pricing function by Pi : [ci, ci] → R+. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be the vector of
pricing strategies, HP the market price distribution induced by P and Θ, and
P−i(c−i) = (Pj(cj))j 6=i the price vector of firms other than i.
Definition 3.2. The strategy profile {P, σ} is a market equilibrium if
1. σ is a personal equilibrium for the price distribution HP .
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2. For each i and ci ∈ [ci, c¯i],
Pi(ci) ∈ argmaxpi∈R+ (pi − ci) · Prob [σ(pi, P−i(c−i), χ) = i | ci] .
Our definition of market equilibrium extends Bayesian Nash equilibrium
to allow for reference effects in consumer behavior. A market equilibrium
needs to satisfy two conditions. First, consumers play a personal equilibrium
given the correctly forecasted price distribution.9 Second, each firm at each
cost realization plays a best response to other firms’ pricing strategies, taking
consumers’ reference point as given.10
One of our goals in this paper is to investigate circumstances under which
all firms charge the same price irrespective of their cost positions. We introduce
a term for such a situation.
Definition 3.3. A market equilibrium is a focal-price equilibrium if there is a
price p∗ that all firms charge with probability one. In a focal-price equilibrium,
p∗ is the focal price.
To address what we believe is mostly a technical issue that arises in our
model as well as the standard Salop model with cost asymmetry, we introduce
a restricted class of market equilibria.
Definition 3.4. A market equilibrium is an interior equilibrium if for any
equilibrium price vector, all firms sell to a positive measure of consumers on
each side of their location.
9 For notational simplicity, our definition implicitly imposes that there is a single rep-
resentative consumer, or all consumers play the same personal equilibrium. We argue in
Section 3.6 that this does not affect our results.
10 Hence, at the stage when firms’ prices are chosen, these prices do not influence a
consumer’s reference point. This specification reflects our assumption that the reference
point is lagged rather than contemporaneous expectations. If, for instance, a consumer had
been confidently expecting to pay $14.99 for a CD that she now finds costs $18.98, she
presumably adjusts her beliefs about the price distribution immediately, but she would still
experience paying $18.98 as a loss.
While the expectations that are relevant for specifying the reference point are clearly
lagged, the fact that we do not specify when exactly these expectations are formed is a
weakness of our approach. In addition, we exclude any direct influence of firm behavior
on what expectations consumers form. As we show below, for instance, there are typically
a continuum of focal prices, so firms have a strong incentive to manage consumers’ price
expectations. While firms might be able to do so through public commitments to prices,
advertising, or other marketing activities, analyzing these motives is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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In principle, it is possible that a firm prices so low relative to a neighbor
that it attracts all consumers between them. In the standard Salop model, at
such a price level there is a discontinuity in the firm’s demand, as it suddenly
captures all consumers on the other side of its neighbor. In our model, both
convex kinks and discontinuities in demand are possible. Since we do not know
how to handle equilibria with such situations, we follow previous models with
cost uncertainty (e.g. Aghion and Schankerman 2004) and focus on (what we
call) interior equilibria.
In the following three sections, we analyze the above model. As a founda-
tion for this analysis, Lemma 3.1 derives a key part of firms’ incentives, the
price responsiveness of demand. Suppose the consumer had expected the dis-
tribution of her purchase price and the distribution of her acquired product’s
distance from ideal to be F (·) and G(·), respectively. These distributions are
determined as part of a personal equilibrium by the consumer’s strategy σ and
the distribution of market prices H in the following way:
F (p′) = Probp∼H,χ∼U [0,1][pσ(p,χ) ≤ p′] for any p′ ≥ 0, and
G(s) = Probp∼H,χ∼U [0,1][d(χ, yσ(p,χ)) ≤ s] for any s ≥ 0.
Denoting right and left limits by subscripts ↓ and ↑, F (·) and G(·) can be used
to express how demand depends on prices:
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that given the consumer’s lagged expectations F (·) and
G(·) and the realized prices, the realized tastes that make the consumer in-
different between purchasing yi and the respective neighboring products are at
distances x+, x− ∈ (0, 1/n) from yi on its two sides. Then, the right derivative
of firm i’s residual demand, Di(pi, p−i), with respect to its price pi is
Di↓(pi, p−i) =− 1
2t
·
[
2 + (λ− 1)F (pi)
2 + λ−1
2
(G(x+) +G(1/n− x+))
+
2 + (λ− 1)F (pi)
2 + λ−1
2
(G(x−) +G(1/n− x−))
]
, (3.3)
and the left derivative Di↑(pi, p−i) is given by the expression in which F↑(pi)
replaces F (pi) above.
Whenever firm i’s two neighbors set the same price p, we will denote the
indifferent consumer on each side by x = x+ = x−, and firm i’s demand as a
function of its price by Di(·, p).
The price responsiveness of a firm’s residual demand Di derives partly
from the comparison effect explained above: as reflected in the numerators in
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Equation (3.3), the higher the probability with which the consumer expected
lower prices, the more she experiences paying a given price as a loss, and hence
the more responsive she is to price changes. The comparison effect has two
important implications we will use repeatedly in the paper. First, the residual
demand curve is kinked at pi if F (·) has an atom at pi, and it is differentiable
at pi if F (·) has no atom at pi. Second, the price responsiveness of demand is
greater at higher prices in the purchase-price distribution.
More subtle than the effect of utility from money itself is the effect of prod-
uct satisfaction on the price responsiveness of demand. A small price change
can affect a consumer’s choice if she is approximately indifferent between firm
i’s product at a distance x+ from ideal and the neighbor’s product at a dis-
tance 1/n − x+ from ideal. If any of these options is evaluated as a loss to a
greater extent—that is, if the expected probability of a better product, G(x+)
or G(1/n− x+), is higher—then a change in the consumer’s realized taste has
a greater effect on which option she prefers. This means that a given price
change reverses the consumer’s decision for a smaller range of taste realiza-
tions, lowering the price responsiveness of firm i’s demand.
3.3 Existence and Properties of Focal-Price Equilibria
As our first step in analyzing the model, we establish a necessary and sufficient
condition for a focal-price equilibrium to exist, and explore the condition’s
implications for the price level and the effect of industry concentration on
pricing. The condition allows for stochastic costs, and even for commonly
known differences in (stochastic or deterministic) costs.
To derive our condition, we solve for the cost levels c1 for which firm 1
does not want to deviate from a focal price of p∗. Market equilibrium requires
that the consumer anticipated all prices to be p∗, so that she expected to
spend p∗ with probability 1. In addition, since (having expected equal prices)
she expected to buy the product closest to her taste, G(·) is the uniform
distribution on [0, 1/(2n)]. In addition, the consumers who are indifferent
between a firm and its neighbor are at distances x+ = x− = x = 1/(2n) from
the firm, so G(x) = G(1/n− x) = 1.
Given these considerations, Equation (3.3) implies that D1↓(p∗, p∗) = −1/t.
Using that D1(p
∗, p∗) = 1/n, so long as (p∗−c1)/t ≥ 1/n firm 1 cannot benefit
from locally raising its price. Similarly, since D1↑(p∗, p∗) = −2/(t(1 + λ)), so
long as 2(p∗− c1)/(t(1 +λ)) ≤ 1/n firm 1 cannot benefit from locally lowering
its price. Combining and rearranging these conditions, charging p∗ is locally
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optimal if and only if
p∗ − t
n
· 1 + λ
2
≤ c1 ≤ p∗ − t
n
. (3.4)
In the appendix, we show that when local deviations are unprofitable, non-
local deviations are also unprofitable. Therefore:
Proposition 3.1. A focal-price equilibrium exists if and only if
c− c ≤ λ− 1
2
· t
n
.
When there is no loss aversion (λ = 1), a focal-price equilibrium exists
only if c − c = 0—if all firms have the same deterministic cost. As explained
above, however, if consumers are loss averse and expect all firms to charge the
same price p∗, there is a kink in residual demand at p∗, so for a range of cost
levels p∗ is the optimal price to charge. Hence, with loss aversion a focal-price
equilibrium can exist despite cost differences and variation.
Proposition 3.1 has a number of important comparative-statics implications
for when a focal-price equilibrium exists. Naturally, a focal price is easier to
sustain when the range of marginal costs c − c is smaller. Also, a focal-price
equilibrium is more likely to exist when consumer loss aversion is greater. The
greater is λ, the greater is the difference between a consumer’s sensitivity to
price increases from p∗ and price decreases from p∗. Hence, the greater is
the difference between the effects on profits of price increases and decreases,
and the greater is the range of cost levels for which p∗ is the optimal price.
One implication of this comparative static and our model more generally may
be that ceteris paribus, prices are less variable in consumer markets than in
transactions between (presumably less loss averse) firms. Evidence in Blinder,
Canetti, Lebow and Rudd (1998) is broadly consistent with this prediction.
Most interestingly, a focal-price equilibrium is more likely to exist when
market power as measured by product differentiation relative to the number
of firms (t/n) is greater. For an intuition, consider the price p∗ at which a
firm with cost c is just indifferent to raising its price. Then, due to a kink
in demand, for a range of cost decreases it strictly prefers not to decrease
its price. This range—and hence the allowed cost variation for a focal-price
equilibrium to exist—is increasing in the markup p∗ − c, so that it is larger
in less competitive industries. With a higher markup, the value of a marginal
consumer is higher, so a change in the responsiveness of demand has a greater
effect on the firm’s incentives to change its price. Hence, the low responsiveness
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of demand to price decreases makes the firm more reluctant to cut its price,
and it will not want to do so for a greater range of cost decreases.
In addition to identifying conditions under which a focal-price equilibrium
exists, Inequality (3.4) determines what the focal price level can be:
Proposition 3.2. There is a focal-price equilibrium with focal price p∗ if and
only if
c+
t
n
≤ p∗ ≤ c+ t
n
· 1 + λ
2
.
In the corresponding Salop model without loss aversion, the support of a firm’s
interior-Bayesian-Nash-equilibrium prices is bounded above by c+t/n, and this
bound can only be attained if the firm has realized cost c.
Proposition 3.2 says that in a focal-price equilibrium, consumer loss aver-
sion leads to increased prices: even at the lowest possible cost, a firm charges
a higher price than it would in the standard model at the highest possible cost.
Intuitively, if a firm unilaterally lowers its price, it attracts some consumers of
the neighboring firms, who (unexpectedly) choose a good that both costs and
matches their taste less than expected. Since consumers are more sensitive to
the loss in satisfaction than to the gain in money, the firm attracts fewer of
them than without loss aversion. But if the firm unilaterally raises its price,
its consumers must either pay a higher price or get a less satisfactory product
than they expected was possible, so—as either choice involves a loss—the firm
loses the same number of consumers as without loss aversion. Since loss aver-
sion decreases a firm’s incentive to lower its price and leaves a firm’s incentive
to raise its price unchanged, it increases equilibrium prices.
Proposition 3.2 implies that if there is a focal-price equilibrium, there are
generically multiple ones, with the set of possible focal prices being a closed
interval. If consumers’ expectation of the price increases from p to p′ > p, the
difference between paying p′ and paying p turns from a loss to a foregone gain.
Because this makes demand less responsive, firms are more willing to increase
prices, within limits exactly matching the increased expectations.
Beyond a theoretical possibility, our model predicts that focal-price equilib-
ria can exist for calibrationally non-trivial amounts of cost variation. Assuming
λ = 3, which corresponds to the conventional assumption of about two-to-one
loss aversion in observable choices (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, for exam-
ple), a focal-price equilibrium exists for cost variation c − c up to t/n. Since
by Proposition 3.2 the equilibrium markup lies in the interval [t/n, 2t/n], the
allowed cost variation is between 50 percent and 100 percent of firms’ markups.
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3.4 Conditions for All Equilibria to be Focal
In this section, we identify sufficient conditions under which firms with possibly
different cost distributions suppress cost shocks and adhere to focal pricing of
differentiated products in any interior market equilibrium. To our knowledge,
no price-setting model predicts focal prices so robustly. We first establish that
if the intervals containing the supports of firms’ cost distributions overlap,
there cannot be an equilibrium with stable but different prices—if each firm
sets a deterministic price, they set the same one. Then, we show that if
the density of each firm’s cost distribution is sufficiently large everywhere
on its connected support, prices are stable—each firm sets a deterministic
price. Then, when both conditions hold, any market equilibrium is a focal-price
equilibrium. We also give examples illustrating that if firms’ cost distributions
do not overlap, equilibria with different deterministic prices can exist.
The following proposition is the first part of our argument:
Proposition 3.3. Suppose ∩i∈N [ci, ci] 6= ∅. If all firms set a deterministic
price and either
λ ≤ 1 + 2
n− 1
(
1 +
√
1 + 2n(n− 1)
)
(3.5)
or n = 2, the market equilibrium is a focal-price equilibrium.
The intuition for Proposition 3.3 is the same as in the two-firm example
of Section 3.2: if firms do not charge the same price, a highest-price firm has
a higher markup and a lower inframarginal demand than a lowest-price firm,
and because by the comparison effect it tends to face a greater responsiveness
of demand, either it or the lowest-price firm wants to deviate. This intuition,
however, ignores an effect that (for n > 2) makes it necessary to impose
Condition (3.5). A change in a firm’s price changes the distribution of marginal
consumers in its two markets. By Lemma 3.1, this typically changes the price
responsiveness of its residual demand. If demand responsiveness changed too
fast, the firm’s profit-maximization problem might not be single-peaked, and
this would generate many technical difficulties. To rule out such possibilities,
Proposition 3.3 above and Proposition 3.4 below impose restrictions on λ.
But Condition (3.5) is relatively weak. It only applies when n > 2, and it
is satisfied for any number of firms whenever λ ≤ 1 + 2√2 ≈ 3.8. Since the
conventional assumption of two-to-one loss aversion is equivalent to λ = 3, the
condition does not seem very problematic.
As a second ingredient for the main result of this section, we give condi-
tions such that all firms charge a deterministic price. Because analyzing a
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more general model is technically very difficult, we restrict attention to in-
dependent (idiosyncratic) cost shocks, still allowing for asymmetries in firms’
cost distributions.11
Proposition 3.4. Suppose costs are independently distributed with ci ∼ Θi[ci, ci]
and corresponding densities θi. If 38 > λ > 1 and (c−c) < (t/n)·(3+λ)/(2(1+
λ)), there is a real number ρ(λ, t, n, c− c) > 0 such that if
θi(c) > ρ(λ, t, n, c− c)
for all c ∈ [ci, ci], then firm i sets a deterministic price in any interior equilib-
rium.
Combining Propositions 3.3 and 3.4:
Corollary 3.1. If the conditions of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 hold, any interior
market equilibrium is a focal-price equilibrium.
It is worth noting that the function ρ(λ, t, n, c−c) that naturally drops out
of our approximations underlying the proof of Proposition 3.4 is decreasing in
t and increasing in n, and approaches zero as t → ∞ and infinity as n → ∞.
Our sufficient conditions for all equilibria to be focal are therefore more likely
to be met in less competitive industries.
To conclude this section, we provide some examples where the conditions of
Proposition 3.3 do not hold but those of Proposition 3.4 may, illustrating the
logic of market equilibrium with unequal prices and discussing further issues.
Example 3.1. Suppose n = 2, λ = 5, and t = 1. As we verify in the appendix,
there is a market equilibrium in which firm 1 always charges price p1 = 2,
firm 2 always charges price p2 = 9/4, and the consumer buys from firm 1 with
probability 3/4, if and only if c1 ∈ [1/8, 5/4] and c2 ∈ [2, 49/24].
The above conditions for the existence of a market equilibrium with prices
p1 = 2 and p2 = 9/4 allow for several possibilities. If costs are deterministic
with c1 = 9/8 and c2 = 97/48, for instance, there is a market equilibrium
with deterministic prices p1 = 2 and p2 = 9/4, and by Proposition 3.1 a focal-
price equilibrium also exists. The intuition for why both types of equilibria
can exist is the following. If consumers had expected the two firms to charge
11 If costs are not independent, a change in ci changes the distribution of competitors’
prices conditional on ci and hence also the distribution of marginal consumers for a given pi.
By Lemma 3.1, this typically changes the price responsiveness of residual demand. While we
believe this consideration would not substantially modify the comparison effect, the main
force driving our result, we cannot formally analyze this more general case.
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the same price, demand will be very responsive to increases from this price
and not very responsive to decreases from this price, so that it is optimal
for both firms to charge this price. But if consumers had expected different
prices, the responsiveness of demand in-between the two expected prices is at
an intermediate level, so that it is optimal for the low-cost firm to charge the
lower of the prices and for the high-cost firm to charge the higher of the prices.
In contrast, if costs are deterministic with c1 = 1 and c2 = 97/48, charging
deterministic prices p1 = 2 and p2 = 9/4 is still a market equilibrium, but in
this case a focal-price equilibrium does not exist. More generally, if firm 1’s
and firm 2’s marginal costs are independently and narrowly distributed around
1 and 97/48, respectively, Proposition 3.4 implies that each firm charges a
deterministic price in any market equilibrium, and Proposition 3.1 implies
that these prices are different. Hence, sticky pricing—the unresponsiveness of
prices to cost circumstances—does not necessarily go hand in hand with focal
pricing—equal pricing across firms. Intuitively, if each individual firm’s cost
distribution is sufficiently narrow, the firm’s price will be invariant to its cost
realization. But if one firm is at the same time much more efficient than the
other, the deterministic prices of the two firms must be different.
While not generating focal pricing, in some ways the above example still
illustrates how loss aversion can lead to reduced price variation and lower
competition—two important themes in the paper. It is easy to check that in
a standard Salop model, an equilibrium with a price difference of 1/4 requires
a cost difference of 3/4. In our example, a cost difference of up to 23/12 can
support the same price difference, showing that with loss aversion prices can
be much closer to each other. Indeed, unlike in our setting, in the standard
model any cost difference above 3/2 would lead the low-cost firm to price the
high-cost firm out of the market. Loss aversion therefore reduces competition
and allows both firms to make positive profits.
Although our example does not speak directly to situations with more than
two goods, its logic also suggests that in many situations uniform pricing is
more likely to happen than focal pricing. If a single firm’s cost distributions
for its different products are narrow and overlapping, the firm will often set
the same deterministic price for all its products. But again, if one firm has
much lower costs overall than the other, the uniform prices of the two firms
will have to differ.
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3.5 Industry-Wide Cost Shocks
In this section, we fully characterize symmetric equilibria when firms always
have identical marginal costs—that is, when they are subject only to industry-
wide cost shocks. This allows us to study, in a tractable model, the respon-
siveness of price to cost when conditions for a focal-price equilibrium are not
necessarily met. We find that markups strictly decrease with cost in any mar-
ket equilibrium, and that the price may be sticky (unchanging in cost) in some
regions. Furthermore, markups decline faster with cost, and prices tend to be
more sticky, in more concentrated industries.
Suppose firms’ common marginal cost is continuously distributed according
to Θ on [c, c¯], with corresponding density θ. We first establish two basic
properties of symmetric market equilibria:
Lemma 3.2. Suppose firms have identical, continuously distributed marginal
costs. In a symmetric market equilibrium, price is a continuous and non-
decreasing function of marginal cost.
To understand the lemma, take costs c and c′ and corresponding equilib-
rium prices p and p′ > p, and suppose that residual demand is differentiable at
both p and p′. Because firms use symmetric strategies, inframarginal demand
is the same at the two prices (and equal to 1/n). In addition, due to the com-
parison effect, demand is (weakly) more responsive to unilateral price changes
at the high price p′ than at the low price p. In order for firms’ first-order
conditions to be satisfied at both costs, therefore, c′ must be greater than c
and not arbitrarily close to it.12
We now fully characterize the set of symmetric-equilibrium pricing func-
tions P : [c, c]→ R, and then turn to a detailed discussion of the implications
of this characterization. As a step toward a full analysis, we posit that for a
cost c, P (c) is not an atom of the market price distribution, and derive P (c).
Since in a symmetric equilibrium firms set identical prices in all states of the
world, consumers always choose the product closest to their taste. Hence,
as in Section 3.3, G(·) is the uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1/(2n)].
Furthermore, Equation (3.3) implies that the derivative of firm 1’s residual
demand exists at P (c) and is equal to
−1
t
· 2 + (λ− 1)F (P (c))
1 + λ
= −1
t
· 2 + (λ− 1)Θ(c)
1 + λ
, (3.6)
12 If the price distribution has atoms at p or p′, so that residual demand is not differ-
entiable, the same argument still works by considering—instead of first-order conditions—
incentives to lower one’s price from p′ as compared to incentives to raise one’s price from
p.
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where F (P (c)) = Θ(c) because P (·) is non-decreasing and P (c) is not a pricing
atom. Substituting Equation (3.6) into the firm’s first-order condition, using
that D1(P (c), P (c)) = 1/n, and rearranging yields
P (c) = c+
t
n
· 2 + (λ− 1)
2 + (λ− 1)Θ(c) ≡ Φ(c). (3.7)
Expression (3.7) and Lemma 3.2 impose strong restrictions on a symmetric-
market-equilibrium pricing function. For any c ∈ [c, c] that is not on a flat part
of P (·), P (c) is not a pricing atom, so P (c) = Φ(c). In addition, arbitrarily
close to an interior end of a flat part there are costs c for which P (c) is not
a pricing atom, where again P (c) = Φ(c). Hence, at interior ends a flat part
of P (·) connects continuously to Φ(·). Finally, because for c = c Equation
(3.6) is the left derivative of demand whether or not c is a pricing atom, for
price decreases from c to be unprofitable we must have P (c) ≤ Φ(c); and by a
similar argument, P (c) ≥ Φ(c).
The above conditions are in fact not only necessary, but also sufficient for
P (·) to be a symmetric-market-equilibrium pricing function:
Proposition 3.5. Suppose firms have identical marginal costs distributed ac-
cording to Θ on [c, c¯]. A pricing function P : [c, c]→ R is a symmetric-market-
equilibrium pricing function if and only if all of the following are satisfied:
1. P (·) is continuous and non-decreasing.
2. There are disjoint intervals [f1, f
′
1], [f2, f
′
2], · · · ⊂ [c, c] such that P (·) is
constant on all [fi, f
′
i ] and not constant on any interval not contained in any
[fi, f
′
i ].
3. P (c) = Φ(c) for any c 6∈ ∪i[fi, f ′i ].
4. P (c) ≤ Φ(c) and P (c) ≥ Φ(c).
To start identifying the implications of Proposition 3.5 in specific cases,
suppose that Φ(·) is strictly increasing. In that case, P (·) cannot have a flat
part: because P (c) ≤ Φ(c) and P (c) ≥ Φ(c), a flat part cannot start at
either of these points and connect continuously to Φ(·); and an interior flat
part cannot connect continuously to Φ(·) at both ends. Hence, there are no
pricing atoms, and the unique symmetric market equilibrium has P (c) = Φ(c)
everywhere:
Corollary 3.2. Under the conditions of Proposition 3.5, if Φ(c) is strictly
increasing, the unique symmetric market equilibrium has pricing strategies
P (c) = Φ(c). Otherwise, a symmetric equilibrium with strictly increasing pric-
ing strategies does not exist.
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But Φ(·) is not necessarily strictly increasing. Differentiating Equation
(3.7) with respect to c,
Φ′(c) = 1− t
n
· (1 + λ)(λ− 1)θ(c)
[2 + (λ− 1)Θ(c)]2 , (3.8)
which is negative if θ(c) is very high. If Φ(·) is non-increasing, then P (·)
cannot have a strictly increasing part—where it would have to coincide with
a non-increasing Φ(·)—so that it is constant. Hence, in these situations any
symmetric market equilibrium is focal:
Corollary 3.3. Under the conditions of Proposition 3.5, if Φ(c) is non-increasing,
any symmetric market equilibrium is a focal-price equilibrium. Otherwise, sym-
metric equilibria other than focal-price equilibria exist.
As with Proposition 3.4, the intuition for this result is most easily seen by
first assuming that consumers expected firms’ prices to be strictly increasing in
cost. If the density of the cost distribution is high, a small increase in c implies
a large increase in F (P (c)) and hence a large increase in the comparison effect
and the corresponding price responsiveness of demand. This is inconsistent
with equilibrium: a firm can increase profits either by decreasing prices at
higher costs and attracting substantial extra demand, or by increasing prices
at lower costs without losing many consumers. Since this is true for any strictly
increasing pricing strategy, the equilibrium price must be constant.
If Φ(·) is neither strictly increasing nor non-increasing, Proposition 3.5
implies that market-equilibrium pricing functions will generally consist of flat
parts pasted together continuously with strictly increasing parts that coincide
with Φ(·). Figure 3.3 illustrates a non-monotonic Φ(·) and possible market
equilibria. For c ∈ [c, c′] and c ∈ [c′′, c] the pricing function cannot have a
flat part, because that could not be pasted continuously with Φ(·). Hence,
in these regions P (·) is strictly increasing and therefore equal to Φ(·). The
non-decreasing P (·), however, must be “ironed out” over the range where Φ(·)
is decreasing. Furthermore, because at the ends of a flat interval P (·) connects
continuously to increasing parts of Φ(·), it has exactly one flat part. P 1(·) and
P 2(·) are two possible market-equilibrium pricing functions.
In combination with Equation (3.7), Proposition 3.5 has a number of im-
portant implications for symmetric equilibria. Two implications are about the
level and variation in markups in our model relative to the standard one (iden-
tical to λ = 1 here). In the standard Salop model, the markup is constant in
cost and equal to t/n. As in focal-price equilibria (Proposition 3.2), one effect
of loss aversion is to increase the price level: the markup is strictly greater than
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t/n for c < c, and greater than or equal to t/n for c = c. The consumers that a
firm attracts by lowering its price experience a pure loss in product satisfaction
(from choosing a product unexpectedly far from ideal), and unless c = c, only
some combination of gain and avoided loss in money. Hence, they are more
difficult to attract than in the standard setting, decreasing competition and
increasing prices.
The other effect of loss aversion is to decrease price variation by making
markups strictly decreasing in c:
Corollary 3.4. Under the conditions of Proposition 3.5, in any symmetric
market equilibrium P (c)− c is strictly decreasing in c on the support of Θ.
This prediction of our theory is potentially relevant for understanding
macroeconomic fluctuations. Extensive evidence reviewed by Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) indicates that costs are strongly procyclical. Hence, our
model implies markups are countercyclical.13 Intuitively, recall that due to the
comparison effect, consumers are more responsive to price changes at higher
than at lower prices within the price distribution. Since inframarginal demand
is constant across the price distribution, this means that firms compete more
fiercely at higher prices, reducing markups.
Proposition 3.5 implies not only that price variation is lower than in the
standard model, but also that it is systematically related to the competitive-
ness of the market. The more concentrated is the industry (the lower is n) and
the greater is product differentiation (the greater is t), the lower is Φ′(c) at
any c (Equation (3.8)). As a result, the more countercyclical are markups—
the faster P (c)− c decreases with c—when price is strictly increasing in cost,
and the more likely it is that any symmetric equilibrium is a focal-price one.
Intuitively, with the higher average markups firms enjoy in a less competi-
tive industry, the increased ability to attract consumers at higher prices has
a greater impact on firms’ incentive to cut prices, generating markups that
decrease faster in cost. If markups are very high, the impact of an increase in
demand responsiveness on firms’ incentive to cut prices is so great that firms
are unwilling to raise their price at all—they charge a sticky (and focal) price.
In fact, Proposition 3.5 allows us to more fully describe pricing patterns
for industries ranging from very competitive (t/n ≈ 0) to very uncompetitive
(t/n → ∞). If competition is sufficiently strong, the unique symmetric mar-
ket equilibrium features a strictly increasing pricing function, which is close to
marginal-cost pricing if competition is very strong. At lower levels of compe-
tition, markups are higher and more countercyclical. At even lower levels of
13 Of course, if one measures countercyclicality using the Lerner index (p−c)/p, the Salop
model without loss aversion also features countercyclical markups.
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competition, the price is constant in cost near regions where the cost distri-
bution is relatively dense, but may remain strictly increasing in cost in other
regions. At very low levels of competition, the price is sticky and focal.
It is important to note that in this section identical pricing across firms
was assumed, not derived. The question arises whether such identical pricing
would be the outcome in an environment where idiosyncratic cost shocks also
exist. For cases in which the cost variation is sufficiently small, Section 3.3 has
shown that a focal-price equilibrium exists even when there is both industry-
wide and idiosyncratic cost uncertainty. More strongly, although (for reasons
mentioned above) we cannot fully analyze a general model with both types
of cost uncertainty, intuition developed in the last two sections suggests that
in regions where both components vary little, the price will be focal in any
equilibrium.14 But in regions where the common cost shocks are not absorbed,
residual demand will be smooth, so idiosyncratic cost shocks will also not be
absorbed.
3.6 Robustness
In this section, we argue that our results are largely robust to natural variations
of our model. In short, most of our results rely on the simple intuition that—
due to loss aversion in money—a consumer’s sensitivity to price changes is
increasing in the probability with which she expected to pay lower prices, and
this force is not eliminated by reasonable modifications of the model.
Because in many situations consumers are unsure either about what they
want or about what is available, we have assumed a dispersed prior on χ. But
most of our results do not depend on this assumption. Even if χ is known
perfectly, our results in Sections 3.3 and 3.5 remain unchanged, with the same
logic and essentially the same proofs.15 Under reasonable refinements, such
as that consumers play the ex-ante optimal personal equilibrium, a version of
Proposition 3.3 also remains true—although for a completely different reason
than above.16 To illustrate, suppose n = 2 and firms 1 and 2 charge prices p1
14 Again, the intuition can be seen by assuming that cost shocks are not absorbed. If
costs vary little, the price distribution will be dense, so that the comparison effect implies
that a small increase in the price leads to a large increase in the price responsiveness of
demand. Then, a firm can increase profits either by increasing lower prices (where demand
is relatively inelastic) or by decreasing higher prices (where demand is relatively elastic).
15 Technically, if different consumers have different information about their preferred
locations, there cannot be a representative consumer. The definition of market equilibrium
can be modified easily to account for such heterogeneity.
16 In fact, the assumption that consumers play the ex-ante optimal personal equilibrium
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and p2 > p1. If a consumer prefers product 1 ex ante and plans to buy it, to
avoid a loss in money she prefers it even more ex post. If she prefers product
2 ex ante and plans to buy it, to avoid a loss in satisfaction she prefers it even
more ex post. With all consumers “locked in,” both firms want to raise their
price, contradicting equilibrium.
Our methods in Proposition 3.4 do not extend to the case when χ is known
with certainty. The logic of our proof, however, only seems to rely on suffi-
ciently many marginal consumers being sufficiently uncertain about their rel-
ative preference for at least two neighboring products that they are unsure
as to which one they will buy. These consumers exhibit a similar pattern of
behavior to our consumers above, so they give a firm similar incentives.
As do most applications of the Salop model, our model assumes that firms’
prices affect only the allocation of demand, not its level. One way to model
a market-size effect is to assume that consumers have an outside option with
a randomly determined level of utility. In this case, the comparison effect
makes consumers on the margin between two firms, as well as on the margin
between a firm and the outside option, more responsive to price changes at
higher than at lower prices in the purchase-price distribution. Hence, our
qualitative results on reduced price variation (but not necessarily our result
that loss aversion increases prices) are likely to survive.
We assume above that each firm sells exactly one product. As long as no
firm owns neighboring products, our results carry over unchanged to multi-
product firms, so that results on focal pricing above translate directly into
uniform pricing.17 In an interior equilibrium, the incentive for locally chang-
ing one product’s price is unaffected by how many non-neighboring products a
firm owns. But global deviations are weakly less profitable for a multiproduct
firm because such a firm might be cannibalizing its own market.18
In our model, consumer demand is stable and symmetric across firms, but
firms have possibly different and uncertain marginal costs. In most industries,
is much stronger than we need. It suffices to assume, for example, that consumers have an
arbitrarily small amount of self-discipline in the sense that they can select ex-ante whether
to impose an arbitrarily small ex-post cost on themselves if they choose a certain action
deemed undesirable ex ante.
17 In this case, the relevant measure of the competitiveness of the industry depends (in
addition to t) on the number of products rather than on the number of firms.
18 Even if firms can own two neighboring products, all the forces behind our results are
still present, so that focal pricing will often be an equilibrium, and often the only type of
equilibrium. Our conditions and proofs, however, would have to account for the decreased
competition between firms and for the fact that products may differ in how many neighboring
products they compete with. When a firm can own three neighboring products, the middle
one faces no immediate external competition, so the firm always sets a higher price for it.
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firms do differ in the features and popularity of their products, leading to
different elasticities of residual demand even if all of them set the same price.
In our setting, for instance, the intrinsic valuations of firms’ products could
be different and random instead of always taking the same value v. Because
a change in its product’s intrinsic value has similar implications for a firm’s
pricing incentives as a change in its marginal cost, results closely analogous to
those above would likely hold in this alternative model.
While we have assumed that industry structure is exogenous, our model can
be extended to allow for endogenous entry. Suppose industry concentration
is determined by a fixed cost that firms must pay to enter the market, and
post-entry products are located equidistant from each other. Since the fixed
cost determines the number of firms but has no impact on market equilibria
given the number of firms, our qualitative results on the effect of industry
concentration on market equilibria survive.
Our results on focal pricing and reduced price variation more generally
also hold in a model in which consumers are loss averse only in money. This
assumption would, in fact, substantially simplify some of our formal state-
ments and proofs (especially those of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4). We make
the assumption that consumers are loss averse also in the product dimension
both because it is far more realistic and experimentally and theoretically well-
motivated, and because it shows the robustness of results to including loss
aversion in things other than money.
Our definition of market equilibrium assumes that all consumers play the
same personal equilibrium. Relaxing this assumption does not affect our re-
sults. In all situations in Sections 3.3 and 3.5, selection is a non-issue simply
because the personal equilibrium is unique. Our proofs in Section 3.4 work
by investigating how the responsiveness of a firm’s residual demand changes
across the price distribution. Since our bounds hold for any personal equi-
librium a person might be playing, they also hold if consumers play different
equilibria.
The results in this paper are also robust to heterogeneity in loss aversion
among consumers. Our estimation methods would have to account for such
heterogeneity, but as long as there is some loss aversion in the population, the
results would survive in some form.
A more fundamentally different extension of our model than all the consid-
erations above is the incorporation of dynamics, and we conclude this section
by intuitively discussing how this may affect our results. Suppose the firms
play the pricing game T times with costs independently redrawn in every pe-
riod, and consumers’ reference points depend on lagged rational expectations
regarding the distribution of outcomes they are going to get in each period.
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Clearly, since for a range of costs firms cannot increase even current profits by
deviating from focal pricing in any single period, our existence results easily
extend to this dynamic setting. But whether focal and sticky pricing emerges
as the unique possible outcome is far trickier. A major complication is that
past prices can in general affect a consumer’s expectations and hence also her
reference point for future outcomes. While a full and realistic analysis of this
issue seems important—and could potentially lead to novel models of adver-
tising and price leadership—it is beyond the scope of this paper.19 Hence, to
abstract from this consideration, we assume that the expectations determining
a consumer’s reference points are formed before she observes any prices.
With this assumption, the same logic that underlies our results in this paper
seems to imply that if firms’ cost distributions overlap and have sufficiently
high density, then in each period prices will be focal. Because there can be a
continuum of static focal-price equilibria, however, it is not necessarily the case
that firms set the same price from period to period. Whether this is guaranteed
depends on how exactly lagged expectations determine consumers’ reference
point. At one extreme, suppose that consumers compare their outcomes in
a period only to their lagged expectations specific to that period, possibly
because new consumers arrive in each period. Then, any sequence of static
focal prices is an equilibrium; it could be that consumers expect the price of
a CD to be $15 in one week and $20 in the next, and firms comply with both
of these expectations. At the other extreme, suppose that a consumer forms
expectations regarding all T periods, and her reference point for outcomes in
each period is an average of these expectations. Then, the logic of our results
seems to indicate that the unique equilibrium is to charge the same focal price
in each period: just like it cannot be an equilibrium for firms to charge different
deterministic prices, it cannot be an equilibrium for them to charge different
prices in different periods. More generally, if consumers’ average reference
point changes slowly—for example because a small fraction of consumers is
replaced in each period—there is a tendency for firms not to move away from
prices set in previous periods.
3.7 Related Literature
Loss aversion features prominently in at least two somewhat separate litera-
tures. In experimental and behavioral economics, loss aversion and reference
19 Nevertheless, there is a way in which observing past prices might increase the tendency
for sticky pricing: if consumers take past prices as salient indicators of the future play of
firms, firms may have a strong incentive to comply with these expectations.
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dependence explain a number of robust phenomena, including the endowment
effect and small-scale risk aversion mentioned in Chapter 1. More closely re-
lated to our topic, empirical evidence in marketing indicates loss aversion in
consumer behavior that is broadly consistent with the consumer model of this
paper. Consumers seem to compare actual market prices to “reference prices”
determined at least partly by “price beliefs” or expectations, and purchases
are more sensitive to losses from the reference price than to gains relative
to it (Erickson and Johansson 1985, Kalwani and Yim 1992, Winer 1986).
Hardie, Johnson and Fader (1993) find loss aversion in evaluations of qual-
ity as well. Our paper develops a model of reference prices based on insights
from behavioral economics, and—asking a question not formally addressed in
either literature—examines ways this impacts the strategic interactions be-
tween firms.
There are several prominent theories of price stickiness, some of which also
feature focal-price equilibria. The stickiness of prices is a robust feature of
these theories, but we will argue that their aim is not to explain the equality
of prices: if they are extended to allow for asymmetric firms and differentiated
products, they either become inconsistent with focal pricing, or predict a large
number of equilibria with no compelling reason to select the focal one. Fur-
thermore, these theories do not ask how the competitiveness of the industry
affects price variation, and do not address the issue of uniform pricing.
Perhaps the most commonly invoked theory of price stickiness is that of
menu costs. Menu costs generate a disincentive to change prices, but not an
incentive to set identical prices. Furthermore, in some situations prices tend
to be sticky even though menu costs seem to be zero.20
Formalizing the casual view of many researchers and observers that price
stickiness and focal pricing are due to collusive behavior,21 Athey, Bagwell
and Sanchirico (2004) show that in a repeated price-setting game, the optimal
symmetric equilibrium is often a focal-price equilibrium. This equilibrium is
enforced by the threat of price war in case of a price change, and is efficient
because the price war is never triggered. In asymmetric environments, how-
ever, there is no reason for firms’ sticky prices to coincide. Similarly, if each
20 For example, Kashyap (1995) finds sticky pricing in retail catalogues even when new
catalogues are printed anyhow. Genesove (2003) documents substantial rigidity in apart-
ment rents, even though a new lease is filled out and signed every year for most apartments
in his sample.
21 This view is expressed, for instance, in Carlton (1989, pages 914-915) and Knittel and
Stango (2003, pages 1704-1705). In addition, focal prices and reduced price variability seem
to have raised suspicions of collusion in other cases, such as the recent Sony-BMG merger
case in Europe.
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colluding oligopolist sells multiple differentiated products, there is no reason
to set the same price for all those products.
Rotemberg (2011) develops a monopoly model in which consumers both
dislike price changes and are willing to punish the firm if they perceive it to
be insufficiently altruistic. Even if selfish, the firm pretends to be sufficiently
altruistic by setting the highest acceptable price. The model predicts that
observable increases in input costs lead to price increases but increases in
demand may not. While this captures an important aspect of price dynamics
our model misses, Rotemberg’s single-product monopoly setup cannot address
focal or uniform pricing.22
An important class of models with implications for price variation assumes
that consumers must pay search costs to sample firms’ products and prices.
These models, however, often generate excess rather than reduced price varia-
tion. If search costs are bounded away from zero and the first search is costly,
there is no focal-price equilibrium even with deterministic identical costs: if
a consumer expecting price p shows up at a firm, the firm knows she values
the good above p, and can raise the price. If search costs are not bounded
away from zero, the situation is more complicated. If consumers observe the
price distribution, a price increase by a firm triggers search by some consumers
arriving at the firm, and a price decrease triggers search by some consumers
arriving at other firms. Stiglitz (1987) shows that as a result of these oppos-
ing forces, price stickiness obtains if search costs are convex in the number of
searches, but excess price variation results if search costs are concave. Finally,
if consumers do not observe the price distribution, a price increase triggers
search by consumers arriving at the firm, but (because it is not observed) a
price decrease does not trigger search by consumers arriving at other firms.
This can lead to price stickiness.23 But even in this case, equilibria with non-
equal prices exist, and with asymmetry there is no compelling reason to select
a focal-price one.
Our model is related to an older literature on kinked demand curves (Hall
and Hitch 1939, Sweezy 1939). In these models, each firm believes that ri-
vals will follow price decreases but not price increases—leading to a kinked
demand curve. Maskin and Tirole (1988) provide a game-theoretic foundation
22 Rotemberg (2005, 2010) investigates the implications of Rotemberg’s fair-pricing model
for monetary policy and the frequency and size of price changes.
23 Nevertheless, for reasons similar to the logic in Varian (1980), if there is a mass of
informed consumers—who find out all prices for some reason—a focal-price equilibrium
can once again not exist. With search costs, any equilibrium must have positive expected
profits. Then, if all firms were to charge the same price, undercutting other firms slightly
would attract all informed consumers, increasing profits.
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for these beliefs, but do not investigate the impact of cost shocks on pricing
behavior. In addition, once we drop their assumption that all consumers buy
from a lowest-price firm, there is no reason to presume that equilibria would
necessarily be focal. More distantly, our paper is also related to the literature
on switching costs, whereby consumers face an exogenously given cost when
buying a product different from the one they purchased previously.24 Con-
sumers in our model face a kind of “psychological” cost when switching away
from their expected outcomes: they dislike trading an unanticipated loss in
one dimension for an unanticipated gain in the other dimension. Both kinds of
switching costs predict increased prices. But whereas in typical switching-cost
models the profits from increased prices are competed away in earlier periods
when firms fight for unattached consumers, the same is not true in our model.
More importantly, in our model the size of the switching cost is endogenous
and situation-dependent. In particular, the key feature of our model is that
consumers are less reluctant to switch in response to a price change if they
construe it as more of a change in a loss rather than a gain. Since this feature
is not present in classical switching-cost models, these models do not predict
reduced price variation.
3.8 Conclusion
A basic premise of our model is that consumers have accurate expectations
about prices. Marketing studies disagree whether consumers can even re-
call prices for recently purchased products accurately, with estimates ranging
from 5% to 50% of consumers.25 The surveys upon which these estimates are
based typically focus on the knowledge of average consumers and do not study
the accuracy of price expectations. While for simplicity we have assumed
that all consumers have correct price expectations, our effects are driven by
marginal consumers—consumers who will switch in response to some relevant
price changes—and so require only (some of) these consumers to have cor-
rect expectations. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any empirical work on
whether they do.
In contrast to our results, which predict reduced price variation in a number
of senses, there often seems to be excess price variation between even identical
products.26 Such price variation seems to occur primarily in industries where
24 For a recent survey, see Farrell and Klemperer (2007).
25 For a recent meta-study, which includes an extensive literature survey, see Estelami
and Lehmann (2001).
26 Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004), for example, document that for many products,
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consumers cannot or do not compare prices across different sellers, partly
because firms deliberately make comparisons difficult.27 Our theory clearly
applies better when prices and relevant features of products are transparent
to consumers.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. To derive our expression, we solve for how the location
of the indifferent consumer between firms 1 and 2, which is equal to firm 1’s
demand on the interval [0, 1/n], changes with p1 for a given p2. Suppose a
consumer’s realized taste is χ ∈ [0, 1/n]. The consumer’s utility from buying
good 1 at price p1 is then
u1 = v − χt− p1 − λ
p1∫
0
(p1 − p) dF (p) +
∞∫
p1
(p− p1) dF (p)
− λt
χ∫
0
(χ− s) dG(s) + t
1/n∫
χ
(s− χ) dG(s). (3.9)
Replacing p1 with p2 and χ with 1/n−χ in Equation (3.9), we get utility from
buying good 2 at price p2:
u2 = v − ((1/n)− χ)t− p2 − λ
p2∫
0
(p2 − p) dF (p) +
∞∫
p2
(p− p2) dF (p)
− λt
1/n−χ∫
0
((1/n− χ)− s) dG(s) + t
1/n∫
1/n−χ
(s− (1/n− χ)) dG(s). (3.10)
Equations (3.9) and (3.10) are differentiable with respect to χ, and right and
left differentiable with respect to p1. Using this together with the fact that
different internet-based retailers charge very different prices.
27 Ellison (2005) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006) identify competitive advantages of
making price comparisons difficult. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show that in the presence
of some consumers who ignore add-on costs, firms have no incentive to make add-on prices
transparent, even when it is very cheap to do so. Ellison (2005) gives natural conditions
under which rational consumers who are unresponsive to an ex-ante hidden add-on price
also decrease competition in transparent aspects of the product.
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Figure 3.3: Determination of Equilibrium Pricing Functions with
Industry-Wide Shocks
For better visibility, overlapping curves are drawn as close parallel curves.
The solid curve Φ(c) is the solution to the first-order condition for optimal
pricing assuming that P (c) is not an atom of the price distribution. Since
a market-equilibrium pricing function is non-decreasing and continuous, it
consists of constant parts pasted together with strictly increasing parts that
coincide with Φ(·). Two market-equilibrium pricing functions are P 1(c) and
P 2(c).
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u1 = u2 for the indifferent consumer x
+ implies that
(
dx+
dp1
)
↓
= −
(
∂u1
∂p1
)
↓
−
(
∂u2
∂p1
)
↓
∂u1
∂χ
− ∂u2
∂χ
= − 1
2t
·
[
2 + (λ− 1)F (p1)
2 + λ−1
2
[G(x+) +G(1/n− x+)]
]
,
(3.11)
and that (dx∗/dp1)↑ is given by the expression in which F↑(p1) replaces F (p1)
above. Similar calculations give the responsiveness of demand on the other
side of the firm.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. If the condition in the proposition is satisfied,
then there is a p∗ satisfying p∗− t
n
1+λ
2
≤ c ≤ p∗− t
n
for all c ∈ [c, c]. That this
is a necessary and sufficient condition for local deviations to be unprofitable
has been established in the text.
We now show that under the above condition, non-local deviations are also
unprofitable. We start with increases in the price. First, note that the firm
will never charge a price so high that it would be charging itself out of one
market: if a deviating firm is charging itself out of one market, it is charging
itself out of both, earning zero profits. Therefore, we only need to consider
deviations for which x ∈ (0, 1
2n
)
. Recall Equation 3.11:
dx
dp1
= − 1
2t
[
2 + (λ− 1)F (p1){
2 + λ−1
2
[G(x) +G((1/n)− x)]}
]
Since F (p1) = G
(
1
n
− x) = 1 and G(x) is increasing in x, in the range x ∈(
0, 1
2n
)
, firm 1’s demand (as a function of p1) is concave. This implies that
if local deviations are unprofitable, non-local increases in the price are also
unprofitable.
Next, we rule out the possibility that firm 1 might like to charge a price so
that x ∈ [ 1
2n
, 1
n
]
. In that case, Equations (3.9) and (3.10) imply that
− xt− p1 + (p∗ − p1)− λt
(
x− 1
4n
)
= −
(
1
n
− x
)
t− p∗ − λt · 2n ·
(
1
n
− x
) 1
n
− x
2
+ t · 2n ·
(
x− 1
2n
)
x− 1
2n
2
.
Solving for p1 gives
p1 = p
∗ − 1
2
t
[
(λ+ 1)
(
2x− 1
n
)
+ (λ− 1)
(
x− 1
4n
− nx2
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡κ
.
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To show that lowering the price to p1 is not a profitable deviation, it is equiv-
alent to show that
1
n
(p∗ − c) ≥ 2x(p1 − c) = 2x
(
p∗ − c− 1
2
tκ
)
.
Rearranging and using that p∗ − c ≤ t(1+λ)
2n
gives that it is sufficient to show
that (
2x− 1
n
)
1 + λ
n
≤ 2xκ, (3.12)
or equivalently
(λ+ 1)
(
2x− 1
n
)2
≥ (λ− 1)2x
(
nx2 +
1
4n
− x
)
= (λ− 1)2x
(
2x− 1
n
)(
nx
2
− 1
4
)
.
This simplifies to
(λ+ 1)
(
2x− 1
n
)
≥ (λ− 1)2x
(
nx
2
− 1
4
)
.
Notice that in the above inequality, the left-hand side is equal to the right-
hand side for x = 1
2n
and greater for x = 1
n
. Furthermore, the left-hand side
is linear, while the right-hand side is quadratic and convex. This implies that
the left-hand side is no less for all 1
2n
≤ x ≤ 1
n
.
For n > 2, we are left to rule out that firm 1 undercuts its rival and steals
more than the entire adjacent market. We begin by ruling out deviations in
which the firm captures less than two adjacent markets on each side. Let p′1
be the price at which the consumer located at 1
n
is indifferent between buying
from firm 1 and buying from firm 2. This consumers utility of buying from
firm 1 is
v − 1
n
t− p′1 + (p∗ − p′1)− λt
[
1
n
− 1
4n
]
.
In case he buys from firm 2, her utility is
v − p∗ + t 1
4n
.
Thus, if the consumer is indifferent
p∗ − p′1 =
t
2n
[
2 +
3
4
(λ− 1)
]
.
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Consider the maximum price at which a local deviation is unprofitable; for
this price p∗ − c = t
2n
[2 + λ− 1] and in this case p′1 − c = t2n
[
1
4
(λ− 1)]. Thus
even if firm 1 would get the entire two adjacent markets when setting p′1, this
is unprofitable as 1
n
(p∗− c) > 4
n
(p1− c).28 Obviously undercutting is (weakly)
less profitable for any lower focal price or any higher level of marginal cost.
We are left to consider the case in which n > 4, and firm 1 steals more than
two adjacent markets on each side. We show that this is unprofitable because
it requires firm 1 to price below marginal cost. For the consumer located at 2
n
to weakly prefer buying from firm 1 rather than firm 3, it must be that
v − 2
n
t− p1 + (p∗ − p1)− λt
[
2
n
− 1
4n
]
≥ v − p∗ + t 1
4n
.
Hence, in this case p∗ − p1 ≥ t2n [4 + (λ− 1)74 ] > t2n [2 + λ− 1] ≥ p∗ − c, which
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We have shown in the text that local devia-
tions are unprofitable if and only if
p∗ − t
n
· 1 + λ
2
≤ ci ≤ p∗ − t
n
for all i and ci ∈ [ci, ci]. It follows from the proof of Proposition 3.1 that if
local deviations are unprofitable, so are global ones.
It remains to show the second part of the proposition. In the standard
Salop model, for the consumer x between firms 1 and 2 who is indifferent
between the two products,
x =
t
n
+ p2 − p1
2t
.
Hence, for realized cost c, firm 1’s problem is
max
p1
p1 − c
2t
·
(
2t
n
− 2p1 + E[p2 + pn|c]
)
.
This implies that
P1(c) =
t
2n
+
E[p2 + pn|c]
4
+
c
2
.
28 Clearly if n = 3, the firm cannot attract two adjacent markets on each side, as there
are only three local markets. Nevertheless, the upper bound on profitability we use is still
valid.
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Suppose that the supremum of prices charged by firms 1, 2, and n are p1,
p2, and pn, respectively. Suppose without loss of generality that p1 is the
supremum of market-equilibrium prices of all firms. Then for any c ∈ [c1, c1],
P1(c) ≤ t
2n
+
p2 + pn
4
+
c
2
. (3.13)
Taking the supremum of both sides implies
p1 ≤
t
2n
+
p1 + p1
4
+
c
2
.
Rearranging gives the upper bound in the proposition.
Finally, we show that this upper bound can only be attained at c. If no
firm’s price attains p1, we are done. Next, suppose that for a price c < c,
P1(c) = p1. By Inequality (3.13), again we are done.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Posit a candidate market equilibrium in which
all firms set a deterministic price and in which the highest price pH is strictly
greater than the lowest price pL. We prove that if the condition in the Propo-
sition is satisfied, either (one of) the highest price firm(s) has a strict incentive
to lower its price or (one of) the lowest price firm(s) has a strict incentive to
raise its price, contradicting equilibrium.
We establish that the marginal profit of lowering the highest price is weakly
greater than the marginal profit of raising the lowest price for all given cost
realizations c. This is sufficient because it implies that the high-price firm has
a strict incentive to lower its price when it has its lowest cost realization, or the
low-price firm has a strict incentive to raise its price when it has its highest
cost realization (which is higher than the high-price firm’s lowest cost real-
ization because the supports of the cost distributions overlap), contradicting
equilibrium. Let x+H and x
−
H be one of the highest cost firm’s demands on its
right and left, respectively. Define x+L and x
−
L similarly. We want to establish
that
(pH−c)
[
1
2 + λ−1
2
[G(x+H) +G(
1
n
− x+H)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ 1
z+
H
+
1
2 + λ−1
2
[G(x−H) +G(
1
n
− x−H)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ 1
z−
H
]
×[2+F↑(pH)(λ−1)]
≥ (pL − c)
[
1
z+L
+
1
z−L
]
× [2 + F (pL)(λ− 1)], (3.14)
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where z+L and z
−
L are defined analogously to z
+
H and z
−
H . For brevity, let
ηH ≡ [2 + F↑(pH)(λ− 1)] and let ηL ≡ [2 + F (pL)(λ− 1)].
Notice that either
(
z+L
1
z+H
+ z−L
1
z−H
)
≤ 1
2
(z+L+z
−
L )
(
1
z+H
+ 1
z−H
)
or
(
z−L
1
z+H
+ z+L
1
z−H
)
≤
1
2
(z+L + z
−
L )
(
1
z+H
+ 1
z−H
)
. We distinguish two cases depending on whether the
former (Case I) or the latter (Case II) holds.
Case I. We rewrite Equation 3.14 as
ηH
(
z+L
z−L
z+H
+ z−L
z+L
z−H
)
≥
(
1− pH − pL
pH − c
)
ηL (z
+
L + z
−
L ). (3.15)
Equation 3.15 is equivalent to
ηH
(
z+L
(
1− z
+
H − z−L
z+H
)
+ z−L
(
1− z
−
H − z+L
z−H
))
≥
(
1− pH − pL
pH − c
)
ηL (z
+
L+z
−
L ).
As ηH > ηL a sufficient condition for Equation (3.14) to hold is that
ηH
(
z+L
z+H − z−L
z+H
+ z−L
z−H − z+L
z−H
)
≤ pH − pL
pH − c ηL (z
+
L + z
−
L ). (3.16)
Using that
|z+H − z−L | =
λ− 1
2
∣∣∣∣[G(x+H)−G(x−L)]− [G( 1n − x−L
)
−G
(
1
n
− x+H
)]∣∣∣∣ ,
that g(·) is bounded by 2n, and that for all p < pH∣∣∣∣dxdp
∣∣∣∣
↓
,
∣∣∣∣dxdp
∣∣∣∣
↑
≤ 1
2t
· 2 + (λ− 1)F↑(pH)
2 + λ−1
2
,
we get that
|z+H−z−L | ≤
λ− 1
2
2n |x+H−x−L | ≤
λ− 1
2
2n (pH−pL)
(
2 + (λ− 1)F↑(pH)
2 + λ−1
2
1
2t
)
,
and by a similar logic |z−H − z+L | has the same upper bound. Combining these
with Equation 3.16 implies that it is sufficient to prove
1
pH − cηL(z
+
L + z
−
L ) ≥ (ηH)2
λ− 1
2
2n
1
2 + λ−1
2
1
2t
(
z+L
1
z+H
+ z−L
1
z−H
)
.
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Using that
(
z+L
1
z+H
+ z−L
1
z−H
)
≤ 1
2
(z+L + z
−
L ) (
1
z+H
+ 1
z−H
) it is sufficient to prove
1
pH − cηL ≥ (ηH)
2
λ−1
2
2 + λ−1
2
n
2t
(
1
z+H
+
1
z−H
)
. (3.17)
Since the high-price firm’s demand is always less than or equal 1
n
, the fact that
it does not want to lower its price implies
1 ≥ n
2t
(pH − c)ηH
(
1
z+H
+
1
z−H
)
.
Hence, a sufficient condition Equation 3.17 to hold is that
ηL ≥ ηH
λ−1
2
2 + λ−1
2
.
For n = 2, F (pL) = F↑(pH), so the above is satisfied for any λ > 1. For n > 2,
using that F (pL) ≥ 1/n and ηH ≤ 1 + λ, a sufficient condition for the above
inequality to hold is that
(4 + λ− 1)(2n+ λ− 1) ≥ n(2 + λ− 1)(λ− 1).
Setting a = λ− 1, this can be rewritten as
0 ≥ (n− 1)a2 − 4a− 8n.
Since this quadratic has one positive and one negative root, if a is positive and
a ≤ 2
n− 1
(
1 +
√
1 + 2n(n− 1)
)
,
the inequality is satisfied. This gives the bound in the proposition.
Case II. In this case, we rewrite Equation 3.14 as
ηH
(
z−L
z+L
z+H
+ z+L
z−L
z−H
)
≥
(
1− pH − pL
pH − c
)
ηL (z
+
L + z
−
L ).
The remaining steps are analogous to Case I and thus omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We begin by proving that each firm’s pricing
function is continuous in cost. This fact follows from the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.3. Consider any interior equilibrium with λ < 38 and any cost
realization ci of firm i. Consider furthermore the range of prices pi ≥ ci such
that for all equilibrium price vectors p−i, the indifferent consumers x+(pi, p−i)
and x−(pi, p−i) are located within distance (0, 1/n) of firm i’s ideal product.
Over this range of prices, firm i’s expected profits are single peaked.
Proof. Since for all price vectors under consideration, there exists in-
different consumers within distance of 1/n of firm i, Equation 3.11 implies
that profits are differentiable whereever the market price distribution does not
have an atom—which is almost everywhere—and continuous. Furthermore, at
prices where the profit function is not differentiable, demand has a concave
kink, and hence (as long as pi ≥ ci) so do profits.
Suppose by contradiction that the profit function is not single-peaked in
the relevant price region. This implies that the profit function must have
a trough. At this trough, it obviously cannot have a concave kink, so it is
differentiable. To arrive at a contradiction, we prove that if firm 1’s first-order
condition is satisfied at some price p1, profits are lower slightly to the right of
p1.
Let the subscript 1 denote partial derivative with respect to firm 1’s price of
x+ and x− respectively. Note that for each x(p1, p−1) ∈ {x−(p1, p−1), x+(p1, p−1)}
one has
lim sup
p′1↘p1
1
p′1 − p1
·(x1(p′1, p−1)− x1(p1, p−1)) = −
1
2t
(λ− 1)F ′(p1)
2 + λ−1
2
(G(x(p1, p−1)) +G( 1n − x(p1, p−1)))
− 1
2t
λ−1
2
(2 + (λ− 1)F (p1)) · lim supp′1↘p1
G(x(p1,p−1))−G(x(p′1,p−1))+G(1/n−x(p1,p−1))−G(1/n−x(p′1,p−1))
p′1−p1
[2 + λ−1
2
(G(x(p1, p−1)) +G( 1n − x(p1, p−1)))]2
≤ (x1(p1, p−1))2
λ−1
2
2n
2 + λ−1
2
(G(x(p1, p−1)) +G( 1n − x(p1, p−1)))
≤ (x1(p1, p−1))2
λ−1
2
2n
2 + λ−1
2
.
(3.18)
Let pi(p) = (p− c)E[x+(p, p−1) + x−(p, p−1)]. We will prove that
lim sup
p′1↘p1
pi′(p′1)− pi′(p1)
p′1 − p1
< 0.
This is sufficient because it shows that the derivative of the profit function is
negative to the right of and sufficiently close to p1, so that profits are smaller
there.
104
               dc_785_13
3.8. CONCLUSION 105
By Equation 3.18, it is sufficient to prove
(p1 − c) E
[(
x−1 (p1, p−1)
)2
+
(
x+1 (p1, p−1)
)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
λ−1
2
2n
2 + λ−1
2
+2E
[
x−1 (p1, p−1) + x
+
1 (p1, p−1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
< 0. (3.19)
To bound the above, we begin showing that I divided by the square of II is
less than or equal to 1
2
(k+1)2
4k
, where
k ≡ 2 + λ− 1
2 + λ−1
2
.
Since |x1(p1, p−1)| ≥ 12t 2+(λ−1)F (p)2+(λ−1) and |x1(p1, p−1)| ≤ 12t 2+(λ−1)F (p)2+λ−1
2
, one has
max{|x−1 (p1, p−1)|, |x+1 (p1, p−1)|}
min{|x−1 (p1, p−1)|, |x+1 (p1, p−1)|}
≤ 2 + λ− 1
2 + λ−1
2
= k.
Now we use the following fact.
Fact 3.1. Suppose a˜+ and a˜− are positive random variables such that
sup{a˜+, a˜−}
inf{a˜+, a˜−} ≤ k
Then
E[a˜2+ + a˜
2
−]
E[a˜+ + a˜−]2
≤ 1
2
(k + 1)2
4k
. (3.20)
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that 1 ≤ a˜+, a˜− ≤ k. Since
the quadratic function is convex, the ratio on the left-hand side of Inequality
3.20 is maximized if the support if a˜+, a˜− consists of the extremal values 1, k.
Thus, the left-hand side of the inequality is less than or equal to
max
b+,b−∈[0,1]
b+ (k2 − 1) + 1 + b− (k2 − 1) + 1
(b+(k − 1) + 1 + b−(k − 1) + 1)2 ,
which is equivalent to maximizing
max
b+,b−
1
2
[
b++b−
2
(k2 − 1) + 1(
b++b−
2
(k − 1) + 1)2
]
.
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For brevity, let b = b
++b−
2
. Then the first-order condition for the above maxi-
mization is satisfied if and only if
(b(k − 1) + 1)2 (k2 − 1)− (b (k2 − 1)+ 1)2(k − 1)(b(k − 1) + 1) = 0,
which yields b = 1
k+1
. Substituting this into the maximand and rewriting gives
the desired inequality.
Hence, for Inequality 3.19 to hold it is sufficient that
(p1 − c)
∣∣E [x−1 (p1, p−1) + x+1 (p1, p−1)]∣∣ 12 (k + 1)24k λ−12 2n2 + λ−1
2
< 2.
Since the firm prices its neighbors out of the market with probability zero, its
first-order condition implies
(p1 − c)
∣∣E [x−1 (p1, p−1) + x+1 (p1, p−1)]∣∣ ≤ 2n.
In this case, the above condition simplifies to
(k + 1)2
4k
λ−1
2
2 + λ−1
2
< 1.
This condition holds for any λ < 38.
Since in an interior equilibrium, prices are above marginal costs and there
exists an indifferent consumer between any two products for any marginal cost
realization, the above lemma implies the following corollary:
Corollary 3.5. In an interior equilibrium with λ < 38, the pricing function
is continuous in cost for each firm.
We are now ready to prove the statement of the proposition. We prove
by contradiction; suppose that there exists (at least one) firm that does not
charge a deterministic price. Corollary 3.5 implies that there must exist a
nontrivial interval of prices, each of which the firm charges for some cost. On
this interval, consider a price p0 and a sequence of prices pi ↘ p0 such that
i.) F is differentiable at pi, p0; ii.) the pricing function p(·) is differentiable at
p0 with a strictly positive derivative.29 Let the corresponding costs be c0 and
ci ↘ c0.
29 Given our estimation in Lemma 3.3 (which we also use again below to bound the
derivative of p(·)), we can show that p(·) is Lipschitz continuous. Hence, we can apply the
Fundamental Theorem of Calculus to conclude that its derivative must be strictly positive
on a set of positive measure.
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Taking the difference between the first order condition for pi and p0, divid-
ing it by pi− p0, and taking the limit as pi → p0 while making use of the same
calculation as in the proof Lemma 3.3, establishes that
p′(c0) =
E[x+1 (p
0, p−1) + x−1 (p
0, p−1)]
(p0 − c) limi→∞ E[x
+
1 (p
i,p−1)+x−1 (pi,p−1)−x+1 (p0,p−1)−x−1 (p0,p−1)]
pi−p0 + 2E[x
+
1 (p
0, p−1) + x−1 (p0, p−1)]
<
1
2− (k+1)2
2k
λ−1
2
2+λ−1
2
.
By the firm’s maximization problem,
(pi−ci)E [x−1 (pi, p−1) + x+1 (pi, p−1)]+E[x+(pi, p−1)+x−(pi, p−1)] = 0 (3.21)
for each i, and a similar condition holds at p0.
Fix any p−1. We find a condition under which for x(·, ·) ∈ {x+(·, ·)x−(·, ·)},
lim sup
ci→c0
[(pi − ci)x1(pi, p−1) + x(pi, p−1)]− [(p0 − c0)x1(p0, p−1) + x(p0, p−1)]
ci − c0 < 0.
This is sufficient for a contradiction because it implies that the first-order con-
dition 3.21 cannot hold for all pi, p0 (since for i sufficiently high, the difference
between the left-hand sides of the first-order conditions is negative).
The above limsup is equal to
lim
ci→c0
x(pi, p−1)− x(p0, p−1)
ci − c0 + limci→c0
[(pi − p0)− (ci − c0)]
ci − c0 · x1(p
0, p−1)
+ lim sup
ci→c0
(pi − ci) · x1(p
i, p−1)− x1(p0, p−1)
ci − c0
= x1(p
0, p−1) · (2p′(c0)− 1) + (p0 − c0) · lim sup
ci→c0
x1(p
i, p−1)− x1(p0, p−1)
ci − c0 .
(3.22)
Now we work on the last term above, which is (with apologies for the small
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font) equal to
− p
0 − c0
2t
· lim sup
ci→c0
1
ci − c0
{[
(λ− 1)(F (pi)− F (p0)){
2 + λ−12 [G(x(p
0, p−1)) +G((1/n)− x(p0, p−1))]
}]
+
[
(2 + (λ− 1)F (pi)){
2 + λ−12 [G(x(p
i, p−1)) +G((1/n)− x(pi, p−1))]
}
− (2 + (λ− 1)F (p
i)){
2 + λ−12 [G(x(p
0, p−1)) +G((1/n)− x(p0, p−1))]
}]}
= −p
0 − c0
2t
· (λ− 1)F
′(p0) p′(c0){
2 + λ−12 [G(x(p
0, p−1)) +G((1/n)− x(p0, p−1))]
} − p0 − c0
2t
· lim sup
ci→c0
2 + (λ− 1)F (pi)
ci − c0
×
λ−1
2 ·
(
G(x(p0, p−1))−G(x(pi, p−1)) +G((1/n)− x(p0, p−1))−G(1/n− x(pi, p−1))
){
2 + λ−12 [G(x(p
0, p−1)) +G((1/n)− x(p0, p−1))]
} · {2 + λ−12 [G(x(pi, p−1)) +G((1/n)− x(pi, p−1))]}
≤ (p0 − c0) x1(p0, p−1)
[
λ− 1
λ+ 1
p′(c0)F ′(p0)
+ lim sup
ci→c0
1
ci − c0
λ−1
2 ·
(
G(x(p0, p−1))−G(x(pi, p−1)) +G((1/n)− x(p0, p−1))−G(1/n− x(pi, p−1))
){
2 + λ−12 [G(x(p
0, p−1)) +G((1/n)− x(p0, p−1))]
} ] .
Now, notice that only eitherG(x(p0, p−1))−G(x(pi, p−1)) orG(1/n−x(p0, p−1))−
G(1/n−x(pi, p−1)) can be strictly greater zero but not both, and since G(s)−
G(s′) ≤ 2n(s − s′) for any s > s′, the sum of these expressions is less than
or equal to 2n |x(pi, p−1)− x(p0, p−1)|. Using also G(x(p0, p−1)) + G(1/n −
x(p0, p−1)) ≥ 1, this implies that the above is less than or equal to
(p0 − c0)p′(c0)
(
x1(p
0, p−1)
λ− 1
λ+ 1
F ′(p0) +
(
x1(p
0, p−1)
)2 (λ− 1)n
2 + λ−1
2
)
.
Substituting into Expression 3.22 and using that |x1(p0, p−1)| ≤ 12t 1+λ2+λ−1
2
= k
2t
implies that it is sufficient to prove
1 + k2
λ− 1
λ+ 1
n
2t
(p0 − c0)p′(c0) < 2p′(c0) + (p0 − c0)p′(c0)λ− 1
λ+ 1
F ′(p0).
Using that F ′(p0) ≥ D(p0) θ1(c0)
p′(c0) and that
p0 − c0 = D(p
0)
−D′(p0) ≤
2
n
1
2t
2
1+λ
=
2t
n
(1 + λ),
the above becomes
1 + k2(λ− 1)p′(c0) < 2p′(c0) + (p0 − c0)D(p0)λ− 1
λ+ 1
θ1(c
0). (3.23)
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To finish our proof, we put a bound on the firm’s profits (p0 − c0)D(p0). In
a market equilibrium, no firm charges a price less than c, so firm 1’s profits
are at least as much as it would make if both of its neighbors charge c with
probability one. If firm 1 also charges c, its demand in each of its two markets
is 1
2n
. Now
|x1(p1, p−1)| ≤ 1
2t
1 + λ
2 + λ−1
2
=
k
2t
.
This implies that a sufficient condition for the firm to be able to sell profitably
is
c− c <
1
2n
k
2t
=
t
n
1
k
=
t
n
3 + λ
2(1 + λ)
.
Furthermore, if this is the case, its profits are at least
2(p− c)
(
1
2n
− k
2t
(p− c)
)
= (p− c)
(
1
n
− k
t
(p− c)
)
.
Maximizing this expression with respect to p and setting c = c gives
(p0 − c0)D(p0) ≥ k
4t
(
t
n
1
k
− (c− c)
)2
=
k
4
t
n2
(
1
k
− γ
)2
,
where γ ≡ (c− c)/(t/n).
Now we have two cases.
Case I: k2(λ−1) ≤ 2. In this case, a sufficient condition for Inequality 3.23
to hold is
t
n2
θ1(c
0) >
λ+ 1
λ− 1
4k
(1− kγ)2 .
Case II: k2(λ − 1) > 2. Then, substituting our bound for p′(c0) into In-
equality 3.23 and rearranging gives that a sufficient condition is
t
n2
θ1(c
0) >
4k
(1− kγ)2 ·
(1 + λ)k2 − (k+1)2
4
2− λ−1
λ+1
(k+1)2
4
.
This completes our proof.
Calculations for Example 3.1. For the low-price firm 1 to have market
share 3/4, it must be that in personal equilibrium consumers who are within
a distance α = 3/8 of firm 1’s location y1 = 0 buy from firm 1. Personal
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equilibrium requires that having expected this behavior, a consumer with re-
alized taste χ = 3/8 be indifferent between buying from the two firms. The
above behavior induces expectations to pay p1 with probability 3/4 and p2
with probability 1/4, and (from Figure 3.1) also induces an expected distribu-
tion of the product’s distance from ideal that is a step function with a density
of 4 between 0 and 1/8, a density of 2 between 1/8 and 3/8, and a density
of zero everywhere else. Given these expectations, a consumer’s utility from
buying good 1 at price p1 if she has taste 3/8 is
u1 = v− 3
8
t−p1 + 1
4
(p2−p1)− λt
1/8∫
0
(
3
8
− s
)
4d(s)− λt
3/8∫
1/8
(
3
8
− s
)
2d(s),
(3.24)
while the utility from buying good 2 at price p2 is
u2 = v− 1
8
t−p2−λ3
4
(p2−p1)− λt
1/8∫
0
(
1
8
− s
)
4d(s) + t
3/8∫
1/8
(
s− 1
8
)
2d(s).
(3.25)
Setting u1 = u2 yields
v − 3
8
t− p1 + 1
4
(p2 − p1)− λt
2
(
3
8
− 1
16
)
− λt
2
(
3
8
− 2
8
)
= v − t
8
− p2 − 3λ
4
(p2 − p1)− λt
2
(
1
8
− 1
16
)
+
t
2
(
2
8
− 1
8
)
.
Rearranging gives
p2 − p1 =
t
(
5
16
+ λ 3
16
)
5
4
+ λ3
4
=
1
4
, (3.26)
We now derive the range of marginal costs that can support the above
prices, and the above personal equilibrium, as part of a market equilibrium.
To do so, we take advantage of Lemma 3.1. For the indifferent consumer on
either side of either firm, G(x) +G(1/n− x) = G(3/8) +G(1/8) = 3/2. Using
that λ = 5, the responsiveness of demand to local deviations from the prices
p1, p2 is
D2↓(p2, p1) = −6
5
, D2↑(p2, p1) = D1↓(p1, p2) = −1; D1↑(p1, p2) = −2
5
.
Hence, for firm 2 not to want to deviate locally from the proposed equilibrium,
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p2 must satisfy the following conditions:
(p2 − c2)D2↓(p2, p1) +D2(p2, p1) = −(p2 − c2) · 6
5
+
1
4
≤ 0
(p2 − c2)D2↑(p2, p1) +D2(p2, p1) = −(p2 − c2) · 1 + 1
4
≥ 0.
This implies:
p2 − 1
4
≤ c2 ≤ p2 − 5
24
(3.27)
By similar calculations, for firm 1 not to want to deviate locally, p1 and c1
must satisfy
p1 − 15
8
≤ c1 ≤ p1 − 3
4
. (3.28)
Lemma 3.3 implies that if a a local deviation is unprofitable, a non-local de-
viation to an “interior” price (a price such that the indifferent consumer x is
within distance 1/2 of the firm) is also unprofitable. It is also clearly unprof-
itable to change one’s price after capturing or losing the entire market, so that
the above local conditions are sufficient for firms not to want to deviate.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We begin with proving continuity. Suppose by
contradiction that ci → c but P (ci) 9 P (c). Then, since the pricing function
is obviously bounded, we can choose the sequence so that P (ci) converges; let
P (ci) → P ′ 6= P (c). Furthermore, suppose that P ′ > P (c); the proof for the
other case is analogous.
Since P (ci) is optimal when the marginal cost is ci, a firm cannot benefit
from marginally lowering its price. Using Equation 3.11 to express the firm’s
marginal profit from lowering its price, this implies that
1
2n
− (P (ci)− ci) · 2 + (λ− 1)F↑ (P (ci))
1 + λ
≥ 0. (3.29)
Similarly, since P (c) is optimal when the marginal cost is c, a firm cannot
benefit from marginally raising its price. Using Equation 3.11, this implies
that
1
2n
− (P (c)− c) · 2 + (λ− 1)F (P (c))
1 + λ
≤ 0. (3.30)
Subtracting Inequality 3.29 from Inequality 3.30 gives
(
P (ci)− ci) · 2 + (λ− 1)F↑ (P (ci))
1 + λ
− (P (c)− c) · 2 + (λ− 1)F (P (c))
1 + λ
≤ 0.
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The limit of the left-hand side of this inequality as i → ∞ is positive, a
contradiction.
Next, we prove by contradiction that P (c) is non-decreasing. Suppose that
c′ > c and P (c′) < P (c). Since P (c) is optimal when the marginal cost is c, a
firm cannot benefit from marginally lowering its price. As above, this implies
that
1
2n
− (P (c)− c) · 2 + (λ− 1)F↑ (P (c))
1 + λ
≥ 0. (3.31)
Similarly, since P (c) is optimal when the marginal cost is c, a firm cannot
benefit from marginally raising its price. Therefore,
1
2n
− (P (c′)− c′) · 2 + (λ− 1)F (P (c
′))
1 + λ
≤ 0. (3.32)
Subtracting Inequality 3.31 from Inequality 3.32 gives
(P (c)− c) · 2 + (λ− 1)F↑ (P (c))
1 + λ
− (P (c′)− c′) · 2 + (λ− 1)F (P (c
′))
1 + λ
≤ 0,
a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. We first show that any symmetric equilibrium
pricing function satisfies the above properties. Property 1 follows from Lemma
3.2. Since P (·) is increasing and continuous, P−1(p) is a closed interval for
any p on the range of P (·). Let p1, p2, . . . be the (at most countable) set of
prices pi such that P
−1(pi) is a non-trivial interval, and let [fi, f ′i ] = P
−1(pi).
These [fi, f
′
i ] satisfy Property 2 by construction. Also, for any c 6∈ [fi, f ′i ], P (c)
is not an atom of the pricing distribution, so a firm’s demand is differentiable,
and hence P (c) must satisfy Equation 3.7. This implies that Property 3 holds.
Notice that D1↑(P (c), P−1(c)) = −1t 21+λ , so firm 1 does not want to decrease its
price at c only if (P (c)− c)1
t
2
1+λ
≤ 1
n
, which implies the first part of Property
4. Also, D1↓(P (c), P−1(c)) = −1t . So for raising the price marginally to be
unprofitable, we must have (P (c)− c)1
t
≥ 1
n
, which implies the second part of
Property 4.
We now argue that if P (·) satisfies the properties in the Proposition, it
is an equilibrium pricing strategy. Notice that for any c ∈ (c, c), c 6∈ [fi, f ′i),
demand is differentiable from the right. Since P (c) = Φ(c) for all such c, our
analysis in the text implies that there is no profitable local price increase. We
are left to consider non-local price increases. Analogously to Proposition 3.1,
since the demand curve is concave for price increases, the result is immediate.
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Now for any c ∈ (c, c), c 6∈ (fi, f ′i ], demand is differentiable from the left.
Furthermore, since P (c) = Φ(c) for all such c, our analysis in the text implies
that local price decreases are unprofitable. We now consider non-local price
decreases.
The proof mirrors the proof of Proposition 3.1. Suppose the realized cost is
c, so that the firm’s price in the posited equilibrium is P (c). At this price, con-
sumers’ marginal utility in money from a price decrease is 2+(λ−1)F↑(P (c)).
We will use that as the price decreases, this marginal utility in money also
decreases.
We first rule out the possibility that firm 1 might like to charge a price p1
so that the indifferent consumer is x ∈ [ 1
2n
, 1
n
]
. Equating Expressions (3.9)
and (3.10), setting p2 = P (c), and replacing the difference in money utilities,
P (c)− p1 +
[
−λ
∫ p1
0
(p1 − p) dF (p) +
∫ ∞
p1
(p− p1) dF (p)
]
−
[
−λ
∫ P (c)
0
(P (c)− p) dF (p) +
∫ ∞
P (c)
(p− P (c)) dF (p)
]
,
with its upper bound (2 + (λ − 1)F↑(P (c)))(P (c) − p1), gives that for the
indifferent consumer x
−xt+ (P (c)− p1)(2 + (λ− 1)F↑(P (c)))− λt
(
x− 1
4n
)
≥ −
(
1
n
− x
)
t− λt · 2n ·
(
1
n
− x
) 1
n
− x
2
+ t · 2n ·
(
x− 1
2n
)
x− 1
2n
2
,
so that
P (c)−p1 ≥ t
2 + (λ− 1)F↑(P (c))
[
(λ+ 1)
(
2x− 1
n
)
+ (λ− 1)
(
x− 1
4n
− nx2
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡κ
.
(3.33)
To show that lowering the price to p1 is not a profitable deviation, it is sufficient
to show that
1
n
(P (c)− c) ≥ 2x(p1 − c).
Using Inequality (3.33), it is sufficient to show that
1
n
(P (c)− c) ≥ 2x
(
P (c)− c− t
2 + (λ− 1)F↑(P (c))κ
)
.
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Rearranging and using that P (c)− c = t(1+λ)
n(2+(λ−1)F↑(P (c))) gives(
2x− 1
n
)
1 + λ
n
≤ 2xκ,
which is equivalent to Inequality (3.12), which we verified in the proof of
Proposition 3.1.
For n > 2, we are left to rule out that firm 1 undercuts its rival and steals
more than the entire adjacent market. We begin by ruling out deviations in
which the firm captures less than two adjacent markets. Let p1 be the price
at which the consumer located at 1
n
is indifferent between buying from firm 1
and buying from firm 2. Substituting x = 1/n into Equation 3.33 gives
P (c)− p1 ≥ t
(2 + (λ− 1)F↑(P (c)))n
[
2 +
3
4
(λ− 1)
]
.
Using the expression for P (c)− c we get p1 − c ≤ t(2+(λ−1)F↑(P (c)))n
[
1
4
(λ− 1)].
Thus, even if firm 1 would get the entire two adjacent markets when setting
p′1, this is unprofitable as
1
n
(P (c)− c) > 4
n
(p1 − c).
We are left to consider the case when n > 4 and firm 1 steals at least two
adjacent markets on each side. We show that this is unprofitable because it
requires firm 1 to price below marginal cost. For the consumer located at 2
n
to weakly prefer buying from firm 1 rather than firm 3, it must be that
P (c)− p1 ≥ t
(2 + (λ− 1)F↑(P (c)))n [4 + (λ− 1)
7
4
]
>
t
(2 + (λ− 1)F↑(P (c)))n [2 + λ− 1] = P (c)− c.
This completes the proof that non-local price decreases are unprofitable.
We have established that there is no profitable deviation for c ∈ (c, c), c 6∈
[fi, f
′
i ]. For any c ∈ (c, c), c ∈ [fi, f ′i ], we have P (fi) = P (c) = P (f ′i). Since it
is not profitable to lower the price at fi, it is also not profitable to lower it for
c, and since it is not profitable to raise the price for f ′i , it is also not profitable
to raise it for c.
We are left to prove that there are no profitable deviations for c and c.
Our analysis of non-local deviations above (which only used that P (c) = Φ(c))
implies that for P (c) = Φ(c), there is no profitable deviation. Now suppose
that P (c) < Φ(c). Demand responsiveness to price decreases from P (c) is
then the same as when P (c) = Φ(c). Hence, with the markup being lower,
the incentive to lower the price is smaller than for P (c) = Φ(c), so there is
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no profitable price decrease. Next, we deal with price increases from c. Since
P (c) < Φ(c), we consider two cases. First, suppose that P (c) is a constant
p∗. Then, using that by Property 4 in the proposition Φ(c) ≥ p∗ ≥ Φ(c),
and Equation 3.7, the condition in Proposition 3.2 is satisfied. Hence, p∗ is
a market-equilibrium focal price. If P (c) is not constant, there is a largest
interval [c, f ′1] for which it is constant, and where f
′
1 < c. In this case, our
argument in the previous paragraph applies. Finally, a similar argument works
for price deviations from c.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. Suppose by contradiction that there is a constant
interval [f1, f
′
1]. By Conditions 3 and 4 of Proposition 3.5, we must have
P (f1) ≤ Φ(f1). But by the same two conditions, we must also have P (f ′1) ≥
Φ(f ′1), which is impossible since Φ(·) is strictly increasing on the interval while
P (·) is constant.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. We first prove by contradiction that if Φ(c)
is weakly decreasing, then any symmetric equilibrium is a focal-price one.
Suppose the price is not deterministic. Then, by the continuity of the pricing
function, there are cost levels c, c′ > c such that P (c) and P (c′) are not atoms
of the price distribution. Thus, for these cost levels, the chosen price must
satisfy Equation 3.7. Using that Φ(c) is strictly decreasing, this means that
P (c′) < P (c), contradicting that the pricing function is non-decreasing.
If Φ(c) is not weakly decreasing, then there are obviously non-constant P (·)
satisfying Proposition 3.5.
Proof of Corollary 3.4. The statement is true on both the constant and
strictly increasing parts of the pricing function.
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Chapter 4
Regular Prices and Sales1
4.1 Introduction
It is widely understood in the literature that loss aversion—whereby individ-
uals dislike losses relative to a reference point more than they like same-sized
gains—leads individuals to be very averse to small and modest-scale monetary
risk, and some researchers believe that loss aversion is the primary explanation
for aversion to such risk.2 Many existing theories have exploited this basic im-
plication of loss aversion to show that firms often have an incentive to shield
loss-averse consumers or employees from uncertainty in the environment.3 As
a complement to previous work, in this paper we identify an economically
central setting in which the opposite is the case: a firm selling to loss-averse
consumers optimally introduces random “sales” into an otherwise riskless en-
1 This chapter is coauthored with Paul Heidhues, and is forthcoming in Theoretical
Economics.
2 As explained in Chapter 1, Rabin (2000b) shows that in an expected-utility-over-
wealth model non-trivial aversion to modest-scale risk must be associated with implausible
and empirically unobserved extreme aversion to large-scale risk, so that expected utility
over wealth cannot explain attitudes toward both modest-scale and large-scale risks. They
argue that loss aversion is likely a better explanation for aversion to small and modest-scale
risks. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) demonstrate that
investor loss aversion can help explain the equity premium puzzle. Sydnor (2010) documents
that homeowners display extreme aversion to risk in their deductible choices for homeowners’
insurance, and argues that loss aversion can contribute to explaining this behavior.
3 For instance, Chapter 3 of this dissertation explains why non-identical competitors often
sell differentiated goods at identical prices. Similarly, Herweg and Mierendorff (forthcoming)
argue that the prevalence of flat-rate contracts can be due to consumer loss aversion. In
models of moral hazard with loss-averse agents, Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) and
Macera (2012) demonstrate that the optimal incentive contract features less variation in the
wage than would be expected based on classical models.
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vironment. The resulting distribution of prices is not only a theoretically novel
implication of loss aversion, but it is consistent with some empirically docu-
mented patterns in retailer pricing summarized in Section 4.2. While we are
unaware of compelling evidence on the importance of our mechanism relative
to those in other models of sales, our theory seems like a promising explanation
to consider for at least two reasons. First, it is based on loss aversion, one of
the most well-documented phenomena in human behavior. Second, as demon-
strated by the combination of previous work and ours, unlike most theories
loss aversion is consistent with the puzzling combination of flexibility in ob-
served consumer prices (reflected in frequent sales) and stickiness in observed
consumer prices (reflected in the stickiness of the regular price). Furthermore,
our theory makes additional predictions on the circumstances under which
random sales are likely to be observed.
We assume that a risk-neutral profit-maximizing monopolist sells a single
product to a representative consumer with known valuation, and the con-
sumer’s reference point for evaluating her purchase is her recent rational ex-
pectations about the purchase. The monopolist announces a price distribution,
and the consumer forms her expectations after observing the price distribu-
tion. Then, a price is drawn from the distribution, and the consumer decides
whether to buy a single item of the good. Our main result establishes that
the optimal price distribution consists of low and variable “sale” prices and
a high and atomic “regular” price. The sale prices are chosen such that it
is not credible for the consumer not to buy at these prices. Then, because
the consumer expects to purchase with positive probability and dislikes un-
certainty in whether she will get the product, she chooses to buy also at the
regular price. Furthermore, because the consumer dislikes uncertainty in how
much she pays, to get her to choose to buy at the regular price the monopolist
makes the regular price sticky. We also show that market power is necessary
for random pricing to be optimal: if two firms compete ex ante for consumers
by announcing their price distributions, they choose deterministic prices in
equilibrium.
Section 4.3 presents our basic model, which uses the framework of Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006) to incorporate consumer loss aversion into a simple model
of first-degree price discrimination. There is a single product and a single
representative consumer. If the consumer gets the product, she derives con-
sumption utility v from it, and she also derives additive consumption disutility
from any money she pays. In addition, the consumer derives gain-loss utility
from the comparison of her consumption utility in the product and money
dimensions to a reference point equal to her lagged expectations regarding
the same outcomes, with losses being more painful than equal-sized gains are
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pleasant. Suppose, for example, that the consumer had been expecting to buy
the product for either $5 or $7. If she buys it for $6, she experiences no gain
or loss in the product dimension and “mixed feelings” in the money dimension
consisting of a loss relative to the possibility of paying $5 and a gain relative
to the possibility of paying $7, with the weight on the loss equal to the prob-
ability with which she had been expecting to pay $5. If she does not buy,
she experiences a loss in the product dimension and (paying $0) a gain in the
money dimension relative to both prices $5 and $7. To determine expectations
and behavior with these preferences, we assume that the consumer must form
credible purchase plans: given the expectations induced by her plan of which
prices to buy at, buying at exactly those prices must be optimal. Among
credible plans, the consumer chooses one that maximizes her ex-ante expected
utility, which we call a preferred personal equilibrium or PPE.
The above consumer interacts with a risk-neutral profit-maximizing mo-
nopolist with deterministic production cost. In period 0, the monopolist com-
mits to a price distribution. This commitment assumption captures, in a
reduced form, the idea that a patient firm would have the incentive to develop
a reputation for playing the long-run optimal price distribution. The consumer
observes the price distribution while forming expectations about her own price-
contingent behavior. In period 1, a price is drawn from the distribution, and
the consumer decides whether to buy a single item of the good. For technical
reasons, we assume that the price distribution must be discrete with atoms
at least ∆ > 0 apart, and look for the limit-optimal price distribution as ∆
approaches zero.
We analyze our basic model in Section 4.4. We show that for any loss-averse
preferences by the consumer, the monopolist’s limit-optimal price distribution
looks qualitatively like that illustrated in Figure 4.1: it consists of a region of
continuously distributed low sale prices and a single atomic high regular price.
We explain the intuition in three parts.
First, despite a loss-averse consumer’s dislike of uncertainty—in fact, by
exploiting this dislike—the monopolist can earn greater profits by charging
uncertain prices than by charging a deterministic price. If the monopolist uses
a deterministic price p, then it cannot earn revenue of more than v.4 But
consider instead the strategy of sometimes charging sale prices low enough
to make not buying at these prices non-credible, and at other times charging
4 In this case, any rational expectations match actual behavior, so in PPE gain-loss
utility must be zero. As a result, the consumer prefers to maximize consumption utility, not
buying if p > v. And such a plan is credible: once the consumer makes her preferred plan
not to buy, she would experience paying for the product as a painful loss, so that she would
especially not like to buy.
118
               dc_785_13
4.1. INTRODUCTION 119
1
2
3
d
e
n
s
i
t
y 0.25
0.5
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
plsale p
h
sale p
l
reg price
.............
.........................
....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
...
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
..
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.
................................
.........
continuous distribution
of “sale prices”
.....................................................
.......
single atomic
“regular price” > v
↑
Figure 4.1: A Limit-Optimal Price Distribution
The figure graphs the limit-optimal price distribution when the monopolist sells to
a single consumer with known consumption value v for the product, and—to be
consistent with experimental evidence suggesting two-to-one loss aversion—loss-
aversion parameters are λ = 3 and η = 1 (see Section 4.3 for a definition of these
variables). The left axis shows the scale for the density of the sale prices, and
the right axis shows the scale for the probability of the regular price atom. In
this example, plsale = p = 0.5 · v, phsale ≈ 0.81 · v, and preg ≈ 1.47 · v. Although
the location of the prices and the weight placed on the regular price is typically
different, the limit-optimal price distribution has the same qualitative features (a
region of continuously distributed low prices and an atomic high price) for any
λ > 1 and η > 0.
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a high regular price. The consumer’s realization that she will buy at the
sale prices engages an expectations-based variant of the endowment effect first
discussed by Thaler (1980) and documented for instance by Kahneman et
al. (1990): if she plans not to buy at the high regular price, she expects to
get the product with an interior probability, so she feels an unpleasant loss
if she does not get it. To avoid this sense of loss, she prefers to eliminate
uncertainty in whether she will get the product, and is therefore willing to
buy at a regular price that exceeds v somewhat. As with the endowment
effect, the two-dimensional nature of loss aversion is crucial for this logic to
hold: if the consumer experienced gain-loss utility over her total consumption
utility rather than over the product and money dimensions separately, buying
at a regular price exceeding v would neither be optimal ex post, nor reduce
risk ex ante.
Going further, by exploiting a type of time inconsistency to push the con-
sumer’s expected utility below zero, the firm can lead her to pay not only a
regular price exceeding v, but also an average price exceeding v. When the
consumer decides to buy at a sale price in period 1, she does not take into
account that this increases her period-0 expectations to consume and spend
money, lowering her expected utility. In this sense of leading the consumer to
choose outcomes she does not like ex ante, the monopolist’s pricing strategy
is manipulative.
Second, the profit-maximizing way to execute the above “luring sales” is
to put a small weight on each of a large number of sale prices. If the consumer
had expected not to buy, she would experience paying for the product as a loss
and getting the product merely as a gain, creating a low willingness to pay for
the product. To make not buying non-credible, then, the monopolist puts a
small weight on a low price p chosen such that even if the consumer expected
not to buy, she would buy at p. Since the consumer realizes that she will buy
at p, she experiences not getting the product partially as a loss rather than a
foregone gain, and paying for it partially as a foregone gain rather than a loss,
increasing her willingness to pay. As a result, not buying at a slightly higher
price is also non-credible, allowing the monopolist to charge higher prices at
all other times. Continuing this logic further, the monopolist needs to charge
each sale price with only a low probability.
Third, because the role of the regular price is completely different from
that of sale prices, the monopolist chooses that price to be atomic. The regular
price is chosen by the monopolist not to make a strategy of never buying non-
credible, but to ensure that the consumer is willing to buy at all prices rather
than just at the sale prices. Hence, there is no reason to make the regular price
random—the monopolist just sets it at the consumer’s endogenous willingness
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to pay for the product.
In Section 4.5, we turn to various extensions and modifications of our
framework, making several predictions on when random sales are less likely
to be observed. In Section 4.5.1, we consider perfect ex-ante competition
for consumers: two firms simultaneously announce their price distributions in
period 0, and in the same period the consumer decides which firm to visit
in period 1. Because a price distribution that manipulates the consumer into
suboptimal behavior would not attract her, in this case firms offer deterministic
prices. This result shows that some market power is necessary for random
pricing to obtain in equilibrium. In Section 4.5.2, we argue that—although the
main point of this paper is to demonstrate the optimality of random prices—in
a sense our paper does not contradict previous results that loss aversion leads to
reduced price variation. In particular, our results are consistent with stickiness
in the regular price, and with price stickiness in a competitive environment.
Intuitively, if the regular price was uncertain, the consumer would experience
a gain if it turned out relatively low and a loss if it turned out relatively
high. Due to loss aversion, she would feel the loss more heavily, making her
less willing to buy at an uncertain regular price. Hence, not only does a
monopolist not need variation in the regular price (as we explained above),
it has an incentive to keep the regular price sticky to induce the consumer to
buy at the regular price in addition to the sale prices. Similarly, because a
consumer dislikes uncertainty in the price, to attract her from a competitor
a firm has an incentive to eliminate variation in the price, leading to sticky
prices under ex-ante competition. Finally, in Section 4.5.3 we show that if it
is sufficiently costly for consumers to observe the realized price before buying,
then the monopolist chooses a deterministic price.
In Section 4.6, we summarize the behavioral-economics and pricing liter-
atures most related to our paper. We conclude the paper in Section 4.7 by
pointing out some pricing patterns that our model cannot explain. All proofs
are in the Appendix.
4.2 Evidence on Pricing
The predictions of our model are qualitatively consistent with much of the
evidence on supermarket pricing. Supermarket prices change every two or
three weeks on average, typically by moving away from the regular price and
then quickly returning to it (Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi 2003, Kehoe and
Midrigan 2008, Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo 2009). Furthermore, most
of these temporary price changes are sales (price decreases rather than in-
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creases), with the mean deviation being -22% of the regular price (Kehoe and
Midrigan 2008).
This price variability occurs despite considerable stickiness in the regular
price, which change about once a year on average (Kehoe and Midrigan 2008,
Eichenbaum et al. 2009). In addition, consumer retail prices tend to be sticky
more broadly. In a classic study, Cecchetti (1986) finds that the time between
magazine price changes is typically over a year and sometimes over a decade.
For a selection of goods in a mail-order catalog, Kashyap (1995) observes
an average of 14.7 months between price changes. MacDonald and Aaronson
(2006) document that for restaurant prices, the median duration between price
changes is around 10 months. Even at the lower end of the stickiness spectrum,
Bils and Klenow (2004) find a median price duration of 4.3 months for non-
shelter items in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data underlying the
Consumer Price Index.
In a classical reference-independent model, any change in the firm’s cost
or elasticity of demand creates an incentive to change prices. From this per-
spective, it is likely that changes in the economic environment are far too
rapid to justify the above lags between price changes. As suggestive evidence
for this observation, Eichenbaum et al. (2009) document that conditional on
the weekly price being constant and equal to the regular price, the standard
deviation of quantities sold is 42%.
Recent empirical research also shows that sale prices are less sticky than
regular prices. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) document that it is more likely for
a sale price to change from one promotion to the next than for a regular price
to change when interrupted by a sale. Nakamura and Steinsson (2009) find
that for the median product category, the sale price changes in 48.7 percent
of the weeks during a multi-week sale, while the regular price changes in only
6.1 percent of weeks. The number of unique prices as a fraction of total weeks
spent on sale is 0.434, while the same number for regular prices is 0.045.
It is important to note that the frequency of sales that has been observed at
supermarkets does not seem to be a general feature of consumer retail prices—
many retailers simply charge a sticky price and rarely have non-cyclical sales.
Movies, for instance, largely sell at the same price for extended periods of time
(Einav and Orbach 2007). Similarly, many previous studies of price stickiness,
including the Cecchetti (1986) study on newspapers and the MacDonald and
Aaronson (2006) study on restaurants mentioned above, do not seem to find
frequent sales. And while Eichenbaum et al. (2009) report that sale prices con-
stitute about 30% of price observations at supermarkets, Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2008) find that overall they constitute only 8% of non-food price observations.
We are unaware of evidence on whether the pattern of sale frequencies across
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different types of retailers is consistent with our model’s predictions that sales
are less likely to occur when prices are harder to observe or there is competi-
tion.
4.3 Model
In this section, we introduce our basic model of pricing with a loss-averse con-
sumer. A risk-neutral profit-maximizing monopolist is looking to sell a single
product with deterministic production cost c to a single representative con-
sumer. We suppose that c is sufficiently low for the monopolist to sell to the
consumer; this will be the case whenever the revenue from the price distribu-
tion we identify below exceeds c. The interaction between the monopolist and
the consumer lasts two periods, 0 and 1. In period 0, the monopolist commits
to a price distribution Π(·) for its product. The consumer learns the price
distribution, makes a price-contingent purchase plan, and forms stochastic be-
liefs regarding her consumption outcomes. In period 1, a price p is drawn from
Π(·), and after observing the price, the consumer decides whether to buy a
single item of the product, choosing quantity b ∈ {0, 1}. For technical and ex-
positional reasons, we assume that any indifference by the consumer in period
1 is broken in favor of buying.
Our assumption that the firm can commit to the price distribution cap-
tures, in a static reduced form, a patient firm’s dynamic incentives to forego
possible short-term profits to manage consumers’ price expectations. One
possible micro-foundation for this assumption is a model in which (based on
Fudenberg and Levine 1989) the firm can develop a “reputation” for playing
the optimal committed price distribution. More generally, it seems plausible
to assume that over time consumers learn a firm’s basic pricing strategy and
incorporate it into their expectations, and that firms take this into account.
This assumption is clearly crucial for our main result: once the consumer has
formed expectations, the firm would prefer not to charge sale prices, so com-
mitment is necessary for it to use sales as a way to induce an expectation to
buy in the consumer.
Our model of consumer behavior follows the approaches of Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006) and Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008), but it adapts and simplifies
these theories to fit the decision of whether to purchase a single product. The
consumer’s utility function has two components. Her consumption utility is
(v−p)b, so that the consumption value of the product is v. Consumption utility
can be thought of as the classical notion of outcome-based utility. In addition,
the consumer derives gain-loss utility from the comparison of her period-1
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consumption outcomes to a reference point given by her period-0 expectations
(probabilistic beliefs) about those outcomes. Let kv = vb and kp = −pb be the
consumption utilities in the product and money dimensions, respectively. For
any riskless consumption-utility outcome ki and riskless reference point ri in
dimension i, we define total utility in dimension i as u(ki|ri) = ki +µ(ki− ri).
Hence, for any (kv, kp) and (rv, rp), total utility is
u(kv|rv) + u(kp|rp) = kv + µ(kv − rv) + kp + µ(kp − rp). (4.1)
We assume that µ is two-piece linear with a slope of η > 0 for gains and a
slope of ηλ > η for losses. By positing a constant marginal utility from gains
and a constant and larger marginal disutility from losses, this formulation cap-
tures prospect theory’s (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman
1991) loss aversion, but ignores prospect theory’s diminishing sensitivity. The
parameter η can be interpreted as the weight attached to gain-loss utility, and
λ as the coefficient of loss aversion.5
Beyond loss aversion, our specification in Expression 4.1 incorporates the
assumption that the consumer assesses gains and losses in the two dimensions,
the product and money, separately. Hence, if her reference point is not to
get the product and not to pay anything, for instance, she evaluates getting
the product and paying for it as a gain in the product dimension and a loss
in the money dimension—and not as a single gain or loss depending on total
consumption utility relative to the reference point. This is consistent with
much experimental evidence commonly interpreted in terms of loss aversion.6
It is also crucial for our results: if gain-loss utility was defined over total
consumption utility—as would be the case, for example, in an experiment
5 Consistent with most of the evidence and literature on loss aversion suggesting that
individuals are loss averse even for small stakes, we assume a kink in gain-loss utility at zero.
An alternative specification is one in which the marginal gain-loss utility changes quickly
around zero, but there is no kink. The mechanism behind our results indicates that in such
an alternative specification, charging random sale prices and separate regular prices would
still be optimal. In a setting with cost uncertainty and downward-sloping demand, however,
the regular prices would no longer be fully sticky, only compressed relative to what one
would expect in a classical model.
6 Specifically, it is key to explaining the endowment effect—that randomly assigned “own-
ers” of an object value it more highly than “non-owners”—and other observed regularities
in trading behavior. The common and intuitive explanation of the endowment effect is that
owners construe giving up the object as a painful loss that counts more than money they
receive in exchange, so that they demand a lot of money for the object. But if gains and
losses were defined over the value of the entire transaction, owners would not be more sen-
sitive to giving up the object than to receiving money in exchange, so no endowment effect
would ensue.
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with induced values—then for any reference point the consumer’s willingness
to pay for the product would be v, so that the firm would set a deterministic
price equal to v. We will discuss how gain-loss utility and loss aversion in each
of the two dimensions contributes to our results.
Since we assume below that expectations are rational, and in many situa-
tions such rational expectations are stochastic, we extend the utility function
in Expression 4.1 to allow for the reference point to be a pair of probability
distributions F = (F v, F p) over the two dimensions of consumption utility.
For any consumption-utility outcome ki and probability distribution over con-
sumption utilities F i in dimension i, we define
U(ki|F i) =
∫
ri
u(ki|ri)dF i(ri), (4.2)
and define total utility from outcome (kv, kp) as U(kv|F v)+U(kp|F p). In eval-
uating (kv, kp), the consumer compares it to each possibility in the reference
lottery. If she had been expecting to pay either $15 or $20 for the product,
for example, paying $17 for it feels like a loss of $2 relative to the possibility
of paying $15, and like a gain of $3 relative to the possibility of paying $20.
In addition, the weight on the loss in the overall experience is equal to the
probability with which she had been expecting to pay $15.
To complete our theory of consumer behavior with the above belief-dependent
preferences, we specify how beliefs are formed. Still applying Ko˝szegi and Ra-
bin (2006), we assume that beliefs must be consistent with rationality: the con-
sumer correctly anticipates the implications of her period-0 plans, and makes
the best plan she knows she will carry through. While the formal definitions
below are notationally somewhat cumbersome, the logical consequences of this
requirement are intuitively relatively simple. Note that any plan of behavior
formulated in period 0—which in our setting amounts simply to a strategy of
which prices to buy the product for—induces some expectations in period 0. If,
given these expectations, the consumer is not willing to follow the plan, then
she could not have rationally formulated the plan in the first place. Hence, a
credible plan in period 0 must have the property that it is optimal given the
expectations generated by the plan. Following original definitions by Ko˝szegi
(2010) and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we call such a credible plan a personal
equilibrium (PE). Given that she is constrained to choose a PE plan, a rational
consumer chooses the one that maximizes her expected utility from the per-
spective of period 0. We call such a favorite credible plan a preferred personal
equilibrium (PPE).
Formally, notice that whatever the consumer had been expecting, in period
1 she buys at prices up to and including some cutoff (recall that the consumer’s
125
               dc_785_13
126 CHAPTER 4. REGULAR PRICES AND SALES
indifference is broken in favor of buying). Hence, any credible plan must have
such a cutoff structure. Consider, then, when a plan to buy up to the price p∗
is credible. This plan induces an expectation F v(Π, p∗) of getting consumption
utility v from the product with probability Π(p∗), and an expectation F p(Π, p∗)
of spending nothing with probability 1−Π(p∗) and spending each of the prices
p ≤ p∗ with probability PrΠ(p). The plan is credible if, with a reference point
given by these expectations, p∗ is indeed a cutoff price in period 1:
Definition 4.1. The cutoff price p∗ is a personal equilibrium (PE) for price
distribution Π if for the induced expectations F v(Π, p∗) and F p(Π, p∗), we have
U(0|F v(Π, p∗)) + U(0|F p(Π, p∗)) = U(v|F v(Π, p∗)) + U(−p∗|F p(Π, p∗)).
Now utility maximization in period 0 implies that the consumer chooses
the PE plan that maximizes her expected utility:
Definition 4.2. The cutoff price p∗ is a preferred personal equilibrium (PPE)
for price distribution Π if it is a PE, and for any PE cutoff price p∗∗,
EF v(Π,p∗)[U(k
v|F v(Π, p∗))] + EF p(Π,p∗)[U(kp|F v(Π, p∗))]
≥ EF v(Π,p∗∗)[U(kv|F v(Π, p∗∗))] + EF p(Π,p∗∗)[U(kp|F v(Π, p∗∗))]. (4.3)
The monopolist is a standard risk-neutral profit-maximizing firm, trying
to maximize expected profits given the consumer’s behavior. To be able to
state the monopolist’s problem simply as a maximization problem rather than
as part of an equilibrium, we assume that the consumer chooses the highest-
purchase-probability PPE. With this assumption, the monopolist solves
max
Π
{Π(p∗)EP [p|p ≤ p∗]− Π(p∗)c | p∗ is the highest PPE for Π(·)} . (4.4)
To facilitate our statements and proofs, we make one more technical as-
sumption: we suppose that the monopolist must choose a discrete price dis-
tribution in which neighboring atoms are at least ∆ > 0 apart. We think
of ∆ as being small. Together with the assumption that indifference by the
consumer is broken in favor of buying, this ensures the existence of an opti-
mal price distribution. In the Appendix, we identify properties of the optimal
price distribution for ∆ > 0, but in the text we state these results in a more
transparent form, in the limit as ∆ approaches zero:
Definition 4.3. The price distribution Π(·) is limit-optimal if there exist a
sequence ∆i → 0 and optimal price distributions Πi(·) for each ∆i such that
Πi → Π in distribution.
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4.4 The Optimal Price Distribution
This section presents our main results on pricing with loss-averse consumers.
We begin in Section 4.4.1 by illustrating the main idea behind random sales in
a simplified model with no loss aversion in money. In Section 4.4.2, we identify
the limit-optimal price distribution in our main model.
4.4.1 An Illustration: No Loss Aversion in Money
We illustrate the logic behind the role of randomization in the monopolist’s
optimal pricing strategy in a model with no loss aversion in money. This
variant of our model simplifies many calculations, and is also relevant because,
as argued for instance by Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) and Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009), loss aversion may be weaker in the money than in the product
dimension. We assume that for riskless reference points rv, rp, the consumer’s
gain-loss utility in the product dimension is kv + µ(kv − rv) (as above), but in
the money dimension it is simply kp + η · (kp− rp). We define gain-loss utility
for stochastic reference points analogously to above.
Because in this variant the consumer’s disutility of paying a price p is
(1 + η)p independently of rp, her willingness to pay for the product depends
only on rv. To see the effect of this reference point, suppose that the consumer
had expected to buy with probability q. Then, if she buys, her utility in the
product dimension—consisting of consumption utility and a gain of v relative
to the possibility of not buying she had expected with probability 1 − q—is
(1+(1− q)η)v; and if she does not buy, her utility in the product dimension—
consisting of a loss of v relative to the possibility of buying she had expected
with probability q—is −qηλv. Hence, the consumer buys if (1 + η)p ≤ (1 +
η + η(λ− 1)q)v, or
p ≤ (1 + η + η(λ− 1)q)v
1 + η
. (4.5)
To see what this endogenous willingness to pay implies for pricing, first
consider what the monopolist can do with a deterministic price p. In that
case, the consumer faces a deterministic environment, so in any PE she gets
what she expects.7 This implies that her PE total utility is equal to her
consumption utility, so that from an ex-ante perspective buying is optimal if
and only if p ≤ v. To conclude that buying is the PPE if and only if p ≤ v,
however, we must check that this constitutes a PE for any p. This is easy:
7 This is true because—due to our assumption that indifference by the consumer in
period 1 is broken in favor of buying—there are only pure-strategy PE.
127
               dc_785_13
128 CHAPTER 4. REGULAR PRICES AND SALES
for p > v, Inequality 4.5 implies that the consumer is willing to follow a plan
to buy with probability zero (q = 0), and for p ≤ v, the same inequality
implies that the consumer is willing to follow a plan to buy with probability
one (q = 1). Hence, the highest revenue the monopolist can earn with a
deterministic price is v.
But the monopolist can do better with a stochastic price. Suppose that
the monopolist charges p = v with probability s1, and higher prices (whose
distribution we will determine momentarily) starting at v+∆ with probability
1− s1. Then, in any PE the consumer buys at price p = v: by Inequality 4.5,
even if she had expected to buy with probability zero, she would buy at price
v. Given that the consumer therefore buys with probability of at least s1 in
any PE, Inequality 4.5 implies that it is not credible for her not to buy at price
v + ∆ if
v + ∆ ≤ (1 + η + η(λ− 1)s1)v
1 + η
⇔ s1 ≥ 1 + η
η(λ− 1)v∆.
Intuitively, the consumer’s realization that she will buy at price v raises her
reference point in the product dimension and thereby creates a sense of loss if
she does not buy. The motive to avoid this loss induces an “attachment effect”
that raises her willingness to pay for the product.
Extending the above logic to any price distribution is straightforward.
Suppose that the consumer faces the distribution F (·), and define F−(p) =
limp′↗p F (p′). Then, there is a unique PE in which the consumer buys with
probability 1 if and only if
p ≤ (1 + η + η(λ− 1)F−(p))v
1 + η
⇔ F−(p) ≥ 1 + η
η(λ− 1) ·
p− v
v
holds for all p on the support of F (·). A “near-uniform” distribution that puts
weights of (1 + η)∆/(η(λ − 1)v) on each of the prices v, v + ∆, v + 2∆, . . . ,
and the remaining weight on the highest price, satisfies this condition with
equality at each of the atoms.
Notice that when facing the above price distribution, the consumer buys
the product at an average price that exceeds v, so that she receives negative
expected utility. In fact, for small ∆ the consumer pays a price strictly above v
with probability close to 1! Because the consumer has the option of making and
following through a strategy of never buying—which would yield an expected
utility of zero—this means that she behaves suboptimally among the strategies
available to her. Intuitively, the monopolist exploits a novel type of time
inconsistency that arises in our model despite a rational consumer’s attempt
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to maximize a single well-defined utility function.8 While the increase in the
consumer’s reference point due to the expectation to buy at low prices increases
her willingness to pay, it also lowers her utility. When she makes her purchase
decision in period 1, she takes the reference point (formed in period 0) as
given, and therefore ignores this negative effect.
Adding loss aversion in money complicates the above logic underlying ran-
domization for two reasons. First, because a consumer who did not expect to
buy experiences a loss in money if she does buy, loss aversion in money reduces
the highest price at which it is not credible not to buy. Second, once the con-
sumer expects to buy at such a low price, she experiences paying higher prices
as a loss, reducing the monopolist’s ability to cash in on the attachment effect.
Nevertheless, our main result below shows that for any loss-averse preferences
by the consumer, a stochastic price remains optimal. Furthermore, our main
result shows that the optimal price distribution features not only a densely
packed region of sale prices similar to the uniform distribution above, but also
a regular-price atom separated from the sale prices.
4.4.2 Main Result
Our main proposition identifies the features of the monopolist’s limit-optimal
pricing strategy when the consumer is loss averse in the money as well as the
product dimension:
Proposition 4.1. Fix any η > 0 and λ > 1. The profit-maximizing price
distribution induces purchase with probability one. Furthermore, in that case
any limit-optimal price distribution Π(·) has support [plsale, phsale]∪{preg}, where
plsale = p = (1+η)v/(1+ηλ) < p
h
sale < preg and Π(·) is continuously distributed
on the interval [plsale, p
h
sale] with density pi(p) = (1 + ηλ)/[η(λ− 1)(v+ p)]. The
monopolist’s expected revenue is strictly greater than v.
Proposition 4.1 says that the limit-optimal price distribution has two parts
(as illustrated in Figure 4.1): an interval of continuously distributed low prices,
and a single atomic high price. Furthermore, there is a gap between the low
price interval and the price atom. Thinking of the low prices as the non-sticky
sale prices and the high isolated pricing atom as the sticky regular price,
this price distribution is broadly consistent with the evidence on supermarket
pricing summarized in Section 4.2.
8 That beliefs-based preferences can generate time-inconsistent behavior has been pointed
out by Caplin and Leahy (2001) and Ko˝szegi (2010), and explored in more detail by Ko˝szegi
(2010) and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009).
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The proof of Proposition 4.1 has five main steps: (1) with a deterministic
price, the monopolist cannot earn more than v; (2) the firm can earn more
than v with a stochastic price distribution for which it is not credible for
the consumer not to buy at low (sale) prices; (3) it is optimal to make these
“forcing” sale prices—i.e., the prices at which the consumer buys in any PE—
stochastic; (4) it is suboptimal to rely solely on forcing sale prices, so that
there is also a region of high regular prices separated from the sale prices; and
(5) the high regular price is sticky. We have discussed the intuition for Steps
(1), (2), (3), and (5) in the introduction, so here we discuss only Step (4).
To understand Step (4), suppose by contradiction that a forcing distribution—
i.e., a price distribution that consists entirely of forcing prices and hence in-
duces a unique PE in which the consumer buys at all prices—is optimal. By
Steps 1 and 2, its average price must then be greater than v. To get a contra-
diction, we argue that the consumer will still buy at all prices if the monopolist
raises the highest price p in the distribution to some p′ > p while leaving the
rest of the distribution unchanged. By the definition of forcing, p is such that
the consumer buys at p if she had been expecting to buy at prices less than p.
Then, because the attachment effect implies that expecting to buy at p′ raises
the consumer’s willingness to pay for the product, there is a range of p′ > p
such that buying at all prices remains a PE (albeit not the only one). Now
notice that expecting to buy at p′ has a positive effect on utility when buying:
besides generating gains in money, it eliminates losses in money and gains in
the good, and since the average price is greater than v, the elimination of
losses dominates. This means that for p′ sufficiently close to p, the consumer
prefers a plan to buy at all prices rather than only at prices below p, so that
buying at all prices is the PPE.
As the above intuition indicates, the prediction of our model that there is
an atomic regular price separated from the sale prices does not rely on loss
aversion in money: even if the consumer’s disutility from monetary losses was
equal to her utility from gains, the motive to eliminate these losses would lead
her to buy at the higher price p′. This is straightforward to check in the version
of our model in Section 4.4.1 with no loss aversion in money. But as the same
intuition indicates, the regular price does rely on gain-loss utility in money:
if the consumer did not derive disutility from paying a higher price than her
reference point, she would not care about the above losses, and hence she would
prefer not to buy at p′. To see this formally, we return to a subtle modification
of our model in Section 4.4.1: we assume that the consumer’s utility in money
is not reference-dependent, but simply equal to (1 + η)kp. This implies that
for any price distribution the consumer’s set of PE is the same as in Section
4.4.1, and the optimal deterministic price remains v. Nevertheless, absent
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reference-dependence in money, we now show that the monopolist does not
want to charge a regular price. Suppose that for some p∗ > v with F (p∗) < 1,
there is a PE such that the consumer buys only for prices p ≤ p∗. We argue
that for any p′ > p∗ with F (p′) > F (p∗), buying up to prices p′ cannot be a
PPE. For notational simplicity, we denote by V (p′|p) the consumer’s expected
utility if she had formed expectations based on the plan to buy up to price
p, and then follows a plan to buy up to price p′. In this notation, we have
V (p∗|p∗) ≥ V (p′|p∗) > V (p′|p′), where the first inequality follows from the
definition of PE and the second follows from the fact that planning to buy
for prices up to p′ rather than p∗ raises the consumer’s reference point in the
product dimension and hence lowers her utility. This means that with no gain-
loss utility in money, the optimal price distribution induces a unique PE with
purchase with probability 1 (much like the price distribution we identified in
Section 4.4.1), and the firm’s limit-optimal price distribution is the uniform
distribution with support [v, (1 + ηλ)v/(1 + η)].
The qualitatively different nature of the optimal price distribution with
and without gain-loss utility in money also reflects a subtle difference in how
the monopolist exploits the consumer’s attachment to the product to charge
an expected price above v. In each case, the possibility of buying the product
at a low price means that the consumer must expect to get the product with
some probability. Without gain-loss utility in money, the monopolist exploits
the consumer’s ex-post (period-1) aversion to facing a sense of loss in the
product dimension to charge higher prices. With gain-loss utility in money,
the monopolist relies on this ex-post aversion to losses in the sales region, but
the same aversion is insufficient to induce the consumer to buy at the regular
price: if she expected not to buy at the regular price, she would strictly prefer
not to do so ex post. Instead, the monopolist relies on the consumer’s ex-ante
(period-0) aversion to risk in whether she will get the product to induce her
to plan on buying at the regular price.
An interesting possibility arises in our model if c > p, yet the monopolist
can profitably sell to the consumer. In this case, the monopolist’s cost is higher
than some of the prices it charges, providing a non-predatory rationale for
potential below-marginal-cost pricing of a single-product firm. Going further,
since the monopolist induces the consumer to buy at an average price exceeding
v, it may sell the product even if v < c. In this case, loss aversion affects not
only the monopolist’s pricing strategy, but also its production decision, leading
it to produce a socially wasteful product. Finally, note that if below-marginal-
cost pricing is prohibited—as is the case in some countries—sales disappear
altogether: since the firm cannot manipulate the consumer into buying against
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her will, it chooses a sticky price if v > c, and chooses not to sell if v < c.9
Beyond the shape of the optimal price distribution, the observation that
the consumer buys at an expected price exceeding v has an immediate welfare
implication:
Proposition 4.2. For any η > 0, λ > 1, and ∆ < v − p, the consumer would
be better off expecting and following through a strategy of never buying than
expecting and following through her actual strategy of buying at all prices.
Proposition 4.2 identifies a sense in which the firm’s sales are manipulative:
they lead the consumer to buy the product even though she would prefer
not to.10 Two caveats regarding this result are in order. First, the extreme
version of the result—that the firm does only harm to the consumer by selling
to her—clearly relies on our assumption that the firm knows the consumer’s
preferences perfectly. Consumers with much higher valuation than the range of
possible prices would clearly be better off buying than not buying.11 Second,
it matters what the consumer would do with the money if she did not buy
from this firm. Given that we assume linear consumption utility in money,
the implicit assumption in our model is that the consumer would spend her
money on an alternative divisible product which is available on the market at
a deterministic price. But if she would be manipulated into buying something
else from another firm, she might be better off buying from this firm.
4.5 Extensions and Modifications
In this section we discuss a number of further predictions of our framework.
9 Relatedly, with cost uncertainty the firm’s opportunity cost of delivering the product
could sometimes be greater than the highest possible price. This could occur either because
the firm itself faces high costs, or because it has another consumer with high valuation. In a
classical setting, the firm would not sell to the consumer in these contingencies. But in our
theory, not getting the product in some states reduces the consumer’s willingness to pay in
other states, so the monopolist may commit to selling even in situations in which it makes
losses from doing so.
10 Although we model neither multi-product retailers nor the wholesaler-retailer relation-
ship, Proposition 4.2 suggests that retailers may benefit less from sales than wholesalers:
if welfare-reducing manipulative sales induce some consumers to avoid visiting the retailer,
they lower profits from other wholesalers’ products. One would then expect wholesalers to
encourage the use of sales in their contracts with downstream retailers.
11 Nevertheless, even with consumer heterogeneity, some (marginal) consumers who buy
with positive probability would be better off making and following through a plan of never
buying. See our working paper (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi 2010b) for details.
132
               dc_785_13
4.5. EXTENSIONS AND MODIFICATIONS 133
4.5.1 Competition
Our main analysis focuses on the case of a monopolistic retailer. While the
general question of how competition affects pricing is beyond the scope of
the current paper, we discuss two simple forms of competition, showing that
our results on random sales rely on some amount of market power. First,
we consider perfect ex-ante competition for consumers, as for example when
consumers decide which supermarket or restaurant to frequent. Two retailers
simultaneously commit to their price distributions, and after observing the
distributions, the consumer decides which retailer to visit and forms expec-
tations about her consumption outcomes. We assume that if indifferent, the
consumer visits each firm with positive probability. Finally, a price is drawn
from each retailer’s price distribution, and the consumer decides whether to
buy at her previously chosen retailer’s price. We assume that the two retailers
have identical costs c < v, and that they use pure strategies (i.e., they do not
mix between distributions). Then:
Proposition 4.3. For any η > 0, λ > 1, the unique equilibrium with ex-ante
competition is for each firm to choose the deterministic price c.
Proposition 4.3 says that if there is perfect competition, firms do not use
a manipulative price distribution, but instead choose the deterministic price
equal to cost. The reason is simple: a manipulative price distribution would
lead the consumer to visit the other retailer.
Second, we discuss a form of imperfect competition. Suppose the monop-
olist faces a competitive fringe: there is a competitive industry producing a
substitute product that has a lower consumption value vf < v on the same
dimension as the monopolist’s product, the consumer is interested in buying at
most one of the products, and she decides which one to buy after seeing both
prices. The competitive fringe charges a low price pf ≤ (1 + η)vf/(1 + ηλ). In
this case, whatever the consumer had expected, she prefers to buy the fringe’s
good to not consuming. Hence, in any PE she buys one of the products, getting
intrinsic utility of at least vf . As a result, the firm’s problem can be thought
of as choosing the distribution of the price premium p− pf it charges for the
incremental consumption value v − vf . Therefore, the optimal price distribu-
tion is the same as that of a monopolist who sells a product of value v − vf ,
shifted to the right by pf—it has the same shape and probability of sales as
the optimal price distribution in our basic model, but it is more compressed.
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4.5.2 Price Stickiness
As has been intuited by researchers for a long time and shown for instance by
Sibly (2002) and Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008), consumer loss aversion often
creates “price stickiness”—an unresponsiveness of prices to changes in cost or
demand circumstances. While the main point of this paper is that loss aversion
can create the opposite incentive—to introduce uncertainty into a determinis-
tic environment despite facing a consumer who dislikes this uncertainty—we
conjecture that the price variation we identify in this paper is consistent with
stickiness in the regular price, and in price stickiness in a competitive environ-
ment. Intuitively, not only does a monopolist not need variation in the regular
price (as we explained above), it has an incentive to keep the regular price
sticky to induce the consumer to buy at the regular price in addition to the
sale prices. If the regular price was uncertain, the consumer would experience
a gain if it turned out relatively low and a loss if it turned out relatively high.
Due to loss aversion, she would feel the loss more heavily, making her less
willing to buy at an uncertain regular price. Similarly, because a consumer
dislikes uncertainty in the price, to attract her from a competitor a firm has
an incentive to eliminate variation in the price, leading to sticky prices under
ex-ante competition. These intuitions suggest that our model is consistent
with the puzzling combination of stickiness and flexibility in prices.
To demonstrate these forces toward price stickiness formally in our model,
it is necessary to introduce features that in a classical setting would lead to
price variation. A natural way to do so is to assume that demand is downward
sloping and the firm’s cost is uncertain. We have, however, been unable to
analyze models with these features in general, and even special cases raise
considerable technical issues. We describe here two restrictive cases we have
analyzed in detail in our working paper (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi 2010b). In the
monopoly case, we restrict attention to price distributions in which the prices
pL−αL, pL+αL, pH−αH , and pH+αH are charged with probabilities s/2, s/2,
(1 − s)/2, and (1 − s)/2, respectively. Constrained by the exogenous bound
α¯ > 0, the firm chooses s ∈ [0, 1), pL, pH , αL, and αH satisfying pH > pL + 2α¯
and 0 ≤ αL, αH ≤ α¯. In this setting, we show that if α¯ is sufficiently small,
the optimal price distribution has a sales-and-regular-prices structure (s > 0)
and a single regular price (αH = 0), and if in addition the firm’s marginal cost
is sufficiently narrowly distributed, sales prices are flexible (αL = α¯). These
findings contrast with those in the corresponding classical model, where for
sufficiently narrowly distributed costs sale prices would not be used (s = 0),
but the regular price would adjust to cost shocks (αH > 0).
In the competition case, we consider a variant of our model in Section 4.5.1
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in which there is a mass of consumers whose consumption value is distributed
continuously on the interval [0, v], with positive density everywhere, and the
firms have identical cost distributions uniformly distributed on the interval
[cL, cH ] with density d. We show that if d is sufficiently large, then for any ∆ >
0 the unique symmetric equilibrium is for each firm to choose the deterministic
price (cL + cH)/2.
12
4.5.3 Further Extensions and Modifications
An implicit assumption of our model above is that it is costless for the con-
sumer to observe the price in period 1. In contrast, consumers often have to
go out of their way to learn a particular product’s price. We formally analyze
a variant of our model with such price-discovery costs in our working paper
(Heidhues and Ko˝szegi 2010b) and demonstrate that for low price-discovery
costs, the limit-optimal price distribution is very similar to the one we find
in Proposition 4.1, with one important difference: the monopolist charges a
price of zero with small probability. Intuitively, the possibility of a “free sam-
ple” makes non-buying non-credible despite price-discovery costs because the
consumer—even if she had been expecting not to do so—would want to pay
the small price-discovery cost in period 1 to see whether she can get the free
sample.13 In contrast, when price-discovery costs are high, it becomes too
costly or impossible to manipulate the consumer into buying against her will
through a sales-and-regular-price strategy, so that the firm switches to deter-
ministic pricing. This is easiest to see when price-discovery costs are greater
than p: in this case, a strategy of never buying is always credible, so that
it is impossible to manipulate a consumer into buying against her will. Our
framework therefore has the novel prediction that sales are more likely when
price discovery costs are low. This is arguably the case in supermarkets for
the marginal consumer of any given product—so long as these consumers are
visiting the supermarket to buy other products anyhow—but is arguably not
12 Note that sticky pricing is not an equilibrium in this model when consumers have
classical reference-independent preferences, even if these consumers are risk-averse with
respect to the surplus from the transaction or the price to be paid for the product. If a firm
charges the deterministic price equal to average cost, its competitor can profitably deviate
by offering lower prices when its costs are lower, attracting some consumers whose value is
below the average cost.
13 While we provide an explanation for free samples, this prediction is not robust to
realistic variations of our model in which a free sample would generate extra money-losing
demand, for instance by attracting low-valuation consumers or by inducing consumers to
store. When these considerations are important, the firm will use a positive (but low) price
atom instead or switch to deterministic pricing.
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the case for many other retailers.
In our basic model, we have taken the representative consumer’s consump-
tion value v to be deterministic. Suppose instead that v is uncertain. We can
distinguish two cases, depending on whether the consumer knows v in advance
(in period 0). If she does not, then (although we have not analyzed such a
model in detail) the same forces as with cost uncertainty are likely to operate,
so that a qualitatively similar price distribution likely results. If the consumer
does know v in advance, then from the perspective of our model each v can
be thought of as a different pricing situation, in each of which the monopolist
chooses the optimal price distribution we have derived for that v. For example,
as we have discussed, if price-discovery costs are high our theory predicts a
(different) sticky price for each v. This prediction is consistent with matinees
in movie theaters and cyclical sales of many products for which the sale price
is also sticky. At the same time, our model does not explain why prices do not
seem to change in response to some other predictable changes in demand.
4.6 Related Theories of Sales
There is a considerable industrial-organization literature investigating why
firms engage in sales. The most important and most common explanation is
based on firms’ incentive to price discriminate between groups of consumers.
In Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel’s (1984) model of a durable-goods monopolist,
for example, a new cohort of heterogeneous consumers enters the market in
each period, and each consumer decides whether to buy the good immediately
or after some delay. In most periods the monopolist sells to high-valuation
buyers only, but in some periods it lowers its price to sell to the accumulated
low-valuation consumers.14 Intertemporal-price-discrimination models clearly
capture a realistic and important feature missing from our model, and in this
sense we view them as complementary to our theory.
There is also a set of models in industrial organization in which the oligopolis-
tic environment leads firms to play mixed strategies.15 In all of these papers,
each firm is left with a “captive” group of consumers who will not buy from a
14 Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984) assume that high-valuation consumers purchase
immediately unless the price exceeds their value. Sobel (1984, 1991) relaxes this assumption
and shows that stationary equilibria still involve price cycles, while a folk-theorem result
obtains for nonstationary equilibria. Pesendorfer (2002) shows that an intertemporal-price-
discrimination model with storage by consumers matches pricing and consumer behavior in
the market for ketchup quite well.
15 See, for example, Shilony (1977), Varian (1980) Gal-Or (1982), Davidson and Deneckere
(1986), Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992).
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cheaper rival, and a “non-captive” group for which firms engage in price com-
petition. In equilibrium, firms randomize between charging the monopoly price
for the captive consumers and competing for the non-captive consumers.16
A distinct testable implication of our model relative to most models of
sales above is that the monopolist makes higher profits at high prices than
at low prices. Intertemporal-price-discrimination models predict the opposite:
in those models, a low price today decreases future profits by inducing some
consumers to buy now rather than later, so that a firm is willing to set a low
price only if compensated by higher current profits. And by the nature of
a mixed-strategy equilibrium, mixed-strategy models predict equal profits for
low and high prices. While we are unaware of systematic empirical evidence on
profits in sale periods relative to regular-price periods, it seems plausible that
for at least some types of sales profits are higher at regular prices. For instance,
sales that are subject to strict “limited availability” presumably generate most
profits once the item on sale runs out.17 Furthermore, unlike our theory the
above models of sales do not seem to predict stickiness in the regular price
when demand is downward sloping and there are cost shocks.
Although in its current form our model is not intended as a basis for a
macroeconomic model studying monetary policy, in proposing a possible mech-
anism for sales and price stickiness it is related to such models. Kehoe and
Midrigan (2008) assume that there are two distinct kinds of prices, regular
prices and sale prices, and that there is both a menu cost associated with
changing the regular price, and a different and lower menu cost associated
with having an item on sale. Then, the regular price is sticky because it is
costly to change, but sale prices are not sticky because (conditional on having
a sale) they are costless to change. While Kehoe and Midrigan’s theory implies
a price distribution similar to ours, it leaves unanswered why there would be
16 In a model that is similar to the mixed-strategy oligopoly pricing models but in which
consumers’ purchase decisions are based on a naive sampling procedure, Spiegler (2012)
predicts a price pattern similar to ours.
17 One paper suggesting that sales can increase profits at higher prices is Slade (1999).
Slade investigates the prices set for saltine crackers by grocery stores in a small US town.
She allows own past prices to have either a negative or a positive effect on current demand.
The negative effect allows for the price-discrimination effects. The positive effect is meant to
capture a stock of goodwill, which she argues could arise through “consumer habit formation,
product awareness, or brand loyalty,” but might also be due to loss aversion as in this paper.
In her empirical implementation, she finds evidence that low past prices increase current
sales. At the same time, Anderson and Simester (2010) find that mail-order customers who
have recently bought an item at a high price and later see the item with its price deeply
reduced are less likely to order in the future, making sales with deep discounts unprofitable
in this industry.
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two different kinds of prices with different menu costs. Our theory provides
a kind of micro-foundation for these reduced-form assumptions, and makes a
variety of additional predictions on the effects of competition, price-discovery
costs, and other forces.18
Nakamura and Steinsson (2009) analyze a repeated price-setting game be-
tween a monopolist with privately known cost and a consumer with habit
formation. Because the consumer is more willing to consume the firm’s prod-
uct and develop a habit if she believes future prices will be low, the monopolist
would like to commit to relatively low future prices. As a result, the monopo-
list’s favorite Markov-perfect equilibrium is one in which it never selects prices
above a price cap. At the cap the price is unresponsive to cost, but below
the cap the price is fully responsive to cost. While Nakamura and Steins-
son (2009) do not analyze this possibility, it seems that there could well be
higher-profit non-Markov equilibria in which the firm compensates consumers
for high current prices by charging lower prices in the future. Furthermore,
unless pass-through is very high, their model (unlike ours) predicts frequent
sales of considerable magnitude only when there are frequent and considerable
changes in marginal costs. And because the price distribution is essentially the
distribution of short-run profit-maximizing prices censored at the price cap,
their model does not naturally predict a gap between the regular price and
sale prices, as our model does.
4.7 Conclusion
While our model provides a potential explanation for a number of pricing
patterns, there are some patterns it cannot explain. For instance, at many
establishments Persian rugs and furniture seem to be perpetually “on sale”
from an essentially fictitious “regular price” that is almost never charged. For
these products, consumers are unlikely to know the price distribution, and the
perpetual-sale strategy probably aims to manipulate consumers’ perceptions
about typical prices and quality. In addition, given that volume is for some
18 It is important to note, however, that—because gain-loss utility is based on consumption
utility and hence is defined over real variables—in our model the price would scale with
nominal variables, and our result on the stickiness of the regular price is stickiness in the
real rather than nominal regular price. This implies that in contrast to the above and
many other macroeconomic models, our model does not generate a force that in itself leads
to monetary non-neutrality. Whether and how variants of our model—e.g., one in which
consumers are loss-averse over nominal prices, and hence the nominal regular price is sticky—
lead to monetary non-neutrality, and whether and how loss aversion interacts with other
forces that can generate monetary non-neutrality, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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items much higher during sales than when the regular price is charged, it is
likely that storage on the part of consumers and intertemporal price discrim-
ination on the part of firms plays an important role in sales. An important
agenda for future research is to investigate how loss aversion interacts with
these other forces. For instance, it seems that loss-averse consumers’ dislike of
running out of the product or paying a lot for it could strengthen the storage
motive.
Appendix: Proofs
Some Preliminaries
First, we introduce some notation we will use throughout our proofs. For any
market price distribution Π, let p1 be the lowest price, p2 the second lowest,
etc... . Let ql be the probability that pl is charged. For notational convenience,
let Ql =
∑l
l′=1 ql′ and Pl = E[pl′ |l′ ≤ l].
For future reference, observe that the ex-ante expected utility when facing
a market price distribution Π and buying at all prices less or equal to pl is:
EU(pl; Π) = Qlv −QlPl − η(λ− 1)Ql(1−Ql)v (4.6)
− η(λ− 1)Ql(1−Ql)Pl − η(λ− 1)
l∑
l′=1
l′∑
l′′=1
ql′′ql′(pl′ − pl′′).
Finally, buying for all prices less or equal to pl is a personal equilibrium if,
given that the consumer expects to buy for all prices less than or equal to pl,
she prefers to buy at price pl and prefers not to buy at pl+1, where we set
pl+1 =∞ if pl is the highest price in the market price distribution. Hence, pl
is a personal equilibrium cutoff if and only if
pl ≤ 1 + η(1−Ql) + ηλQl
1 + ηλ
v +
η(λ− 1)
1 + ηλ
QlPl < pl+1. (4.7)
Discrete Version of Proposition 4.1
To establish Proposition 4.1, which is stated for the limit-optimal distribution,
we begin by stating and proving a version of the proposition for ∆ > 0 (that
is, not in the limit). To state the proposition as well as later results, we define
q∗(p) =
A∆
(v + p)
,
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where A ≡ (1 + ηλ)/(η(λ− 1)).
We first prove the following proposition:19
Proposition 4.4. For any η > 0, λ > 1, and ∆ satisfying 0 < ∆ < v − p,
if the firm can profitably sell to the consumer, then a profit-maximizing price
distribution exists, and induces purchase with probability one. In addition, for
any profit-maximizing price distribution, there exists a z > 0 such that the
distribution has atoms at p1, p2, p3, . . . , pz, and pz∗ > pz, where p − 2∆ <
p1 ≤ p, and for 2 ≤ l ≤ z, pl − pl−1 < 2∆. For l < z, the weight on atom pl is
ql = A(pl+1 − pl)/(v + pl), the weight on atom pz is qz < 2A∆/(v + pz), and
the weight on atom pz∗ is the complementary probability 1−
∑z
l=1 ql.
Proof. We begin by introducing the formal versions of what in the text we
call sale prices and regular prices. Let Qz ≥ 0 be the highest probability such
that in any PE, the consumer buys the product with probability of at least
Qz. Furthermore, let Qz∗ ≥ Qz be the probability with which she buys the
product. Let the corresponding cutoff prices (defined as the highest atoms on
the price distribution at which the consumer buys) be pz and pz∗ , respectively,
and let F be the optimal price distribution. We think of the prices up to and
including pz as the sale prices, and the higher prices as the regular prices.
Hence, Qz is the probability of buying on sale, and Qz∗−Qz is the probability
of buying at the regular prices.
It is useful to first outline the broad steps in our proof. There are two
major steps, and several substeps. The main parts of the proof correspond to
Steps 1 through 5 that provide the intuition for Proposition 4.1 in the text.
For technical reasons, however, the order of the steps is not exactly the same,
and there are also other steps.
Part A. We show that any profit-maximizing price distribution has the
properties identified in the proposition. We do so by showing that for any
other distribution, there is a distribution satisfying these properties that yields
higher profits. This is the key part of the proof. We will use the following
substeps:
A(i). We show that there must be a single atom on the interval (pz, pz∗ ]—
that is, there must be a single regular price. This corresponds to Step 5 in the
main text.
A(ii). We establish the (intuitively obvious) result that the consumer buys
with probability 1 (Qz∗ = 1).
19 Proposition 4.4 is stated for any ∆ > 0. For sufficiently small ∆ > 0, we know somewhat
more about the structure of the optimal price distribution. In particular, using the notation
of the proposition, in that case p1 = p, pl+1 − pl = ∆ for any l < z, and qz ≤ A∆/(v + pz).
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From here, the proof corresponds to Steps 1 through 4 of the intuition in
the text.
A(iii). We show that with a deterministic price, the firm cannot earn
revenue greater than v. (Step 1.)
A(iv). We show that if ∆ is sufficiently small, the firm charges at least two
prices with positive probability, establishing that Qz > 0. (Step 2.)
A(v). We show that the sale prices are at most 2∆ apart, and have the
property that if the consumer expected to buy up to some sale price, she would
just be willing to buy at the next sale price. (Step 3.)
A(vi). We establish that it is not optimal to set Qz = 1. (Step 4.)
Part B. We show that among price distributions satisfying the properties
of the proposition, a profit-maximizing price distribution exists.
Part A.
A(i). First, we show that there must be a single atom on the interval
(pz, pz∗ ] because otherwise, the monopolist could replace the stochastic prices
with a single higher average price without eliminating the PPE, increasing rev-
enues. To see this formally, suppose by contradiction that the optimal price dis-
tribution F puts positive weight on more than one atom in (pz, pz∗ ]. Consider a
new pricing distribution F ′ constructed from F by replacing the original prices
pz+1 through pz∗ with the average price pa =
(∑z∗
l=z+1 plql
)
/
(∑z∗
l=z+1 ql
)
, and
putting the rest of the weight on a single atom pa+1 above p = (1+ηλ)/(1+η).
Define Qa and Pa correspondingly to the notation above. Then, by construc-
tion Qz∗ = Qa and Qz∗Pz∗ = QaPa. Using that for the market price distribu-
tion F , pz∗ satisfies equation 4.7, one has
pa < pz∗ ≤ 1 + η(1−Qz∗) + ηλQz∗
1 + ηλ
v +
η(λ− 1)
1 + ηλ
Qz∗Pz∗ ≤ pz∗+1,
and since pa < pz∗ , this implies
pa <
1 + η(1−Qa) + ηλQa
1 + ηλ
v +
η(λ− 1)
1 + ηλ
QaPa < pa+1.
Hence, when facing the price distribution F ′ buying up to the price pa is a
personal equilibrium. Furthermore, it is easy to show using Equation 4.6 that
EU(pz∗ ;F ) < EU(pa;F
′), and by construction, EU(pl;F ) = EU(pl;F ′) for
any l < z∗. Thus buying for any price less or equal to pa is the PPE strategy
of the consumer when facing F ′. Continuity of both ex-ante and ex-post utility
with respect to pa implies that if the monopolist increases pa slightly the PPE
still involves the consumer buying for all prices less than or equal to pa. This
increases profits, a contradiction.
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A(ii). Second, we show by contradiction that Qz∗ = 1. Suppose Qz∗ < 1.
If the monopolist can profitably sell to the consumer, it must make a profit at
the highest price pz∗ at which the consumer buys in PPE. Now consider the
distribution F ′ constructed from F by moving the probability weight 1−Qz∗
from the prices above pz∗ to pz∗ . We show that the consumer buys for all
prices in the PPE for F ′, and, hence, this change increases profits, yielding a
contradiction. If z = z∗, it follows from Equation 4.7 that buying at all prices
is the unique PE with F ′. If z∗ > z, the above implies that z∗ = z + 1. In
addition, it follows from Equation 4.7 that buying at all prices is a PE after the
price change. Now using Equation 4.6 and the fact that with price distribution
F the consumer prefers the PE in which she buys up to pz∗ , one has
EU(pz;F ) = Qzv −QzPz − η(λ− 1)Qz(1−Qz)v
− η(λ− 1)Qz(1−Qz)Pz − η(λ− 1)
z∑
l′=1
l′∑
l′′=1
ql′′ql′(pl′ − pl′′)
≤ Qzv −QzPz + qz∗(v − pz∗)− η(λ− 1)(Qz + qz∗)(1−Qz − qz∗)v
− η(λ− 1)(1−Qz − qz∗)(QzPz + qz∗pz∗)
− η(λ− 1)
(
z∑
l′=1
l′∑
l′′=1
ql′′ql′(pl′ − pl′′) + qz∗
z∗∑
l=1
ql(pz∗ − pl)
)
= EU(pz∗ ;F ).
Rewriting using that
qz∗
z∗∑
l=1
ql(pz∗ − pl) = qz∗(Qzpz∗ −QzPz)
gives
0 ≤ qz∗(v−pz∗)−η(λ−1)
(
(qz∗(1−Qz)− qz∗Qz − q2z∗)v + (1− qz∗)qz∗pz∗ − 2qz∗QzPz
)
.
Dividing by qz∗ , one has
0 ≤ v − pz∗ − η(λ− 1) ((1− 2Qz − qz∗)v + (1− qz∗)pz∗ − 2QzPz) . (4.8)
As the right hand-side is increasing in qz∗ and we construct F
′ by moving the
probability weight 1 − Qz∗ from the prices above pz∗ to pz∗ , which increases
qz∗ , it follows that EU(pz;F
′) ≤ EU(pz∗ ;F ′). This completes the proof that
Qz∗ = 1.
Summarizing, so far we have shown that the optimal price distribution has
the following structure. The monopolist charges the prices p1 through pz with
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a total probability of Qz, and the price pz∗ with probability 1 − Qz, where
either z∗ = z or z∗ = z + 1. In addition, if z∗ = z, there is exactly one PE,
and if z∗ = z + 1, there are exactly two PE: one in which the consumer buys
up to price pz, and one in which she buys at all prices. Finally, in the PPE
the consumer buys at all prices. Our next goal is to show that in the optimal
price distribution, we have 0 < Qz < 1, so that z
∗ = z + 1 and z > 0. We
establish this by showing that the monopolist can earn greater revenue with
z∗ = z + 1 and z > 0 than with either z = 0 or z∗ = z.
A(iii). First, consider z = 0. In that case, the monopolist charges a
single deterministic price. Note that in any PE, the consumer gets what she
expected, so that her total utility is equal to her consumption utility.20 This
means that for any p > v, the ex-ante optimal strategy is not to buy. We show
that for such prices, not buying is a PE, so that it must be the PPE. Suppose
that the consumer had expected not to buy the product. If she buys, her
consumption utility is v−p, and her gain-loss utility—consisting of a gain of v
in the product and a loss of p in money—is ηv−ηλp. If she does not buy, both
her consumption utility and (as her outcomes conform to her expectations) her
gain-loss utility are zero. Hence, she is willing to follow a plan not to buy, and
therefore not buying is a PE, if and only if
p >
1 + η
1 + ηλ
· v ≡ p.
Since this inequality is satisfied for any p > v, at these prices it is a PE for
the consumer not to buy.
A(iv). We now establish that if ∆ < v − p, the firm charges at least
two prices with positive probability, so that z > 0. Recall that the optimal
deterministic price is v. To prove that the firm charges at least two prices
with positive probability, we construct a hybrid distribution with which the
monopolist earns expected revenue greater than v. Consider the distribution
that puts weight  > 0 on p and weight 1−  on
pz∗ = v +
2η(λ− 1)p
1 + η(λ− 1).
It is easy to check that (either directly or using Equation 4.10 below) that
for a sufficiently small  buying at both prices is the PPE. Hence, with this
20 In the current setting, there is no mixed-strategy PE because we have assumed that
whenever the consumer is indifferent between buying and not buying, she buys with prob-
ability 1.
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pricing distribution the firm’s revenue is:
(1− )v + (1− ) 2η(λ− 1)
1 + η(λ− 1)p+ p. (4.9)
For  = 0 the revenue is equal to v. Taking the derivative with respect to 
and evaluating it at  = 0 yields
−v + p(2η(λ− 1) + 1) = η(λ− 1) + 2η
2(λ− 1)
1 + ηλ
· v > 0.
A(v). Note that if z∗ = z + 1, then for the consumer to be willing to buy
at all prices, it must both be a PE to buy up to price pz∗ , and this strategy
must be preferred to the PE of buying only up to price pz. By Equations 4.7
and 4.8, the highest pz∗ at which this holds is
pz∗ = min
{
v + η(λ−1)
1+ηλ
QzPz
1− η(λ−1)
1+ηλ
qz∗
, v +
2η(λ− 1)QzPz
1 + η(λ− 1)Qz
}
(4.10)
Notice that that holding Qz fixed (which also fixes qz∗ = 1 − Qz), pz∗ is
increasing in QzPz. Hence, whether or not z
∗ = z or z∗ = z + 1, in order to
maximize profits the monopolist must maximize QzPz subject to the constraint
that the consumer buys with probability Qz in any PE. We next consider the
implications of this maximization problem.
Notice that for any price pl < pz on the support of the distribution, we
show by contradiction that it is optimal to charge pl with the lowest possible
probability such that the consumer is just willing to buy at the next price if
she had been expecting to buy at prices up to pl. Suppose this is not the case,
and consider shifting a little bit of weight from pl to pl+1. For a sufficiently
small shifted weight, Equation 4.7 implies that it will still be the case that in
any PE the consumer buys at all prices up to pz.
We now solve for the weight the monopolist must put on each price for the
the above property to hold for all l < z. That the consumer is just willing
to buy at price pl if she had been expecting to buy at prices up to pl−1 is
equivalent to
v−pl+η(1−Ql−1)v−ηλ(1−Ql−1)pl−ηλQl−1(pl−Pl−1) = −ηλQl−1v+ηQl−1Pl−1,
or
(1 + η + η(λ− 1)Ql−1)v − (1 + ηλ)pl + η(λ− 1)Ql−1Pl−1 = 0.
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The corresponding equation for the consumer to just be willing to buy at price
pl+1 is
(1 + η + η(λ− 1)Ql)v − (1 + ηλ)pl+1 + η(λ− 1)QlPl = 0.
Subtracting the latter equation from the former one and rearranging yields
ql =
(1 + ηλ)(pl+1 − pl)
η(λ− 1)(v + pl) =
A(pl+1 − pl)
v + pl
.
This completes the claim in the proposition regarding the weights ql for l < z.
Next, we establish that PrF (pz) < 2A∆/(v+pz). Suppose by contradiction
that PrF (pz) ≥ 2A∆/(v + pz). Then, if the monopolist set pz∗ = pz + 2∆, it
would be a unique PE for the consumer to buy at all prices. Hence, the optimal
price distribution must have pz∗ > pz + 2∆. Hence, the monopolist could
construct a new distribution F ′ from F in the following way. Let z′ = z + 1,
z∗′ = z∗+1, with the distribution F ′ created from F by shifting up the weight
PrF (pz)−A∆/(v+pz) from pz to pz+1 = pz+∆. Then, by the above calculation,
with F ′ the consumer buys up to pz+1 in any PE. Since Q′z′P
′
z′ > QzPz, this
contradicts that QzPz maximizes profits subject to the constraint that the
consumer buys with probability Qz in any PE.
Now we show that up to pz the atoms of the optimal price distribution
are spaced at intervals of less than 2∆. Suppose by contradiction that this is
not the case for the optimal price distribution F , so that for some l ≤ z − 1,
pl+1− pl ≥ 2∆. We construct the distribution F ′ from F in the following way.
We let z′ = z + 1 and z∗′ = z∗ + 1, we put an extra atom at pl + ∆, and let
q′l = A∆/(v + pl) and q
′
l+1 = ql −A∆/(v + pl), with the weights and positions
of the other atoms remaining the same. Since q′l+1 = A(p
′
l+2− p′l+1)/(v+ pl) >
A(p′l+2 − p′l+1)/(v + p′l+1), this maintains the property that in any PE the
consumer buys at all prices up to pz(= p
′
z+1). And since Q
′
z′P
′
z′ > QzPz, this
contradicts that QzPz maximizes profits subject to the constraint that the
consumer buys with probability Qz in any PE.
Next, we show that p − 2∆ < p1 ≤ p. Clearly, if p1 > p, there is a PE
in which the consumer does not buy. We are left to show that p1 > p − 2∆.
Suppose otherwise. Then, since p2 − p1 < 2∆, we must have p2 < p. Now we
construct the price distribution F ′ from F by moving the atom at p1 to p2.
This ensures that the consumer buys for all prices up to pz in any PE, and
has Q′z′P
′
z′ > QzPz, a contradiction.
A(vi). We are thus left to rule out that Qz = 1. Suppose, toward a
contradiction, that for an optimal price distribution F , Qz = 1. By A(iv),∑z
l=1 qlpl > v, and hence pz > v. By A(v), pz is such that if the consumer
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expected to buy at prices up to pz−1, she would just be indifferent between
buying and not buying at pz. Using Inequality 4.7, this means
pz =
1 + η(1−Qz−1) + ηλQz−1
1 + ηλ
v +
η(λ− 1)
1 + ηλ
Qz−1Pz−1. (4.11)
Notice that the above implies
pz <
1 + η(1−Qz) + ηλQz
1 + ηλ
v +
η(λ− 1)
1 + ηλ
QzPz = v +
η(λ− 1)
1 + ηλ
Pz.
Now consider a price distribution F ′ obtained from F by moving the atom at
pz to some p
′
z > pz, while leaving all other atoms and all weights unchanged.
By continuity of both sides in p′z, the above inequality implies that for p
′
z
sufficiently close to pz, it is a PE for the consumer to buy at all prices when
facing F ′. We now show that for p′z sufficiently close to pz, when facing F
′
the consumer prefers the PE of buying at all prices to the PE of buying only
up to price pz−1, so that always buying is the PPE. This completes the proof
because F ′ yields higher revenue than F , contradicting the optimality of F .
Using Expression 4.6, we want to show that
v − P ′z − η(λ− 1)
z∑
l′=1
l′∑
l′′=1
ql′′ql′(p
′
l′ − p′l′′) > Qz−1v −Qz−1Pz−1
− η(λ− 1)Qz−1(1−Qz−1)(v + Pz−1)− η(λ− 1)
z−1∑
l′=1
l′∑
l′′=1
ql′′ql′(p
′
l′ − p′l′′).
Rearranging, this is equivalent to
qzv− qzp′z + η(λ− 1)qz(1− qz)(v+Pz−1)− η(λ− 1)qz
(
z∑
l′′=1
ql′′(p
′
z − p′l′′)
)
> 0,
which, using that p′l′′ = pl′′ for l
′′ < z and therefore
∑z−1
l′′=1 ql′′p
′
l′′ = Qz−1Pz−1,
simplifies to
p′z < v +
2η(λ− 1)
1 + η(λ− 1)Qz−1Qz−1Pz−1.
Because the right-hand side of this inequality is strictly greater than the right-
hand side of Equation 4.11, this inequality must hold for p′z sufficiently close
to pz.
Part B.
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Suppose by contradiction that a profit-maximizing pricing distribution does
not exist. Then, since the firm’s profits are bounded, there must be a sequence
of price distributions F n such that the corresponding profits converge to the
supremum profit level pi∗. By the logic of Step I, for any pricing distribution
there is a corresponding pricing distribution with at least as high profits that
satisfies the properties of the proposition, and for which the highest price is
given by Equation 4.10. Hence, we can choose F n so that it satisfies these
properties.
Define by zn and zn∗ for each F n as above. Since pricing atoms must be
at least ∆ apart, and the consumer does not buy for any price about p, zn
and zn∗ both come from a finite set. Therefore, F n must have a subsequence
for which zn and zn∗ is constant. With slight abuse of notation, we assume
that F n already has this property. Then, by the diagonal method, it is easy
to show that F n has a subsequence in which the locations of all atoms and
all their weights converge. With another slight abuse of notation, we assume
that F n already has this property.
Now consider the limiting distribution of the sequence F n, F . By con-
struction, in any PE the consumer buys for any price up to pz. In addition, by
Equation 4.10, which is continuous in pl and ql, in PPE the consumer is willing
to buy also at pz∗ . Hence, when facing F , the PPE is for the consumer to buy
at all prices, so that the firm achieves profit level pi∗—a contradiction.
Proofs of Propositions in Text
Proof of Proposition 4.1.
Consider a sequence ∆n → 0 such that a sequence of corresponding optimal
pricing distributions F n converge in distribution. Define zn, pnl , q
n
l , and Q
n
zn
analogously to Proposition 4.4. Assume first that Qnzn converges to some s; we
will establish this below.
Trivially, as ∆ decreases the optimal profits must weakly increase since the
firm could always choose the same distribution as it did for a higher value of
∆. Also, the profits the monopolist can earn are bounded, so that there is
a limiting profit strictly greater than v. By the proof of Proposition 4.4, if
we had s = 0, then the limiting profit would be v, and if we had s = 1, the
limiting profits would be less than v. Hence, we can conclude that 0 < s < 1.
As in Proposition 4.4, consider the distribution on [p, pmax] with density
h(p) =
1 + ηλ
η(λ− 1)(v + p) =
A
v + p
.
Let the corresponding cumulative distribution function beH, and define pmax(s)
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so thatH(pmax(s)) = s. We now establish that for x ≤ pmax(s), F n(x)→ H(x)
as n → ∞; that is, in that part of the real line F n converges in distribution
H.
Since p − 2∆n < pn1 ≤ p, we have pn1 → p. We prove that pnzn → pmax(s).
We have
Qnzn =
zn∑
l=1
qnl = q
n
zn + A
zn−1∑
l=1
pnl+1 − pnl
v + pnl
= qnzn + A
zn−1∑
l=1
∫ pnl+1
pnl
1
v + p
dp+
∫ pnl+1
pnl
(
1
v + pnl
− 1
v + p
)
dp︸ ︷︷ ︸
 (4.12)
We work on the sum of the underbraced term:
zn−1∑
l=1
∫ pnl+1
pnl
(
1
v + pnl
− 1
v + p
)
dp =
zn−1∑
l=1
∫ pnl+1
pnl
p− pnl
(v + pnl )(v + p)
dp.
Notice that this is positive and (since pnl+1 − pnl < 2∆n) it is less than
zn−1∑
l=1
∫ pnl+1
pnl
2∆n
(v + pnl )(v + p)
dp <
zn−1∑
l=1
2(pnl+1 − pnl )∆n
v2
=
2(pnzn − pn1 )∆n
v2
,
which approaches zero as n→∞. Taking the limit of Equation 4.12, plugging
in that the sum of the underbraced terms approaches zero, and using that
qnzn → 0 as n→∞, we get
s = lim
n→∞
A
∫ pnzn
pn1
1
v + p
dp = lim
n→∞
A
∫ pnzn
p
1
v + p
dp.
This implies that pnzn → pmax(s) as n→∞.
Next, we show that for a sufficiently large n, we have pnzn+1 > pmax(s). We
know that pnzn satisfies the condition that if the consumer expected to buy up
to price pnzn−1, she would just be indifferent to buying at p
n
zn . This is equivalent
to
pnzn =
(1 + η + η(λ− 1)Qnzn−1)v + η(λ− 1)Qnzn−1P nzn−1
1 + ηλ
≤ (1 + η + η(λ− 1)Q
n
zn)v + η(λ− 1)QnznP nzn
1 + ηλ
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Given that pnzn → pmax(s) and Qnzn → s < 1, this and Equation 4.10 imply
that for a sufficiently large n, we have pnzn+1 > pmax(s).
Clearly, for any x ≤ p, H(x) = limn→∞ F n(x) = 0. Now take any x
satisfying p < x < pmax(s). So long as p
n
zn > x, which holds for n sufficiently
large, we have
F n(x) =
∑
l,pnl ≤x
qnl = A
∑
l,pnl ≤x
pnl+1 − pnl
v + pnl
= A
∑
l,pnl ≤x
∫ pnl+1
pnl
1
v + p
dp+
∫ pnl+1
pnl
(
1
v + pnl
− 1
v + p
)
dp︸ ︷︷ ︸
 . (4.13)
By the same argument as above, the sum of the underbraced term approaches
zero as n → ∞, and we must have maxl{pnl |pnl ≤ x} → x as n → ∞. Hence,
taking the limit of Equation 4.13, we have
lim
n→∞
F n(x) = A
∫ x
p
1
v + p
dp = H(x).
Finally, since for n sufficiently large pnzn+1 > pmax(s), limn→∞ PrFn(pmax(s)) =
0. This completes the proof that for x ≤ pmax(s), F n(x)→ H(x) as n→∞.
Next, notice that in order for F n to converge in distribution, the sequence
pzn+1 must converge. Let the limit be p. Applying Equation 4.10, p > pmax(s).
We have shown that the limiting distribution has the properties in the propo-
sition.
To conclude the proof, it remains to show that Qnzn converges. Suppose
by contradiction that it does not. Then, the sequence F n must have two
subsequences F n1 and F n2 such that Qn1zn1 and Q
n2
zn2 both converge, but to
different limits s1 and s2, respectively. Then, the above arguments imply that
F n1 and F n2 converge in distribution to different distributions: the limit of
F n1 is distributed continuously on [p, pmax(s1)] and has an isolated atom, while
the limit of F n2 is distributed continuously on [p, pmax(s2)] and has an isolated
atom. But this means that the sequence F n does not converge in distribution,
a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. From the proof of Proposition 4.4, for ∆ <
v − p the consumer buys the product with probability one at an expected
price strictly greater than v. Hence, her consumption utility is negative. Fur-
thermore, in any PE expected gain-loss utility is non-positive. If she follows
through a plan of never buying, both her consumption utility and her gain-loss
utility are zero.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3. We first show that firms earn zero expected
profits in equilibrium. Suppose otherwise. Then, we can assume without loss
of generality that firm 1 earns weakly lower profits than firm 2, so that firm
2 earns positive expected profit. To make positive expected profit, firm 2
must attract the consumer with positive probability. Let F2 be firm 2’s price
distribution, with price atoms p21, . . . , p
2
S, and weight q
2
s on p
2
s. Similarly to
above, let p2z be the highest price at which the consumer buys in any PE,
and p2z∗ the highest price at which she buys with positive probability. We
distinguish two cases.
First, suppose p2z∗ = p
2
z. Then, consider the price distribution F1 obtained
from F2 by shifting all prices up to p
2
z down by  > 0, and putting the rest
of the weight on any price strictly greater than (1 + ηλ)v/(1 + η). Then, the
consumer’s unique PE when facing price distribution F1 is to buy up to the
price p2z − . In addition, the consumer’s ex-ante expected utility is strictly
higher under F1 than under F2, so that firm 1 attracts the consumer with
probability 1. For a sufficiently small  > 0, this deviation therefore increases
firm 1’s expected profits, contradicting equilibrium.
Second, suppose that p2z∗ > p
2
z. Consider the price distribution F1 obtained
from F2 by (i) keeping the prices and weights up to p
2
z the same; (ii) replacing
the prices p2z+1, . . . , p
2
z∗ with a single atom at the average p
1
z+1 = (q
2
z+1p
2
z+1 +
· · · + q2z∗p2z∗)/(q2z+1 + · · · + q2z∗)− ; (iii) putting the rest of the weight on any
price strictly greater than (1+ηλ)v/(1+η). The consumer’s unique PPE when
facing the price distribution F1 is to buy up to the price p
1
z+1, and in this PPE
the consumer obtains ex-ante expected utility strictly greater than that when
facing F2. Hence, firm 1 attracts the consumer with probability 1. For a
sufficiently small  > 0, this deviation therefore increases firm 1’s expected
profits, contradicting equilibrium. This completes the proof that firms earn
zero expected profits in equilibrium.
To complete the proof, we show that firms charge a deterministic price
of c in equilibrium. Observe that if the consumer goes to a firm that makes
zero expected profits, the consumer’s ex-ante expected utility is weakly lower
than v − c: the consumer’s expected consumption utility is at most v − c,
and by Expression 4.6 her gain-loss utility is non-positive. Furthermore, if the
consumer faces a stochastic price, by the same logic (and using that in that
case she faces uncertainty either in the product or in the price dimension) her
ex-ante expected utility is strictly lower than v − c.
Now suppose, toward a contradiction, that firm 2 charges a (non-degenerate)
stochastic price. Then, the consumer cannot strictly prefer firm 1 to firm 2: if
this was the case, then by the above observation the ex-ante expected utility
the consumer would obtain from firm 2 would be strictly lower than v− c; but
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in that case, firm 1 could make positive profits by offering a deterministic price
of c +  for a sufficiently small  > 0. Because the consumer does not strictly
prefer firm 1, the consumer visits firm 2 with positive probability. Again by
the above observation, then, firm 2 gives the consumer an ex-ante expected
utility strictly below v−c. Hence, once again firm 1 has a profitable deviation,
a contradiction.
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